



THE
BY

10/10/10

Brian Hodgson at the Kathmandu Residency

1825-1843

by

K.L.Pradhan

SPECTRUM PUBLICATIONS

GUWAHATI: DELHI

Throughout the 19th century, the British Political Officers resident in Asia and Africa, had important roles to play, in the relationship between the Imperial authorities and the native states. The position and functions of the residents, however varied depending upon the kind of dominance exercised over a particular State. In the case of Nepal, political relations began with the establishment of a British Residency in Kathmandu by the Treaty of Sagauli (1816) which clearly stated the functions of the Resident as an Ambassador accredited to an independent State.

The book gives a vivid account of the Nepali political system after the unification of Nepal and the historical background of the relations with British India during the period 1823-1843. Focus on Sir Brian Houghton Hodgson's initial interest in Gorkha recruitment and on Himalayan trade are covered in this book, which is also an attempt to present a comprehensive and critical analysis of the relationship between Hodgson and the Nepalese Government.

The book also discusses in detail the attitude of Hodgson towards the *Mukthiar* and the nature and extent of his involvement in the internal politics of Nepal, and his attempts to assert his power at par with the Residents of the Indian native states. However, circumstances prevented Hodgson from playing a decisive role in establishing British paramountcy in Nepal.

Published by

SPECTRUM PUBLICATIONS

***Panbazar Main Road, Post Box No 45,**

GUWAHATI-781001, Assam

***298-B Tagore Park Extn.,**

Model Town -1

DELHI-110009

First Published in 2001.

© Author

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be used, reproduced or translated in any manner, by any media whatsoever, without written permission, except in the case of brief quotations for critical articles or reviews. Please address all enquiries to the publishers.

ISBN 81-87502-15-0

SOLE DISTRIBUTORS

united publishers

H.O. PANBAZAR MAIN ROAD. GUWAHATI-781001

Tel. (0361)544791, Cables. UNIPUB, email: unipub@gwl.dot.net.in

unipub@gwl.dot.net.in

S.O. LG-6 Akarshan Bhavan, 23 Ansari Road, New Delhi-110002.

Tel. (011)324-1471

Published by Krishan Kumar on behalf of Spectrum Publications
and Printed in India at D.K. Fine Art Press, DELHI - 110052

Dedicated to My Parents

CONTENTS

	<i>Page</i>
<i>Frontispiece</i> Sir Brian Houghton Hodgson, An Artist's impression	ii
<i>Preface</i>	xiii
<i>Abbreviations</i>	xvii
Chapter I INTRODUCTION	1
Nepal—Location and People : The unification under Prithivi Narayan Shah: The new aristocracy; the Maharaja—the Darbar—the Bharadars, their functions, com- position; factional politics: Emer- gence of Bhim Sen Thapa: Early Anglo-Nepalese Relations-Anglo- Gorkha War (1814-1816): Treaty of Sagauli (1816) British gains and establishment of Residency (1816): Hodgson as Assistant Resident—his initial interests on Himalayan regions.	
Chapter II EARLY YEARS (1825-1833)	15
The Company and the Gorkha soldier; Gorkha militarism- Hodgson's suggestion for recruit- ing surplus soldiers-inducement to trade: Extradition agreement proposed to prevent border crimes-negateated by the Gov- ernment of India: Nepal's impor- tance for trade with Central Asia and China- its political advan- tages: Hodgson's studies of the military tribes, their recruitment	

again proposed: Hodgson and the Residency-effort to assert Resident's position-reasons thereof-Government of India's caution.

- Chapter III HIMALAYAN TRADE (1834-1835) 42
Efforts to assert position continued-question of direct access to the Maharaja, attitude of Darbar views of Government of India: Proposal for trade revived-suggestion to remove barriers, violation of Commercial Treaty of 1792- the question of its enforcement: Hodgson's suggestion—negativated by Government of India and Hodgson censure: Commercial Treaty rejected by the Darbar- protested by Hodgson-reasons for new agreement analysed: Draft Treaty—its provisions—rejected by the Board of Control.
- Chapter IV FALL OF BHIM SEN THAPA 64
(1835-1837)
Growing opposition to Bhim Sen Thapa—his attempt against the Maharaja : Mission to India proposed, the motives—the Maharaja's stand: Maharani Samrajya Lakshmi determination; Mission failed-Bhim Sen's consequent attitude towards boundary: Thugi problems and the question of trade: The opposition-Hodgson's analysis of its nature, possibility of intercession mooted: Rajendra gradually consolidated his authority: Removal of Bhim Sen Thapa.

Chapter V	<p>HODGSON, AUCKLAND AND DARBAR POLITICS (1837-1839) Situation in Darbar—Hodgson disillusionment—Recommended firm action against the Darbar: Lord Auckland's Minute—his caution to Hodgson: Ranjung Pande and Anti-British intrigues: Rangnath as Mukhtiar—intrigues continued: defensive measures proposed—army observation on the frontier : Hodgson impatience—Nepalese agents recalled from the plains: Intrigues renewed counter-measures proposed: Opposition politics in the Darbar—proposed intervention negatived by the Government of India—non-intervention insisted upon—Lord Auckland's observation on Nepal.</p>	85
Chapter VI	<p>TENTATIVE INTERVENTION (1839-1841) Hodgson's worries—circumstances leading to the Engagement of 6 November 1839; Panda politics and breach of Engagement—attitude of the Government of India: Events of April-June 1840—Gorkha occupation of Ramanagar-mutiny in Kathmandu: Lord Auckland demanded immediate withdrawal of troops—ultimatum to Nepal and military preparations: Rajendra's submission—the settlement of November 1840: Ranjuh Pande removed—followed by removal of anti-British <i>Bharadars</i>: Hodgson's pro-</p>	113

British ministry at work-Lord Auckland's caution against extending protection to the ministry: Rajendra's last bid-turmoil in the North-West observations.

Chapter VII	ELLENBOROUGH AND HODGSON'S RECALL (1841-1843)	139
	British influence at its height in Darbar-Troops withdrawn from the frontier: Fresh problems created by Heir Apparent: Mathbar Singh's plan of Gorkha-Sikh alliance-Hodgson's observation thereof: Lord Ellenborough disapproval of Hodgson's methods, including support to Fateh Jung's ministry—instructions to withdraw from Darbar entanglement: Implementation of policy of non-interference: Decision to recall Hodgson-request for extension refused—Hodgson's resignation and departure: Subsequent career.	
Epilogue		163
Appendices		
A.	Treaty of Commerce, 1792	171
B.	Treaty of Friendship and Alliance, 1801	174
C.	Treaty of Sagauli, 1816	180
D.	Memorandum Relating to the Restoration of Terai, 1816	183
E.	On the Military Tribes of Nepal	186
F.	On the Commerce of Nepal	198
G.	Draft of Agreement, 1832	241
H.	Draft for New Commercial Treaty, 1835	243

I. Draft Letter from the Governor General of India to the Maharaja of Nepal, 1837	246
J. Translation of an Engagement under Red Seal in the form of Letter from the Maharaja of Nepal to the Resident, 6 November 1839.	248
K. Lal Mohur (Red Seal) by the Rajah of Nepal to Maharani, 1 January 1843	250
L. Fauna of Nepal by S.H. Prater, C.M.Z.S.	252
<i>Glossary</i>	259
<i>Bibliography and Source Materials</i>	262
<i>List of illustrations</i>	
1. The wooden house from which Kathmandu takes its name	4
2. Sketch map showing trade route-western Tibet	26
3. Sketch map showing trade route: Bengal and Central Tibet	28
4. Sketch map showing trade route—Sikkim	29
5. Photograph of Brian Hodgson	33
6. Sketch map of Tibet and neighbouring areas	275

PREFACE

While the studies on India's frontier regions have begun to focus upon the relationship between the Centre and the periphery, the specific rule of British residents, with the exception of Walter Desai's *History of British Residency in Burma, 1826-1840*, has not been sufficiently emphasised so far. In the particular area of Nepal, with which this study is concerned Anirudha Gupta's *Politics in Nepal*; Satish Kumar's *Rana Politics in Nepal*; M.S. Jain's *The Emergence of New Aristocracy in Nepal, 1837-1858* and Ludwig F. Stiller's *The Silent Cry: The People of Nepal 1816-1839* provide a valuable background or understanding of the political system in Nepal in which the British residents worked and which not unoften shaped their attitude and policies. B.D. Sanwal's *Nepal and East India Company*; Rama Kant's *Indo-Nepalese Relations* and K. Mojumdar's *Anglo-Nepalese Relations in the Nineteenth Century*, are more concerned with the problems and Anglo-Nepalese Relations than with the formulation and execution of policy at any particular time or by any particular individual. Sir William Hunter's *Life of Brian Houghton Hodgson* although based on the latter's private papers is the work of a friend and lacked objectivity.

The present study is an indepth analytical attempt to focus the problems and policies of Brian Hodgson in Kathmandu from the time he joined as Assistant Resident in 1825 to his recall in 1843. The work begins with Hodgson's early years in Kathmandu and his showing keen interest in Gorkha recruitment in the British army and on Himalayan trade. The next chapter deals with Hodgson's attempts at the development of Trans-Himalayan trade through Kathmandu. An attempt is also made to critically analyse the relations between Hodgson and Mukhtiar Bhim Sen Thapa. The gradual change in Hodgson's attitude towards the Darbar, after the fall of Bhim Sen Thapa and his

unsuccessful attempt at persuading the Governor General Lord Auckland to abandon the non-intervention policy is examined in the next chapter.

The circumstances leading to his active interference and nature and extent of his involvement in the internal affairs of the kingdom has been studied in detail in chapter six. Lord Ellenborough's non-intervention policy and relations with the Resident and the latter's recall are discussed in the final chapter. In the epilogue, a critical attempt has been made to evaluate Hodgson's lasting contributions. The introduction provides the geographical and political background and a survey of British relations with Nepal.

The work is based primarily on unpublished Government documents and private papers of Governor Generals and Residents available on microfilm in the National Archive of India, and Nepal. Personal diaries, records, memoirs, accounts and contemporary writings where available have been used. A selected bibliography is appended at the end of the volume.

I would like to express my deep sense of gratitude to Prof. Imdad Hussain, Département of History, NEHU., Shillong under whose able guidance and supervision the present work was completed. He was kind enough to extend all possible help to me as and when I encroached upon his precious time. He has all along been a source of inspiration to me in my endeavour to explore the important area of the study.

During the course of my data collections, I had free access to the archival documents in New Delhi, Calcutta and Kathmandu. I am grateful to the respective authorities for allowing me to consult the relevant materials available.

I also owe a great deal to Shri Vanlallianzula, Shri N.R. Pun, Shri C.S. Pradhan, P.K. Pradhan and my colleagues for helping me in several ways in the completion of this work. It would be gross injustice on my part if I don't thank my wife Lalthazuali not only for moral support but also for bearing difficulties at home during my absence.

(xv)

Finally I would like to thank Shri Krishan Kumar and Spectrum Publications, Guwahati for their full cooperation in printing and publication.

K.L. Pradhan

ABBREVIATIONS USED

AR	—	Asiatic Researches.
BMM	—	British Museum Additional Manuscripts
BPP	—	Bengal Past and Present
BS	—	Bikram Sambat
COD	—	Court of Directors
FMPR	—	Foreign Miscellaneous Political Records
FN	—	Footnotes
FPC	—	Foreign Political Consultations
FSC	—	Foreign Secret Consultations
HJ	—	<i>Himalayan Journal</i>
HM	—	Hodgson's Manuscripts
IPD	—	Indian Political Despatch
JAS	—	<i>Journal of Asian Studies</i>
JASB	—	<i>Journal of Asiatic Society of Bengal</i>
JBORS	—	<i>Journal of Bihar and Orissa Research Society</i>
JRAS	—	<i>Journal of Royal Asiatic Society</i>
JHR	—	<i>Journal of Historical Research</i>
NAI	—	National Archives of India
NEN	—	Narrative of Events in Nepal
NWP	—	Papers relating to Nepal War,
OQM	—	<i>Oriental Quarterly Magazine</i>
P&HC	—	Proceedings of Indian Historical Congress
P&HRC	—	Proceedings of Indian Historical Research Commission
SRGH	—	Selection of Records from Government of Bengal.
ZSP	—	Zoological Society Proceedings

CHAPTER-I

INTRODUCTION

The Kingdom of Nepal lies to the north of India, between 80° 15'E - 88° 19'E east longitude and 26° 20'N - 30° 10'N north latitude, and is bounded by the river Mahakali in the west and by the river Mechi in the east. The northernmost part of the country, the great Himalaya region, is entirely mountainous. There are at least eighteen passes in the central Himalaya range that formed the easiest channels of communications between Nepal and Tibet. The important Tibetan trading centres, Kerong and Kuti, were situated on two of these passes. Below this region, in the central midlands, were the valleys, the main centres of habitation and extensive cultivation. The southernmost strip of territory is known as the Terai which forms the immediate zone between the Gangetic plains of India and the Siwalik range.¹

According to Nepalese traditions and history, the Kirats were the earliest inhabitants of the Kingdom, now represented by the Limbus and Rais of Eastern Nepal. The Lepchas of Eastern Nepal are also said to have lived there for as long as the Limbus. The Bhajangi and Dotiyal ethnic groups of West-

-
1. For geographical location of Nepal, see Karan, P.P. *Nepal: A Sultural Geography*, Lexington (1960); Karan, P.P., and Jenkins, J.W., *The Himalayan Kingdoms: Bhutan, Sikkim and Nepal*, Princeton (1963), pp. 79-88; Mason, K., "A Note on the Nepal Himalaya, HJ (1934); Hodgson, B.H., "On Physical Geography of Himalayas, JASB. August (1849), pp. 761-781; Hunter, W.W., *Imperial Gazetteer of India*, Vol. XIX; Oxford (1896); Bose, S.C., *Geography of Himalaya*, New Delhi (1984), pp. 153-172.

ern Nepal, who closely resemble the ethnic groups of Kumaon are said to have migrated there from the plains via Kumaon. The Chepangs, a nomadic tribe living near the confluence of the Kali, Seti and Trisuli rivers are an indigenous group. In the central valley of Nepal live the Newars.* The western and west-central regions are inhabited by the tribes of Mongoloid origins, Gurungs, Magars and Bhutiyas, the first-two providing the bulk of the Gorkha soldiery. The Tharus and Boksas who live in the swampy and malarious Terai strip between India and Nepal claim to have migrated from Rajasthan and have a strong Indian admixture. The Sherpas and Bhutiyas of Nepal's northern borderland are immigrants from Tibet.²

Hinduism is now the State religion of Nepal. Buddhism which had a strong hold in the Central Valley before the twelfth century is so deeply mixed up with Hinduism that it is difficult to draw a line between the two religions.³ The official language—Nepali (or Gorkhali or Eastern Pahari) is akin to Kumaon and thus belongs to the Hindu branch of Indo-Aryan speech; but much of the peasantry speaks one or other of the Tibeto-Burman dialects.⁴


Modern Nepal has, however, a fairly recent history dating from the later half of the eighteenth century when the Gorkhas subjugated the Bagmati Valley and established themselves as rulers. Prior to this the kingdom was divided into a number of warring principalities. In the Western region from Kathmandu Valley to the Mahakali river, there were at least forty-six separate principalities. These were

* Newars are supposed to be the aboriginals of Nepal. They are the main section of the population that is engaged in trade and commerce.

2. Karan, P.P., *op.cit.*, pp.63-67; Hodgson, B.H., "Origin and Classification of the Military Tribes of Nepal", JASB, Vol. II (1833), pp. 217-224; *On the Chepang and Kusunda Tribes of Nepal* JASB, Vol. XVII (1857), p. 650; Sinha, A.C., *Studies in the Himalayan Communities*, New Delhi (1984), pp. 2-4; Bista, D.B., *People of Nepal*, Kathmandu, 1967.
3. For example, the Newars follow both Buddhism and Hinduism, Ram Rahul, *The Himalayan Borderland*, New Delhi (1970).
4. Spake, O.K., Learmouth, A.T.A. and Farmer, B.H., *India Pakistan and Ceylon: The Regions*, Part IV, New Delhi (1967 Reprint), pp. 464-471.

traditionally divided into loose confederacies called *Chaubisi* in the Gandaki region and *Baisi* in the Karnali region. Besides them, the Kathmandu Valley was ruled by the Malla Kings. Gorkha was a small enclave in the *Chaubisi*, but taking advantage of existing disturbances, Prithvi Narayan Shah (1722-75) one of the greatest rulers and founder of present Nepal, gradually subdued all his neighbours and just before he died annexed Kathmandu Valley.⁵ Gradually, more than three decades of Gorkha expansionism brought under central control for the first time, communities and territories with diverse political and social system. The principalities to the West of Kathmandu with political and social structure similar to Gorkhas were rapidly absorbed. Others were left with a measure of local autonomy as chiefdoms or *rajyas*. Unlike the western hills, the eastern region was inhabited by tribal communities with 'ill-defined' decentralised political systems. Little is known of the manner of their absorption by the Gorkhas. But apparently, they were left with a measure of autonomy considerably greater than those of the chiefdoms.⁶ What the Gorkhas achieved in those years was merely the creation of the basic territorial and political framework for complex political, social, economic, administrative factors prevented the integration of the various disparate elements into one nation.⁷ While this process was going on; important political developments were taking place around Kathmandu which were to have far-reaching consequences for the emerging kingdom.

-
5. Regmi, D.R., *Modern Nepal*, Calcutta (1961), pp. 1-42; Stiller F. Ludwig, *The Rise of the House of the Gorkha*, Patna (1973); Hasrat, B.J., *History of Nepal*, Punjab (1971), pp. 134-143.
 6. Treaty of friendship seems to have been established with these tribal chiefs., Thus in Limbuana, the territory of Limbus in the eastern district bordering Sikkim, the chief or Subhah was granted status as Kathmandu's representative in his district with greater power than *rajyas* or centrally appointed Governor. Rose, Loe E. and Scholz, J.T., *Nepal: A Profile of Himalayan Kingdom*, New Delhi (1980), p. 9; Rengmi, M.C., *A Study of Nepali Economic History*, New Delhi (1971) pp. 1-14.
 7. Terai constitutes the biggest problem to national integration. For a recent study of the problems and its economic dimension, see Faige, F.H., *Regionalism & National Unity in Nepal*, California, 1975.



The Wooden House From which Kathmandu Takes its Name

The transfer of the capital from Gorkha to Kathmandu resulted not only in the creation of a new political and administrative system but also of a new elite structure. A large number of families from Gorkha established themselves in Kathmandu and became leaders, at least in the beginning, of the Shah Darbar. Other high-caste families from other absorbed principalities soon followed and became part of the new elite and together dominated the Shah Darbar. On these families were based various political factions, rivalries between whom dominated Darbar politics till 1846.

The Maharaja was the head of the State and exercised supreme authority in civil and military administration.⁸ His decisions were always final and binding. The Maharaja was regarded as an incarnation of God Vishnu of Nepal. His monarchy was absolute in theory but limited in practice but at times he was a mere puppet in the hands of

8. Shrestha, M.K., *A Hand Book of Public Administration in Nepal*, Nepal (1965), p. 2.

the dominant faction in his own Darbar.⁹ The Maharaja was assisted by the body of *Bharadars* drawn mainly from the family based aristocracy.¹⁰ This was probably intended to be a consultative body, but in course of time became the single most important institution in the process of decision making of the kingdom. They were the Maharaja's councilors or ministers and "together ran the administration, fought battles, manoeuvred diplomacy and concluded or broke peace and treaties in the name of the king".¹¹ Hamilton writing in 1816 says:

The *Bharadari* or the great council of the Raja attends him in the Darbar, *Rajdhani* or place to transact business, and which frequently acts without his presence. It ought to consist of twelve members but some of the places are often vacant; and, at other times, the persons who hold them have so little influence that they neglect or avoid giving their attendance. At other times, again, on business of the utmost emergency, a kind of assembly of the notables is held, in which men who have neither office nor any considerable influence in the Government are allowed to speak very freely . . . nor does the court seem ever to be controlled by the opinions advanced in these assemblies.¹²

It is likely that in the beginning the structure of *Bharadars* was hierarchical with clearly defined functions

-
9. Rose and Scholz, *op.cit.*, p. 21. Basically, the political system of Gorkha was military and despotic in character and their administrative set up was based on the interaction between the groups of Thar Ghar Comprised of Influential persons of the various high-castes.
 10. Gupta, A.R., *Politics in Nepal*, New Delhi (1964), pp. 6-8. These *Bharadars* were granted *Jagirs* and *Birtas* on hereditary basis for their rendering services to the Govt. in lieu of emoluments.
 11. Regmi, D.R., *op.cit.*, p. 280.
 12. Hamilton, Francis, *An Account of the Kingdom of Nepal*, Edinburgh (1819), p. 106.

of every member.¹³ But during the period under review, these are blurred and from Bhim Sen Thapa onwards the *Mukhtiarship* was the most important office which in 1843 Mathbar Singh Thapa officially styled as Prime Minister.

The composition of the *Bharadars* clearly reveals its family basis. They were the royal family; the *Chautriyas* or the royal collectoral branch; the Thapas; the Basnists and the Pandes. But often these families or factions were subdivided into smaller groups. For example, among the Pandes there were the Kala Pande and the Gora Pande who were always aligned on opposite sides.¹⁴ Among the *Bharadars*, there was a constant struggle for power. Hence, it was seldom possible for them to form successful coalition governments. Opposition was sometimes eliminated through assassination but not unoften by expulsion. Besides, these factions, the *Brahmins* and the Newars generally found a place in the Darbar. The former's role as *Guru* or priests to the Darbar families gave them a fairly high position in administrative decisions and they later monopolised the state legal system. The Newars were accommodated in the Darbar for their economic and administrative skills, acquired since the time of the Mallas, which were vital for the economic stability of the kingdom.

The emergence of a new aristocracy and the hereditary monarchical system brought new complications and tensions in Nepali political life. Perhaps, the most unfortunate was the division within the royal family. The queen, as a result of the practice of having more than two wife, the sons and the other members of the royal family tended to work at cross-purposes making manipulation of the royal family by some faction or the other both possible and re-

13. Krikpatrick, *An Account of Kingdom of Nepal*, Reprinted New Delhi (1975). He gives the following list of the officials according to their seniority-The *Chautriyas*, The *Kazis*, The *Sirdars*, The *Kharidars*, The *Kappardars*, The *Khazanchi*, The *Thaksali*, The *Dharamdhikar*, The *Bichari*, The *Dittha* and The *Subahs*.

14. During the period under review, the Kala Pandes were the most important, the Gora Pande being insignificant. The Pandes therefore refers only to the Kala Pande.

warding. The system was further complicated by the fact that a minor was on the throne from 1777 to 1847.¹⁵ "The process of the Government during the period", it has been rightly remarked, "were actually controlled by the Regent and or *Mukhtiar* (minister) and the alliance of political factions provided them with a support".¹⁶ The period also witnessed administrative malpractice and nepotism among the *Bharadars*. These *Bharadars* were so divided among themselves and the Maharaja being a minor, the country was at a time on the verge of anarchy. Towards the end of eighteenth century, intense struggle between the various factions characterised the central politics in Kathmandu, the scene being dominated alternatively by the Pandes and Thapas.

In 1799, the internal political crisis forced Maharaja Rana Bahadur Shah to abdicate his throne in favour of his minor son Girwan Juddha Vikram. Damodar Pande, the leader of the Pande faction assumed the responsibilities of the administration with the help of Regent Junior Maharani. But soon the political setting of Nepal took a dramatic turn. In February 1803, Maharani Rajrajeshwari Devi, who had accompanied Ranabahadur Shah to exile in Benaras returned to Nepal and assumed charge as Regent. She appointed Damodar Pande as *Mukhtiar*. In the following year, Rana Bahadur Shah returned. But Damodar Pande who attempted to prevent the Maharaja found the army against him. He was removed and executed.¹⁷

Despite the elimination of Damodar Pande and his principal supporters in 1804, the situation to the Darbar remained explosive. Factional rivalries were so intense that it was a year before Rana Bahadur could finally manoeuvre his appointment as Regent. His efforts to use complete authority against his enemies, however, culminated in his own assassination in 1806. It was out of this chaos, that Bhim Sen Thapa emerged to quickly and effectively remove the

15. Shrestha, M.K., *op.cit.*, pp. 2-3.

16. Rose and Schols, *op.cit.*, p. 22.

17. Oldfield, H.A., *op.cit.*, pp. 180-185.

opposition faction* and appointed the third queen Tripura Sundari Devi as Regent. Immediately after assumption of power, all important posts in the civil and military administration were filled up by the Thapa families. Favoured by the minority of Girwan Juddha Vikram (1799-1816) and Rajendra Vikram Shah (1816-1847), Bhim Sen was able to establish full control over the administration of the kingdom.¹⁸

The East India Company was however aware of the commercial importance of the Himalaya regions even before they had fully consolidated their position in Bengal. After the grant of the Dewani (1765) the company's officials came into contact with the Newars, and from them learnt of a flourishing trade between Bengal and Tibet through Nepal.¹⁹ When Gorkha expansionism under Prithvi Narayan Shah towards the Kathmandu Valley in 1767 threatened the closure of this trade, the British at once responded to a call for help from Jaya Prakash Malla, the Raja of Kathmandu and sent a military force under Captain Kinloch. Gorkha conquest of the Valley was, however, completed before Kinloch reached Kathmandu. The Company realising the folly of antagonising the Gorkhas adopted a conciliatory attitude. The Court of Directors too developed an interest in the region and enquired on 11 February 1768, "Whether trade can be opened with Nepaul, and whether cloth or other European commodities may find their way from thence to Tibet, Lhasa and Western parts of China".²⁰ In June 1770, James Logan was accordingly deputed to Kathmandu to in-

* It is said that seventyseven persons were either murdered or executed in the aftermath of the assassination and the Thapas emerged as the dominant influence in the Darbar for thirty years.

18. Hunter, W.W., *Life of Brian Houghton Hodgson*, London (1896), pp. 132-137; Tyagi, Sushila, *Indo-Nepalese Relations* (1858-1914). Delhi (1974), pp. 46-49; Hasrat, *op.cit.*, p. xiv; Sinha, S.N., "A Study of Internal History of Nepal, 1767-1847" JHR Bihar University, Vol. II (1960), No. 2.

19. Lamb, Alistair, *Britain and Chinese Central Asia-Road to Lhasa, 1767-1905*, London (1960); Rose, Leo E., *Nepal: Strategy For Survival*, Oxford (1973), pp. 33-34.

20. Lamb, Alistair, *op.cit.*, pp. 37-45; Chauduri, K.C., *Anglo-Nepalese Relations*, Calcutta (1960), pp. 38-60.

duce Prithvi Narayan Shah to revive the old trade relations between Bengal and Nepal.²¹ At the same time, the Mackwanpur Terai seized by Kinloch was returned. Yet, it was not till 1792 when British efforts in this direction bore fruits.²²

On 1 March 1792, the British were able to conclude a Commercial Treaty with Nepal.²³ Bitter disputes over debased coins sparked of a border war between Tibet and Nepal. Tibet sought British help. But the company refused to comply as it did not wish to be involved militarily in the difficult Himalayan terrain. Further, such action was bound to adversely effect the trade with China. China, at first remained neutral, but when Nepal annexed certain frontier districts on southern Tibet and plundered monasteries there, they asked Nepal to withdraw and compensate the monasteries for their losses. On Nepal's refusal a Chinese force not only drove the Nepalese out of Tibet but chased them up to Nawakot. Nepal now sought the Company's help. Instead of military assistance against the Chinese the Brit-



-
21. Majumdar K., *Anglo-Nepalese Relations in the Nineteenth Century*, Calcutta (1973), p. 2; Pemble, John, *Invasion of Nepal*, Oxford (1971). After 1770, the Company turned towards alternative route to Tibet. Bogle and Manning were sent to Bhutan and Lhasa to explore trade routes through Chumbi Valley and Bhutanese duars. For details, see Markhom, or, *Narratives of the Mission of Gengle Bogle to Tibet and of the Thomas Manning to Lhasa*, London (1879).
22. Prior to 1792, the commercial intercourse between the two Governments was practically in low ebb. Taking advantages of Nepal's necessity for permission to send goods to the plains. The Government of India empowered Jonathan Duncan, Resident of Benaras to negotiate a commercial treaty with Nepal. He was further directed to effect a limitation of the duties levied in Nepal on British goods. On 12 September 1791, Duncan forwarded to the Government a copy of draft treaty, suggesting the appointment of a temporary Resident at Kathmandu with the consent of Nepal until "the treaty shall at least have had time to take some degree of root on both side". Duncan felt that unless a British representative was allowed to remain for some time in Kathmandu to attend to the execution of the Treaty, its chief advantages might remain unrealised. For details see Narain V.A., *Jonathan Duncan and Varanasi*, Calcutta (1927, pp. 136-143).
23. Aitchison, C.U., *A Collection of Treaties Engagements and Sanads Vol. II*, Calcutta (1906), pp. 103-105. For details, see Appendix-A.

ish offered to mediate between the Nepalese and the Chinese and to this end sent Colonel Kirkpatrick to Nepal in September 1792. However, before the arrival of the Colonel, the war had ended and the Gorkhas were forced to accept a humiliating treaty.

Between 1792-1800 Anglo-Nepal relations were merely of a formal nature. In 1795, a mission under one Quadir Ali was sent to Nepal to induce the Darbar to observe the commercial treaty. On 26 October 1801, taking the advantage of the presence of Rana Bahadur Shah in Benaras, A treaty of Friendship and Alliance was concluded.²⁴ The Treaty provided for the establishment of a British Resident in Kathmandu and a Nepalese agent in Calcutta. Captain Knox who was appointed as the first Resident at the Court of Kathmandu was instructed to forge a close connection between the British and Nepal. He was also cautioned against actions which might adversely effect the British commercial position in China. But the position of the Resident turned out to be an unhappy one. He found, for example, restriction in his movements to the Central Valley of Nepal. Eventually, Captain Knox had to leave Kathmandu in March 1803. On 24 January, 1804, Lord Wellesley formally abrogated the Treaty but expressed a wish to maintain friendly relations with Nepal.²⁵

The policy of the Company under Sir George Barlow (1805-06) and Sir John Shore (1806-13) was essentially pacific with little or no interest in the Himalayan regions. This enabled Bhim Sen Thapa to embark on extensive military campaigns—a part of Sikkim, Kumaon, Garhwal and a number of principalities in Western Himalaya and Terai were annexed. This brought him into conflict with the Company over certain parts of Purnea, Sarun, Gorakhpur and Bareilly districts.²⁶ It has been said of Bhim Sen Thapa that his aim was to take all territories to the north of the Ganges making

24. Aitchison, *op.cit.*, Vol. II, *op.cit.*, pp. 105-108: See Appendix-B.

25. Chauduri, K.C., *op.cit.*, p. 134; Rose, Leo E., *op.cit.*, p. 79; *Campbell's Sketches*, 1803 and 1804.

26. Landon, *op.cit.*, pp. 74-76; Rose, Leo E. *op.cit.*, pp. 79-95.

that river the boundary between Nepal and the British. The war (1814-16) that followed resulted in the defeat and dismemberment of the Kingdom.

The British Legation

By the Treaty of Sagauli signed on 1 March 1816, British gains were not inconsiderable.²⁷ The expulsion of the Gorkha to the west of Jamuna, and the restoration of the chief made an important barrier against Ranjit Singh. It further reduced the chances of direct combination of the Sikhs and the Gorkhas. The possession of Kumaon, Dehradun, Nahan, Malwa and the passage of the river Ganges gave the British an unbroken chain of communications from the river Kali to Sutlej. Strategically, it gave the British "the most valuable and important position of the North-West Frontier line". It further offered a complete barrier against any extension of the Gorkha in the Western direction, a bulwark to the whole country in its rear. Through Kumaon the easiest road to Tibet was secured. This opened for the British Indian traders all prospects for developing trade with the countries beyond the Himalaya. As per trade

27. Aitchison *op.cit.*, pp. 204-208; See Appendix-C; Also see, *The Military History of Nepal* Vol. 2, New Delhi (1983) Reprint.

with China an over land route was now available. With Sikkim as a protectorate of the Company on the east and with British territories on the south and south-west, and Tibetan to the north, Nepalese territories came to be greatly circumscribed.²⁸

Article 8 of the Treaty of Sagauli stipulated:

In order to secure and improve the relations and peace hereby established between the two States, it is now agreed that accredited "Minister"* from each resides at each other.

Sir Edward Gardner²⁹ joined as Resident in early 1816 with definite instructions to ensure that Nepal was conciliated and she acquiesced in her losses. Peaceful relations with Nepal, with a view to the security of the British frontier was the primary object of the policy. Trade for the moment had taken a backseat. When Nepal pressed for return of the Terai, Gardner recommended the retrocession. During the negotiation, prior to the signing of the Treaty he was told by a leading Bharadar:

Never will we consent to give up to you the Terai; take the Terai, and you leave us without the means of subsistence, for the hills without it, are worth nothing. The Terai is of no use to you, because your people cannot live in it, or keep it, and in wresting it from your hands, we will devastate your provinces down to the Ganges.³⁰

The 4th Article of the Treaty, which bound the Company to pay two lakh rupees as annual compensation to the Nepalese Chiefs for the loss of the Terai revenue, was

28. *Ibid.*

* The Treaty does not mention Resident but 'Minister'.

29. Hunter, *op.cit.*, Born in 1784; Registrar and Assistant to the Magistrate of Afghan in 1805, Assistant to Resident of Delhi, 1808; Commissioner and Governor General's Agent in Kumaon 1814: Resident in Nepal 1816-1829.

30. *Campbell's Sketches*, 1815.

annulled and a part of Terai was returned.³¹ This was followed by the demarcation of Nepal's southern frontier with British India.

Six months after Gardner's arrival the young Maharaja Girwan Juddha Vikram Shah died on 20 November 1816, in his eighteenth year leaving behind two year old prince Rajendra.³² The Regency therefore continued and *Mukhtiar* Bhim Sen Thapa maintained supreme power. Bhim Sen Thapa's policy was to ensure that the Residency was isolated and the Resident had no occasion to involve himself in the internal affairs of the kingdom. The *Bharadars* and all sections of people were made to understand that the Treaty forbade contact with the Resident. They were also warned that intercourse with the Resident would spell disaster for Nepal. In fact, a guard was posted on the road to the Residency so that none could enter its precincts. Bhim Sen's attitude towards the Residency and Gardner's policy is summed up by Campbell:

He treated the British Residency with reserve and distrust; yet our representative did not attempt to cultivate the intimacy or gain the goodwill of the oppressed and discontented, but keeping in mind the fatal consequences of foreign interference, he stood aloof from all party spirit, and lent but a deaf ear to the overtures for favour and countenance of those who carried provinces of greater civility...³³

It was to this scene that Brian Houghton Hodgson³⁴ arrived as Assistant to Sir Edward Gardner in 1820. Son of

31. See Appendix-D.

32. Hasrat, *op.cit.*, p. 222.

33. Campbell's Sketches, 1816, Likewise the Resident and his staff were not allowed to exercise about the country at will and often residency baggages were subjected to scrutiny. This policy was also extended to the traders from British India and obstructions were placed in the way of free commercial intercourse.

34. Buckland, C.E., *Dictionary of National Biography*, London, p. 203; Hodgson, B.H., *Essays on Languages Literature and Religion of Nepal and Tibet*, An Introduction by Philip Denwood, New Delhi (1972), pp. i-ii.

A Banker, he was born on 1 February 1800 at Prestburg, Cheshire, and was educated at Macciesfield Richmond and Haileybury. He came to India in 1818 and after passing through the College of Fort William, Calcutta, he was appointed as Assistant to George William Traill, Commissioner of Kumaon. During his two years in Kumaon, Hodgson travelled extensively throughout the province visiting every village and hamlet and getting to know the lands and its people. It was under Traill's influence that he developed his interest in Himalaya studies. The training he received during this formative period proved invaluable to him during his days in Kathmandu and later. His first appointment in Kathmandu was only for two-years after which he came to Calcutta as Deputy Secretary in the Persian Department. Shortly afterwards ill health drove him back to Kathmandu, as Postmaster in 1824 as no other vacancy was available.³⁵ In the following year when the post of Assistant Resident fell vacant, Hodgson was appointed to the billet.

Hodgson from the start devoted much of his time studying the flora and fauna of Nepal and inhabitants of the adjacent areas. From 1824 onwards he began to collect a large number of Sanskrit and Newari manuscripts, Tibetan blockprints and vernacular tracts with a view to discovering the main feature of Buddhism.³⁶ But his first serious research work on which he spent a great deal of time was the military system of Nepal.

35. *Ibid.*

36. *Ibid.* Also see Hunter, *op.cit.*, pp. 337-356. The collections totalled over four hundred works including most of the fundamental Mahayana texts and Tibetan books. Later, he presented these to the Asiatic Society, India Office Library, Bodlein Library and Societe Asiatique de Paris.

CHAPTER-II

EARLY YEARS

The Anglo-Gorkha War (1814-16) left a lasting impression upon the East India Company. The hill campaign had been an arduous one and not since the Mysore Wars was such resistance encountered in India. Sir Charles Metcalfe summed up the contemporary opinion on Nepal when he remarked, "none ever displayed so much bravery in action, so much system, skill and so much well timed confidence. None other ever possessed a country so easily defended and so difficult to the invaders."¹ British officers in the course of the war itself had developed for the intrepid Gorkha, an admiration and even fondness that was to outlive Britain's imperial connections with India. The two Gorkha regiments that had been raised under British colours had proved a success.² In early 1825, at the height

-
1. Thompson, E. and Garratt, G.T., *Rise and Fulfilment of British Rule in India*, Oxford (1943), p. 256. Kaye, J.W., *Selections from the Papers of Lord Metcalfe*, London (1875). Metcalfe further says "We have met with an enemy who has decidedly greater bravery and greater steadiness than our troops". Cavenagh also narrates that "with a force of less than 16,000 men the Gorkhas fought the British Indian army of 46,620 men of whom 4,557 were the European", Cavenagh, Orfeur *Rough Notes on the State of Nepal. Its Government, Army and Resources*, Calcutta (1851) p. 290.
 2. The first of these was Nurss Eri battalion later, the 1st King George V's Own Gorkha Rifles raised to take part in the operation against Malaun, though the orders to embody it into the army were not received until Amar Singh Thapa's capitulation. The second called, Simmur battalion, later, 2nd King Edward VII's Own Gorkha Rifles, was raised by Lieutenant F. Young. Duncan Forbes; *Johnny Gorkha*, New Delhi (1974), p. 5; Also see Cardrew, F.G., *Bengal Native Army*,

of the Anglo-Burmese War (1824-26) Lieutenant General Sir Edward Paget, Commander-in-Chief (1823-25) proposed to raise more Gorkha regiments for the Bengal army.³ Sir Edward Gardner to whom the proposal was referred advised against it. "Even entering on our service". He replied on 31 January 1825,

the Gorkha would not separate themselves entirely from their native country, as they could not remove their families from Nepal (in the Nepal Government's strong disapproval of it) and ... that however faithfully they might conduct themselves on general occasions in the event of any rupture with Nepal, they possessed the feelings of patriotism which would induce the greater part of them to adhere decidedly to their national allegiance.⁴

He favoured instead using troops of the Nepal Army on occasion in India, a suggestion to which even the Darbar was said to have been favourable.⁵

(Calcutta) 1903, pp. 126-27. The real value of the Gorkhas came to be fully realised after the Sepoy Mutiny (1857-58). for a recent account of the Gorkhas in the Indian (and British) Army, see Farwell, Byron, *The Gorkhas*, London, 1985.

3. General Paget, who commanded the British force in Ceylon before his appointment to Bengal, thought very little of the Indian Army, and, in fact abhorred his Indian appointment. Such was his lack of faith in Indian troops that for the military occupation of the North-East Frontier, after the First Anglo-Burmese War (1824-26) he suggested enlisting troops from Mauritius. Hussain, I., *Problem of Defence: N.E. Frontier*, Gauhati University (1975) Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis pp. 13-45; Also see Badenach, W., *An Inquiry into the Indian Army*, London (1826).
4. FPC 23 January 1835, Nos. 49-50; *Campbell Sketches*, He writes, "the system they are subjected it to is formed upon the model of our own and is very closely copied that would consequently have in mere matters of discipline but few new restraints to encounter in our service of their general fitness heretofore to fill our ranks, there can be but little doubt...".
5. Landon, *op.cit.*, p. 97. Gardner's proposal was rejected by the Government of India, which was traditionally opposed to the inclusion of mercenaries in its army.

GORKHA MILITARISM: HOGDSON'S SUGGESTIONS

Gorkha recruitment interested Brian Hodgson from the start but he saw the problem from an entirely different angle. The late war had by no means destroyed or even weakened Nepal's Army. But rather it had, since then, greatly improved in efficiency and vastly increased in size. Its strength in 1816, in Gardner's estimate was ten thousand men. Three years later, it was said to have risen to twelve thousand, made possible by revenue reforms and re-investment of *Birta*⁶ holdings which greatly increased the resources of the Kingdom. A large standing army in Nepal was always looked upon as a source of danger to the British India. Gardner during his days in Kathmandu, considered that the army was out of proportion to the actual needs of the state.⁷ But it was not the standing army that was the focus of Hodgson's attention.

In February 1825, a month after General Paget's proposal, he submitted a detailed note on the military system of Nepal, the result of careful study over several months. The document entitled: *Memorandum Relative to the Nepal Army*,⁸ drew the attention of the Government of India to the

-
6. Regmi, M.C., *Land Ownership in Nepal* (1976). The Birta is a system of land grant made by the State to the individual usually on an inheritable land tax exempt basis. It was finally abolished in 1959. Also see Rose, Loe, E., *op. cit.*, p. 96.
 7. *Campbell's Sketches*. Gardner however agreed that it may be possible for Bhim Sen Thapa to attempt to reduce its strength, in consequence of the temper of the Chief Officers, and of the impossibility of changing the military habits of the people". On 14 May 1817, he thus wrote "There has been some talk of reduction in rank of the officers of the army, but such a measure must be dangerous and impolitic for the ministers to touch upon in the present feeling of the body the members of which are naturally much dissatisfied with their fallen condition; and this temper not frequently breaks out, though, it has not hitherto shown itself seriously. The Government is not a little embarrassed on this account, for it must be sensible that the military force is greater than the state now acquires and even can maintain. At the same time from the nature of constitution ministers have not the hardihood perhaps to attempt effecting the requisite reduction".
 8. FMPR, Vol. 125, 24 February 1825. *Memorandum Relative to the Nepal Army*, Halgan.

short term enlistment system in the Nepal Army as a real factor for the growth of Gorkha militarism. Under this system, enlistment into the ranks was annual after one year of service a soldier became a *Dhakareah*, that is, put off the rolls. Three years after his discharge, he could be re-enrolled into the service for another period of one year repeating the process so long as he was able to bear arms.⁹ Although military service was not compulsory, the short term system made it practically universal and ensured that the number of men trained in arms was far larger than the actual standing army. In times of need therefore Nepal could rapidly augment her army three-fold without difficulty or without it losing much of its efficiency. Life among the *Dhakareah*, consisting mostly of Khas, Magar and Gurung tribes was never easy and once accustomed to regular pay and military discipline they developed a marked disinclination for any other occupation. Not unnaturally, war and conflict were to their interest for it gave them an opportunity to re-enlist before time.

Hodgson thought that such a system posed a constant danger to the security of the British on a strategically important and extremely difficult frontier. He saw a solution in absorbing the *Dhakareah* into the army in India as a 'safety valve'. Even though the Gorkha soldier as an individual was proud, over-bearing and extremely suspicious, he was quite confident that in the Company's service, he would prove "as docile and steady and peaceable body of troops as any other in the world". He therefore recommended in his Memorandum that the ranks of the Company's service should be thrown open to the Gorkhas. The advantage of such a policy was, he explained, thus:

If we could draw off the surplus soldiers of Nepal into our army, we might do her immense service, enabling her to adopt the institution to her circumstances, at the same time we provide

9. Nepali, C.R., *op.cit.*, pp. 64-72; Oldfield, *op.cit.*, p. 175. The rotation system was applicable to both military and civil service, which were held by annual tenure. A soldier off the rolls was called *Dhakareah*, and on the rolls as *Jageera*.

ourselves with the best material in Asia for making soldiers out of it.¹⁰

Closely connected with Gorkha militarism was the problem, of border settlement. The Treaty of Sagauli had broadly defined the southern boundary of Nepal but the arrangement was only partially executed and the border remained largely undemarcated. On the entire stretch of more than three hundred and fifty miles, there were only six boundary pillars, many of which were in a state of disrepair. An unsettled border, always had the potential for troubles and in this case Hodgson feared could become the 'pretext of any future aggression'. But more importantly it could lead to constant tensions between the hill men and those of the plains adversely effecting the growing commercial traffic between India and Nepal. The frontier included the Terai, a region of immense commercial and military importance to both Nepal and India, And so:

the steady continuance of peace and alliance between our Government and that of Nepal would have the effect gaining a value to the frontier land which they (Nepal) have not possessed for a 100 years past and will in the same proportion as it rises their value, render them liable to become the subject of dispute between Oudh and Nepal.¹¹

The demarcation and settlement of the boundary assumed great importance. In August, 1829 shortly after he took over as Officiating Resident, following Gardner's rement, Hodgson drew the attention of the Government of India to the necessity of an early solution to the problem. He asked for and obtained the services of an European Officer, Captain Codrington, to survey and demarcate the

10. FMPR, Vol. 125, *op.cit.*, Nepal Army.

11. FPC 28 May 1830, No. 19: Hodgson to the Political Secretary to the Government of India, 6 April 1830. It created a special problem to determine the actual boundary of the states. It was reported that the course of rivers were diverted by the inhabitants of Oudh for cultivations. Besides, the adjacent valley offered good farming lands.

southern boundary of Nepal during the winter of 1829-1830. By April 1830, this was completed by mutual agreement between Nepal and Oudh. The old pillars were restored and new ones were erected where necessary.¹²

While the demarcation of the boundary in progress, Hodgson returned to the question of Gorkha militarism. "This was a nation of warriors and conquerors", he wrote to H.T. Princep, Political Secretary to the Government of India, in September 1829, whom the British in two campaigns had stripped of half of her territories and where "warlike affairs are habits and passions of the people".¹³ Hodgson considered that British policy should be directed towards achieving two objectives: In the first place, to change "the almost exclusive martial propensities of the Gorkhas and inspiring the chiefs and the Government with some confidence of British intentions and good faith"; in the second, "to persuade them gradually to reduce their large standing army which in such a constant state of preparation was anything but safe".¹⁴ Only then, he pointed out,

might we look with confidence not only to the continuance of the present amicable political relations with Nepal, but also to the speedy rise and progress of valuable commercial relations with it and Bhote and even with China through them.

The Nepal Government was too ignorant of the value of a foreign trade and too jealous of the British to allow the subject to be taken up between the two Governments. But

12. FPC 28 May 1830, No. 19-21: Hodgson to the Political Secretary to the Government of India, 6 April 1830 also Hodgson to Captain Codrington, 3 April 1830.

13. FPC 14 October, 1829, No. 14: Hodgson to the Political Secretary to the Govt. of India, 24 September 1829. Hodgson further explained that troops for the past fourteen years had been in a state of constant preparedness although the country remained peaceful and Darbar's attitude professedly friendly. The more he reflected upon her history and her military enthusiasm the more he was amazed that the "present incessant military display had not hurried the country into the war".

14. FPC 26 March 1830, No. 24: Hodgson to H.T. Princep, 8 March 1830.

Indian traders had been carrying on their business without difficulty in Nepal. Already merchants from Calcutta, Benaras and Patna, attracted by the presence of the Residency, had been flocking to Kathmandu. Nepal's trade with Tibet was in the hands of the Newars. "The Gorkha", he said,

who conquered them (the Newar) 60 years ago by their turbulent habits and spirit of the universal aggression put an end to all the commerce of Nepal with both the south and north. Should we win or gently coerce the Gorkha to steadily peaceful ways the commerce of the Newars with India, Bhote and China might be fully revived and infinitely increased by means of the introduction into it of British commodities.

He also pointed out the advantage of Nepal over Bhutan and Kumaon for commercial enterprises.¹⁵ If such a trade was to revive and develop, at least fifteen years of peace with Nepal was imperative.

TRADITION: PROPOSED AGREEMENT

Just as the border problem was being attended to, Hodgson received information that twelve Nepalese timber agents had taken shelter in the Company's territories. These agents owed a large sum of money to the Nepal Government and the Darbar demanded their immediate surrender. It was stated to the Resident that the Darbar had always and promptly attended to the similar demands of the British Government even though the latter seldom handed

15. *Ibid.* He added that "Kumaon is too remote from Calcutta and the chief commercial cities of India on the one hand and from the eastern and the only wealthy parts of Bhote as well as from China on the other and the people of Kumaon are too poor, ignorant and unenterprising for foreign commercial pursuit. Bhotan is indeed nearer to the great seats of commerce with south and north. But it has no commercial routes equal to those which passed through Nepal proper and the Bhotanese are more poorer and more ignorant than even the Kumaon".

over criminals and fugitives from Nepal. Hodgson immediately realised the necessity of a formal agreement on the whole question of extradition. This was the subject on which the Treaty of Sagauli was entirely silent.¹⁶ The absence of such an agreement has obviously been taken advantage of by criminals, murderers and such persons of the two respective states.

As Hodgson awaited instructions from Calcutta the Darbar reiterated its demand for the surrender of the defaulters. He was reminded that there was no subject of the Company in Nepal against whom there was any case pending. Hodgson immediately communicated to the Government of India the demand of the Darbar along with names and details of the wanted persons. At the same time, he urged that the opportunity should be taken of the present difficulty to formulate rules of extradition for the future. He emphasised, a week later on 16 May, that unless this was done the advantages secured by the recent settlement of the boundary would be futile. Border crimes would certainly multiply and the Terai would soon become the home of criminals and fugitives from justice.¹⁷ "Our chief hold upon this Government", he wrote,

is through the Terai and the course of the hold is daily increasing with the augmenting of cultivation of the waste land, but eminently fertile with those who under take cultivation of these lands and are long they will become under the auspices of continued peace too valuable to be lightly hazarded...¹⁸

He therefore proposed to establish special courts to enforce rules of extradition to be agreed upon by the two

16. FPC 13 May 1831, No. 56; Hodgson to the Political Secretary to the Government of India, 29 April 1831; FPC 18 May 1831, Nos. 20-22: Hodgson to the Political Secretary to the Govt. of India, 10 and 11 May 1831. Also see FMPR, Vol. 127, 10 May 1831, pp. 319-334.

17. FPC 18 May 1831, No. 23: Hodgson to the Political Secretary to the Government of India, 16 May 1831. Hodgson urged the Government that the law of extradition that governed the relations of European natives should be extended to Nepal.

18. *Ibid.*

Governments. Even though the Nepalese Code of Law was backward and judicial administration cruel, he reported that the laws operative in Terai were relatively less severe and as such enforcing new regulations would not be too difficult. Finally, he declared, "it seems to me important to multiply the peaceful ties by which Nepal is bound to us and the adoption of some such arrangement as that now offered for consideration would constitute one such tie and lead to others".¹⁹

Much to his regret, the Government of India disagreed as to the necessity of a formal agreement on special courts.²⁰

HIMALAYAN TRADE

On 1 December 1831 Hodgson, after a thorough enquiry into the Himalayan trade, submitted a very lengthy report elaborating his views of 8 March 1830. The report contained a detailed account of the trade routes from India to Nepal and Tibet; the Tibetan frontier marts and trade with Central Asia. Appended to the report were several pages of tables and statements showing the manner and expense of conveying goods; the amount and nature of duty levied by the Nepal Government at different places; the distance between Kathmandu and the frontier marts; rough estimates of cost of goods in India and its selling price at Kathmandu; the total annual imports and exports to and from Nepal.²¹

-
19. *Ibid.* Hodgson continued his views that "the time seems now come for . . . removal of some of few obstacles to the commerce to Tibet and India through Nepal which are caused by the mistaken policy of this state and that at all appearance if we would endeavour to promote a frontier intercourse with Nepal, we must set the example of unbending (sic)".
20. FPC 10 June 1831, Princep to Hodgson, 10 June 1831. The Government of India had considered the Nepalese Judicial system and its penal code too cruel and primitive, where even for minor crimes mutilation not unoften death sentences were awarded. Hodgson was that the Government "is far from desiring to enter into any stipulation that shall bind the Government under all circumstances to surrender debtors and defaulters to any bordering native that may demand refugees as such a plea".
21. FPC 23 January 1832; Nos. 57-62: Hodgson to Princep, 31 December 1831. This report was afterward published in the "*Selections from the Records of the Govt. of Bengal*", Vol. Calcutta, 1857.

Annual imports to Nepal from the south amounted to sixteen lakhs eleven thousand rupees while the export was more than ten lakhs sixtyfour thousand. Thus the total transaction amounted to twentysix lakhs seventyfive thousand rupees. The approximate annual duty realised by the Nepal Government, calculated from 1830 onwards on this trade was over one lakh sixty thousand rupees. On the basis of 6% ad valorem duty, the total value of the trade amounted to seventeen lakhs eightyone thousand eight hundred twentyone rupees.²² To this could be added, Hodgson's report showed, seven lakhs rupees worth of trade that was duty free, of which items such as gold and spice amounted to not less than five lakhs. Again there was special exemption of custom duty extended to the military and civil officials which amounted to a lakh of rupees annually. Yet another exemption amounting one lakh of rupees was on the Darbar's own imports. The total trade to and from India including the duty free goods therefore amounted to twentyfive lakhs rupees at the net value. Duties were levied at customs houses situated at every four kos. The amount levied varied considerably from one place to another.²³

The entire trade was in the hands of Newars who traditionally controlled an extensive trade with India and Ti-

22. *Campbell Sketches op.cit.* It will be recalled that the first missions to Nepal were primarily commercial. The Commercial Treaty of 1792 provided that Nepal could levy a uniform import duty of 2½% ad valorem on all goods imported from the South. No additional duty could be levied on goods transported from thence to Tibet. But the duty levied at Kathmandu varied from item to item and the duty charged was often much higher than that permissible by the Treaty. How this came about Dr. Campbell Assistant Surgeon of the Resident, explains: "the supiness of Mr. Gardner permitted the Nepalese to infringe regularly and systematically on the provision of the Commercial Treaty of 1792"; Further, the duty had been as high as from 6 to 10% of the invoice price. "Thus we have given", Campbell adds, "for upwards 40 years, a clear advantage of 7½% to Nepal produce to our lands". Besides, although the British Government had avoided all allusion to the former Commercial Treaties, Nepal had continued the unilateral operation of the Treaty on Trade and produce to the extent of 4 to 1 (The Treaty in question was really dissolved by Lord Wellesley in 1804).


23. *Ibid.*

bet. Traders from Benaras and Patna were also taking a keen interest in the trade. Hodgson's enquires revealed that there were in the Begmati Valley alone fiftytwo Newars and twentyfour Indian merchants trading with both south and north. The trading capital of the former, he calculated, was not less than fifty lakhs nineteen thousand rupees and that of the latter not less than twentythree lakhs five thousand rupees. A large proportion of the Indian merchants had come up subsequently to the establishment of the Residency in 1816 and since that period in the estimate of the oldest merchants of Kathmandu the trade had increased three fold.²⁴ Unlike at Calcutta, where the Indian traders had to struggle against the European competition, in Kathmandu they had no such rivals. Hodgson was decidedly against involving Europeans. For, he was quite certain that the Nepalese would look upon them with suspicion and regard them as "a cloak to disguise the Imperial diplomacy". Therefore, he would rather encourage Indian merchants and through them supply Nepal with all her necessities, comforts and luxuries and bind her to a dependence on British goods.²⁵

As regards trade with Tibet and Central Asia, Nepal had distinct advantages. Since the Newars over the years had acquired intimate knowledge of Tibet and China, Hodgson felt that Indian merchants could with great advantage establish closer ties with them. Through them the prospect of British goods in Central Asia could be assessed and a "very flourishing commerce be driven in European and Indian articles" in these regions "by means (at least in the first instance) of our Indian subjects and those of Nepal".

24. Oldfield, *op.cit.*, pp. 303-304. He writes of "the increased commerce resulting from the increased intercourse held by the Nepalese, now that peace was established with plains". In fact, the southern trade of Nepal after 1816 had increased three times. Also see Sen, Jahar, *Indo-Nepal Trade in the Nineteenth Century*, Calcutta, 1977, pp. 29-30.

25. Hodgson, *op.cit.* It especially affected the importation of English and European articles to the exclusion of those of China and Tibet. The Nepalese showed a growing inclination for British luxuries.



Sketch Map of Western Tibet and The Adjacent Region


Tibet, Hodgson pointed out, was a peace-loving, civilised and commercially minded nation;

with her musk, her rhubarb, her borax, her splendid wools, her mineral and animal wealth, her universal need of good woollens and her incapacity to provide herself or to obtain from any of her neighbours, Tibet may well be believed capable of maintaining a large and valuable exchange of commodities with Great Britain through the medium of our Indian subjects and the people of Nepal to which latter additus closed to all other by China, is freely open.²⁶

Compared to Kumaon, Sikkim and Bhutan, Nepal possessed easier routes and was centrally situated. Tibetan trade and wealth were confined to the eastern region which was contiguous to Nepal. Besides, Tibetan needs could be easily acquired from Calcutta, Patna, Benaras, Mirzapur, and Gazipur. Again, Nepal possessed an extraordinary advantage from ancient ties, command of languages and was free from Chinese jealousy by virtue of their long accustomed trade relations.


But it was trade with Central Asia and particularly with China that Hodgson was primarily interested in. The bulk of Chinese trade passed through the Peking-St. Petersburg route on the extreme north and from Peking to India via Nepal on the south. Hodgson found Chinese trade with Russia flourishing despite difficult conditions and even less attractive items. The distance from St. Petersburg to Peking was not less than five thousand five hundred miles, and it was a route on which traders had to encounter sterile country and rigorous climate. By sea, the journey took three years. The Russian Government too levied high customs duties of twenty to twenty-five percent on this trade and there were some obstacles in the form of prohibition

26. *Ibid.*



A.L. 1161

Sketch Map showing Trade Routes between Bengal and Central Tibet



Sketch Map of Sikkim Trade Route

and monopolies especially on coins and precious metals.²⁷ Russian exports to China were only paltry and included woolen and cotton cloth, glassware, hide and finished leather. In return, Russia imported musk, borax, rhubarb, tea, cotton, porcelain and water colour, among other things, from China.

China's trade across the Himalaya offered relatively better prospects and the route itself was less hazardous. From Calcutta to Peking via Kathmandu, the distance was two thousand and eight hundred miles. The distance between Bengal and Kathmandu was a little over five hundred miles and two thirds of this journey was navigable by means of the Ganges and the Gandaki rivers. Though the Himalaya mountains were high and steep there existed regular passes, habitations, cultivations and a temperate climate. During the proper season a journey from Kathmandu to Peking could be accomplished within five months. Even before reaching Peking, the merchants could sell their goods at Szchuen and return with Chinese goods.²⁸ The products of England were in great demand beyond the Himalaya and Calcutta formed the 'natural inlet' for these. On the other hand, Russian trade with Central Asia was largely depended on Manchester. Indeed, England and Canada had supplied Russia with more than half of what she traded with the Central Asian people came from North America via England or the way of Kamtchatka and the Aleutuan Isles. He reminded that Russia could only manufacture coarse quality goods and the fine products she traded in actually came from England.

There was no reason therefore why closer commercial relations with Nepal should not be established. "What should hinder our Indian subjects and the Nepalese" argued Hodgson,

from procuring these same furs at Calcutta and conveying them through Nepal and Tibet to these same Chinese? At less than ninety stages from Kathmandu, they would

27. Dhanalaxmi, R., *British Attitude to Nepal's Relations with Tibet and China, 1814-1914*, New Delhi, 1981, p. 36.

28. Hodgson, *op.cit.*

arrive at the banks of Hwangho in Sifan, or those of the Yang-Tse-Kiang in Szchuen; and then the merchants might be said to have reached their goal. What again should hinder the same merchants from underselling the Russians in the articles of English woollens, hardwares and glassware, by conveying them to Szchuen from Calcutta by the same route?²⁹

The Report spoke of other advantages. If Nepal's trade was allowed to develop it would result in the displacement of the old feudal classes by the emergence of new social groups. The new social elites would naturally pursue different political ideas and would play a subservient role to the British. On the other hand, the increased trade with and through Nepal with Tibet and China would further give the British an exclusive command on Nepal's wants which would ultimately lead the Government of India to control her and her policies.

NEPAL STUDIES: THE MILITARY TRIBES

Hubert Maddock* who was appointed to succeed Sir Edward Gardner in January 1832³⁰ arrived in Kathmandu sometime following March. Free now from the burden of office, Hodgson turned his attention to his first love, research on the Himalayas. He carefully studied the topography of Nepal and prepared detailed statistics on the kingdom. During these years, he was able to publish at least four papers on mammals and birds.³¹ In September 1832

29. *Ibid.*

* Maddock (1790-1870) came to India in 1814; served in the Sagar and Narbada territories: Political Agent Bhopal: Political Resident at Lucknow, 1829-31: Political Officer in Nepal, 1831. Buckland, C.E., *op.cit.*, p. 269.

30. FPC 19 March 1832, Nos. 2-4. Lord Bentinck to Maddock, 30 January, 1832 and enclosures.

31. Landon, *op.cit.*, see Appendix, vol. I, p. 273; *Notes Relative to the Account of the Jarai*, JASB, Vol. I (1832) pp. 66-67; *Further Illustrations of the Antelope Hodgsonii* (Abel) JASB Vol. I (1832) pp. 59-63; *On the Mammalia of Nepal*, JASB Vol. I (1832) pp. 335-348 *Description of new species and Mammalia and Birds from Nepal*, Zoological Society Proceedings, Vol II (1832) pp. 178-186.

he prepared two lengthy but interesting papers on the military roads and population of Nepal. In the first, he described the great military roads running from the Sikkim frontier in the east to Kumaon in the west. The road ran roughly through the centre of the kingdom, equidistant from the 'snows and the plains'. The distance from Kathmandu to the western extremity was shown to be four hundred and forty miles and to the east of it approximately two hundred thirty miles.

The second gave an exhaustive account of the houses and population of the Kathmandu Valley. The figures he provided were:

Total towns/villages	-	226
Houses	-	41,829
Population	-	2,92,003

The number of houses contained in each of the towns and villages as well as those in the scattered settlements "with which the whole face of valley is dotted" was, he said, ascertained by actual counting. The scattered houses were aggregated to the proximate villages. These houses were principally cottages and were inhabited exclusively by the *Parbatiahs* and Murmis. The rest of the houses constituted for the most part of the towns, built of brick and roofed with tiles. "The great indigenous mass" of the population, the Newars, were distinguished for their large substantial houses such as were found only in the cities of India. Every district of the valley was adorned by such houses forming towns and villages. The following observation makes interesting reading:

Most Newars in easy circumstances have two wives and the fecandity of their women is notorious.³²

Meanwhile, Maddock found the climate of Nepal very disagreeable and proceeded on three months leave on 2 December 1832. Hodgson was again asked to officiate.³³ He

32. FPC 19 November 1832: Nos. 34-36: Hodgson to Maddock, 19 September 1832 and enclosures.

33. FPC 17 December 1832 Nos. 22-23: Hodgson to the Political Secretary to the Government of India, 2 December 1832.

was confirmed as Resident on 4 February 1833, when Maddock did not return to his post.³⁴ By then Hodgson had collected sufficient data on the Nepal army and prepared another paper on this subject.



Sir Brian Houghton Hodgson, F.R.S

This paper which he entitled “Origin and Classification of the Military Tribes of Nepal”, he read before the Asiatic Society in Calcutta on 9 January 1833. He described the inhabitants east of the river Kali, or proper Nepal as Turanian. This fact he said is inscribed plainly on their faces and languages. From the 12th century onwards Brahmans from the plains migrated to the hills and converted some of

34. FPC 4 February 1833, Nos. 56-57: Lord William Bentinck to Chief Secretary to the Government, 4 February 1833 and Resolution passed by the Vice-President-in-Council, 4 February 1833. Also FPC 12 February 1833, No. 49. Officiating Chief Secretary to Hodgson, 5 February 1833.

these people. "The earliest and most distinguished converts became Kshatriyas". The offspring of Brahmans and local women also became Kshatriyas and,

from the two roots mainly sprung the numerous, predominant and extensively ramified tribes of Khas - originally the name of a small clan of creedless barbarions, now the proud title of Kshastriyas or military order of the kingdom of Nepal.³⁵

The Khas were reinforced by fresh refugees from India and availing themselves of the "superior knowledge of the strangers" to conquer the neighbouring tribes of the aborigines. The Khas language became the corrupt dialect of Hindi retaining only traces of 'primitive barbarism'. The descendants of more or less pure Rajput and other Kshatriyas of the plains who came to Nepal as refugees or as military adventurers, Hodgson called the Ekthariahs. They were said to claim a superiority over the Khas. But their children if married two generations into the Khas became pure Khas or real Kshatriyas so far as privileges and rank was concerned. The Ekthariahs spoke the Khas language and differed from the Thakurias only to the extent that the latter's lineage was royal. They were descendant from the princes. The Shah or Shahi were the present royal family. The other military tribes were the Magars and the Gurungs³⁶ from whom the soldiery was largely recruited. These generally did not come under Brahminical influence being even later Hindus in name only.

The Khas, Magars and Gurungs, Hodgson considered the military classes of Nepal, each comprising a very nu-

35. Hodgson, "An Origin and Classifications of the Military Tribes of Nepal", JASB, Vol. II (1833). Later, published under *Selections*. For details of the classification of the military tribes of Nepal, see Appendix E.

36. *Ibid.* The original seat of the Magars is the Bara Maganth, or Satahung etc., in other words, most of the central and lower parts of mountains between the Bheri and Marsyandi Rivers . . . Modern events have spread the Magars and Gurungs over most part of the present kingdom of Nepal.

merous race, variously ramified, and sub-divided. The original seat of the Khas is said to be Gorkha from where they emerged to acquire fame and domination under Prithvinarayan Shah and his successors of the Gorkha dynasty.

At the end of his paper, Hodgson revived his proposal to absorb the *Dhakareah* into the Indian army. Fully aware of the caste prejudices in the Bengal Native Infantry, Hodgson spoke of the advantages of the Gorkha soldiers;

These highland soldiers, who despatch their meal in half an hour, and satisfy the ceremonial law by merely washing their hands and face, and taking off their turbans before cooking, laugh at the pharasaical rigour of our *Siphais*, who must bathe from head to foot and make *puja*, are they began to dress their dinner, must eat nearly naked in the coldest weather, and cannot be in marching trim again in less than three hours.³⁷

Hodgson calculated that there were no less than thirty thousand *Dhakareahs* belonging to three military tribes. "I am not sure", he declared, "that there exist any insuperable obstacle to our obtaining, in one form or other, the services of a large body of these men". He spoke highly of the character, love of enterprise, freedom from the caste prejudices, military habits and their amenability to discipline which would make them in the Company's service "*mostly highly prized*". He concluded his paper with the following observation:

37. *Ibid.* Hodgson goes on to say, "In war, the former readily carry several days' provisions on their backs: the latter would deem such an act intolerably degrading. The former see in foreign service nothing but the prospect of glory and spoil: the latter can discover in it nothing but pollution and peril from unclean men and terrible wizards, goblins, and evil spirits. In masses, the former have all that indomitable confidence, each in all which grows out of national integrity and success: the latter can have no idea of this sentiment, which yet maintain the union and resolution of multitudes in peril, better than all other human bonds whatever; and, once thoroughly acquired, is by no means inseparable from service under the national standard".

In my humble opinion they are by far the best soldiers in Asia; and if they were made participators of our renown in arms, I conceive that their gallant spirit, emphatic contempt of *Madhesis* (people of the plains), and unadulterated military habits, might be relied on for fidelity; and that our good and regular pay and noble pension establishment would serve perfectly to counterpoise the influence of nationality, so far as that could injuriously affect us.³⁸

HODGSON AND THE RESIDENCY

Back in Kathmandu, Hodgson turned his attention to the question, left unresolved by Maddock, of the Resident's jurisdiction over Company's subjects in Nepal. The problem had its origin in the case of a sweeper belonging to the Residency alleged to have had illicit relations with a Nepalese woman in September 1832. This under the existing customs of the Kingdom constituted a serious offence entailing a very severe punishment. The aggrieved husband had the right to revenge if the crime was proved and had to carry out the sentence. The event aroused a lot of indignation among the *Bharadars* and those opposed to Bhim Sen Thapa sought to make capital out of it. The problem was ultimately resolved when the Darbar agreed to the Resident's right to try and punish his own subjects according to

38. For extract see Hodgson, *op.cit.*, p. 41. Hodgson added the following postscripts". "Since this paper was written the value and the availability to us of the Gorkhali soldier tribes have been well tested; and "it is infinitely regretted that the opinion of Sir H. Fane, of Sir C. Napier, and of Sir H. Lawrence, as to the high expediency of recruiting largely from this source, were not acted upon long ago. So long as my voice carried any weight, I often pressed the subject on the attention of those in authority. But the then prejudice in favour of Brahmins and Kshatri Siphahis neutralized all my efforts, though the danger of so homogenous an army of foreign mercenaries was, among other arguments, earnestly dwelt upon".

the Company's laws. The sweeper was ultimately convicted and sentenced to five years rigorous imprisonment and sent to India to undergo punishment.³⁹

Hodgson proposed a formal agreement on the subject between the Indian and Nepal Governments. On 18 December 1832 he prepared a draft treaty with the following provision. Firstly, the subjects of Nepal guilty of any offense against the followers of the Residency, whether caught within or outside it, were to be tried by the Darbar. Similarly, the Darbar was to hand over the subjects of the Company, if they happened to be criminals. Secondly, the Resident proposed that in case where the national customs of Nepal were violated he would not pass orders according to the Company law, but as far as possible in accordance with the Nepalese law. Thirdly, in the cases where the guilty would be awarded mutilation or death sentence, the Government of Nepal was to decide in consultation with the Resident. Where the Darbar was not satisfied with proceedings, the case was to be decided at a diplomatic level. But finally, in all cases of wilful murder, heinous crimes, rape and other universally acknowledged offences, the criminals were to suffer capitally.⁴⁰ With the exception of the clause on capital punishment, the Darbar was prepared to accept the draft. They considered that the practice of revenge by an aggrieved *Parbattia* husband was 'part and parcel' of the laws and habits of the Nepalese people.⁴¹

Hodgson while accepting the validity of Nepalese customs, refused to recognise any individual rights. The Darbar however remained adamant. In early 1833, Hodgson was told by the Darbar of the right of revenge by individuals that "we cannot covenant its omission; you cannot covenant

39. FPC 11 November 1833, Nos. 22-24: excerpts from the Letters of the Resident at Kathmandu to Government of India from 1830-1840, prepared by J.R. Tickell, later referred as *Events in Nepal*.

40. For details of draft treaty, see Appendix - F.

41. FPC 4 February 1833, No. 58: Hodgson to Government, 18 December 1832.

42. Ramakant, *op.cit.*, p. 135.

its admission, best way is not have any covenant".⁴² Hodgson decided to drop the idea of the agreement and informed the Government of India that no inconvenience would arise in the absence of such specific understanding so long as the Resident was able to maintain strict vigilance over his subjects. If this was done the Darbar would never hesitate to surrender offenders who should be "silently and quietly transmitted out of Nepal the instant their transgression becomes known to the Resident".⁴³

The draft treaty was apparently put forward to avoid possible complications but in reality it was aimed at asserting the Resident's position *vis-a-vis* the Darbar. Ever since the death in April 1832 of the regent Maharani Tripura Sundari Devi, the chief prop to Bhim Sen's despotic career, the political scene in Nepal underwent a change. The event, which coincided with the attainment of majority by the *Mukhtiar* that his hold on the state could no longer remain unchallenged. The immediate cause for worry was however not the return to power of such families as the Pandes, but the fate of his relations with the British. In Darbar politics the control of the relations with the Resident was regarded an important function of state. And to be able to keep the British representative within bounds was to earn the respect of the Darbar. If the Maharaja chose to deal directly with the Resident it would be a clear indication of the diminution of Bhim Sen's authority. Bhim Sen did not know Hubert Thomas Maddock, who at this precise moment joined as Resident, as well as he knew Hodgson.⁴⁴ The latter thus summed up Bhim Sen's worries:

During the past year there has been a degree of shyness towards the Residency originating in the Premier's anomolous situ-

43. FPC 4 February 1833, No. 59: Hodgson to Government, 5 January 1833.

44. FPC 27 April 1832, No. 18: Hodgson to Government, 20 June 1832. Hubert Thomas Maddock thus complained of his isolation: "the peculiar circumstances under which the Residency was established probably deferred the Resident from adopting the usual mode of keeping himself informed of the ordinary proceedings of the Court. "

ation in respect to his sovereign and in an apprehension on his part that Mr. Maddock's appointment was the prelude to some material change in the style of our intercourse with the Darbar under the decent pretext of suitability to the Rajah's new state of majority.

But as Hodgson pointed out "nothing of the sort having been attempted the minister's fear seem to have subsided"⁴⁵

On 11 February 1833, Bhim Sen Thapa congratulated Hodgson on his appointment as Resident and arranged a meeting with Rajendra. A week later, Hodgson attended a review of troops by the Maharaja. Reporting the event to Fort William, Hodgson said:

I am happy in being able to report to you that the reserve characterising of our intercourse with the Darbar for the past year seems fast emerging into a better and more cordial spirit.⁴⁶

On the same day, he sent a confidential letter to Macnaghten describing in great detail the political situation in Nepal.⁴⁷ He described how during Rajendra's long minority Bhim Sen consolidated his position filling all important posts with his own men. Even after his majority, the Maharaja was placed under strict vigilance. As Hodgson wrote:

The Raja is hemmed into his palace beyond which he cannot stir unaccompanied by the minister, and then only to the extent of a ride or drive. Even within the walls of his palace the minister and his brother reside,

45. FPC 19 March 1833, No. 26: Hodgson to Macnaghten, 8 March 1833.

46. FPC 5 March 1833, No. 19: Hodgson to Macnaghten, 18 February 1833.

47. *Ibid.* Hodgson added the following post script: "This letter has been copied for obvious reasons with my own hand, and I need hardly to say it should be placed for some time in special deposit, out of the reach of all clerks and office people".

the later in the capacity of 'dry nurse' to His Highness.⁴⁸

He was prevented through "gross means" from moving about the kingdom, and meeting the people. He was given the impression that keeping aloof from the public was "the established etiquette of the Court". In the same way the Maharaja was prevented from establishing direct relations with the Resident. The Maharaja on the other hand, Hodgson pointed out, encouraged by his ambitious wife Samrajya Lakshmi Devi was beginning to feel the effect of Bhim Sen's restrictive policy. It was Bhim Sen's fear that the Maharaja would at any time reassert himself and he was quite certain that in such an event the loyalty of support of the army would be with their sovereign. "All these circumstances combined", Hodgson pointed out:

to render Bhim Sen of late provokingly captious and suspicious towards us; lest, I suppose, the Raja should perhaps be undeceived as to the figments palmed on him relative to our personal impracticability and political dishonesty. The minister, in defiance of custom alike and of decency would not restrict still further the little direct commerce ever maintained between the Resident and the Maharaja.⁴⁹

Hodgson was therefore anxious that the British representative in Nepal should at least receive all marks of courtesy and honour he was entitled to.⁵⁰ He was extremely

48. *Ibid.* Towards restrictions on Maharaja, Hodgson continued to write, "Last year the Maharaja desired to make an excursion into the lower hills to short. He was prevented by all sorts of idles tales and obstructions. This year, he proposed visiting at Nayakote, the winter residence of his father, again he was prevented as before".

49. *Ibid.*

50. FPC 25 July 1833, No. 26: Hodgson to Macnaghten, 11 July 1833. Hodgson perceived that non-intercourse had its advantages and disadvantages. It diminished the chance of collision with the *Bharadars* which narrowed their means of observing the British Government and shut out some scope to the prevailing party to misrepresent the British Government when necessary.

unhappy that the Resident received no military compliments with single exception to the salute given him within the walls of the palace when he attended Darbar. If the *Mukhtiar*, on the other hand, passed by the station of any of the Residency, he was saluted, and if he passed by the guardroom the guard also turned out and presented arms. Even when off duty the Residency *siphais* always saluted the *Mukhtiar*. Compared to him the Resident received, Hodgson complained, "not one current token of respect established in his favour and the extraordinary one which is paid him on his rare visit to Court is paid within the closed doors of the Darbar". The system of military compliments to the *Mukhtiar* by the British was established during Gardner's time and it was expected that these would be reciprocal for the Resident.* Since it was customary to consider the Resident and the *Mukhtiar* as equals, Hodgson demanded he should be given equal honours in this regard.⁵¹

The Government of India was of the opinion that the Resident in Kathmandu received all marks of respect which it was usual for the troops of a "foreign native state" to show to any British representative accredited to the Court of its sovereign. They agreed, however, that the *Mukhtiar* ought not to receive greater civilities or distinction than was accorded to the Resident by the Darbar. Still Hodgson was advised that

yet as the discontinuance of act of courtesies which has been usual to grant might be construed into International indignity. His Lordship-in-Council is of the opinion that it would be better to avoid a course which probably be the course of 'unnecessary irritation'.⁵²

* It was only in 1923, after the Treaty, the British Resident received with fully military honours. London, vol. II, *op.cit.*, p. 152.

51. *Ibid.*

52. *Ibid.* No. 27: Macnaghten to Hodgson, 25 July 1833.

CHAPTER-III

HIMALAYAN TRADE

In January 1834, in the course of a ride together, Hodgson told Bhim Sen that he had been expecting for the past six months a change in the form of communication between the Resident and the Nepal Government in view of the Maharaja's attaining *majority*. Bhim Sen politely agreed and the following day sent his *Munshi* to enquire from Hodgson the 'nature and extent' of the changes he desired. Hodgson was quite sure that Bhim Sen was playing for time. He told the *Munshi* and those who accompanied him:

My friends, I am the Maharaja's guest and it is not for me to say I am ill-served as placed at his table... All I can observe is that the most gradual change will please me best and the least one consistent with propriety.¹

What annoyed Hodgson was the *Mukhtiar's* ambivalence in regards to Maharaja's position. On occasion, Bhim Sen would pretend to be powerless declaring he was no longer in control of the state. Yet, on the question of the Resident's access to the Maharaja, he would not admit the Maharaja's majority. "It is time . . . for me", Hodgson told the men, "to be informed whether the Raja is still minor or not". In the past half year, the Maharaja had assumed the character of a major in all matters of ceremony and business,

1. FPC. 13 February 1834, Nos. 6-7: Hodgson to the Political Secretary to the Government of India, 28 January 1834.

including relations with the Chinese." I cannot submit to be made an exception", he curtly told the Munshi. He even demanded that his own Munshi should have direct access to the Maharaja as this was already been done in the case of other *Bharadars*.

The following day, Bhim Sen sent information that the Maharaja would be most happy to see Hodgson as often as the latter chose to come to Darbar. But access to the Maharaja of his *Munshi* could not be agreed to as this would lead to inconvenience. In reporting all these to the Government of India, Hodgson hinted that it was Bhim Sen Thapa who was the hurdle in the closer relations between the Resident and the Maharaja. Further, there was already a section of influential men around the Maharaja, headed by his Raj Guru, who wanted the British deal not with the *Mukhtiar* but with Maharaja Rajendra.

The Governor General-in-Council, not only disagreed with Hodgson's observation but also disappointed of his action. He was firmly told that,

It is not wish or desire of His Honour-in-Council that you should use the name of the British Government in any such discussion on the subject of the nature of the intercourse to be observed between the Resident and the Court of Nepal and it is directed that you will not make any demands even in your own name, from which if they were not acquired in, you could not propriety recede.²

He felt that the direct access to be Maharaja of Hodgson as well as his *Munshi* had already been conceded and there was no reason to press the matter further. Hodgson was instructed that no opportunity should be lost of concilia-

2. *Ibid.* No. 8: Government to Hodgson, 13 February 1834. Hodgson was further advised, "If you studiously maintain neutral position observing all friendly demeanour towards all parties and avoiding as far as possible to come into collision with every object which we can legitimately desire will gradually attained".

tion and winning the affection of the young prince so that "he is inspired with sentiments of confidence and good-will towards the British."³

TRADE: PROPOSAL REVISED

In May 1834, Hodgson once again took up the question of trade and commerce from where he left off more than three years ago. He submitted a lengthy memorandum emphasizing the importance of Nepal in this regard.⁴

From the time of Warren Hastings the Bengal Government with great labour and expense endeavoured to establish active commercial relations with the Himalayan regions. Hence, the costly missions were despatched under Turner, Bogle, Krikpatrick and Knox.⁵ Of all these attempts, it was the last one that rightly directed its efforts towards Nepal. From its central position with reference to "the great emporia of demand and supply" Nepal possessed great advantages over Sikkim on the one hand and the western hills on the other. All the wealth of Tibet was confined to its eastern half. The natural produce of this region alongwith that of Nepal was held in high esteem in India and in Europe. The goods she was in need of were supplied by Calcutta, Dacca, Patna, Mirzapur, Gazipur and Benaras. Hence, an extensive and flourishing trade could be carried in this region.

So long as the route through Nepal was available, trade with Eastern Tibet through Kumaon was "an obvious absurdity". Sikkim too had many disadvantages. The Hindu traders of India looked upon her as "vile and unclean". Its Government was too primitive to afford security to traders.

-
3. FPC. 22 May 1834, Nos. 46-47: Hodgson to Trevelyan, 10 May 1834 and Trevelyan to Hodgson, 22 May 1834. The Governor General-in-Council correctly perceived the situation in the Darbar was clearly borne by subsequent events. The Resident and his followers were granted full access to the Maharaja. Bhim Sen voluntarily waived the right to search the Residency's goods by Nepal customs. At the same time, restriction on Resident's movement within the city was relaxed.
 4. FPC 10 July 1834, Nos. 144-151: Hodgson to Trevelyan, 9 May 1834.
 5. For details of missions, see Pemble, *op.cit.*, pp. 54-89.

Nepal on the other hand, was holy land to them. Newar traders of Nepal had excellent rapport with both Indian and Tibetan merchants. They and the Indian had greater capital than the Sikkimese. Since it was not desirable to deal directly with Tibet now under China the Newars and Indians domiciled in Kathmandu could form "a safe and adequate though indirect channel of commercial dealings with the trans-Himalayan countries".

Hodgson also dwelt at length on how beneficial this trade could prove to Nepal itself. It would change the material life of the people and bind them to the Company notwithstanding the anti-British policy of whoever was in power.

The higher ranks in Nepal have dependent on the plain for their luxurious and conveniences; the dependence is daily spreading downwards and if the Government of this Government can be induced to rid commerce of the absurd clogs which were fixed on its wheels in the past times of alienation and non-intercourse preceding to the late war, Nepal must soon become bound to us by so many beneficial ties that severance of the connections will no longer be subjected to the Darbar's caprices animosities or ambitions.⁶

The encouragement of commerce in Nepal therefore seemed to Hodgson important from a political than from an economic viewpoint. It was fortunate for the Company that "the foreign trade of Nepal is now principally in the hands of our Indian subjects domiciled in Cathmandu".⁷

This was a recurring theme in Hodgson's letters to Fort William. As his Assistant Dr. Alan Campbell wrote, it

6. FPC 10 July 1834, Nos. 144-151; Hodgson to Trevelyan, 9 May 1834. Hodgson pointed out that "I am the last person who would propose political aids to Commerce, the very soul of which is liberty. I would only by quiet explanation; essay the removal of obstacle to its natural course which were thrown in its way by the Darbar".

7. *Ibid.*

was to the Resident the second means of quieting the portion for arms among the military tribes, the first being the absorption of the surplus soldiery.⁸ "My reasons for desiring to see extended commercial intercourse between Nepal and plains are rather political than economic", Hodgson confessed in another despatch dated 31 May. He went on to draw the attention of the Government of India to the fact that the martial qualities of the Gorkhas⁹ remained unchanged for the past twenty years and said this would continue unless some material change was brought to bear upon their habits. Any attempt to win the people over the visible bonds of friendship would be rejected by the Darbar. But "commerce works unseen", and its efficacy as "a peace maker" was proved by history. Such means would bind the people to the British even if the state was opposed:

I would reach the Government through the people, commerce would be my instruments. Nor would I interfere further than merely to procure for commerce an unrestricted course, conformable to the spirit and even better of those commercial to the spirit and even better of those commercial engagements by which Nepal was bound to us.¹⁰

Hodgson realises that if this trade was to develop all trade barriers would have to be removed. He knew the legal difficulties of Indian traders in Kathmandu and hence em-

8. Campbell's Sketches: "I am convinced", Hodgson had written, "that the fierce, uneducated and passionately warlike tribes now dominated Nepal will only weaned from a turbulence alike in the destructive to themselves and deeply injurious to us". Hasrat, *op.cit.*, p. 230.
9. FPC 12 June 1834: No. 140: Hodgson to Trevelyan, 31 May 1834. Hodgson cautioned to Fort William that "she (Nepal) is now formidable as ever. Mere chance may certainly dissipate without harm to us, the Urdu military force which she has amassed in Sheer distance as it were of her circomvallation by our territories. Mere time may certainly wear out the martial propensities of her renewed hostility... From their present suicidal course and gradually to dispose them to shut their institution and habits to their circumstances". Also see Campbell's sketches.
10. FPC 12 June 1834, No. 140: Hodgson to Travelyan, 31 May 1834.

phasised the importance of an extradition agreement. There were some other "trammels", as he called it, that needed immediate attention. One was the adulterated nature of the Nepalese coins which was not accepted in the plains. Another was a prohibition on the use of Indian currency. Indian traders were not paid in the currency of the plains which Nepal received as revenue from the Terai, as this was removed from circulation and used to make her own debased coins. Another restrictions which Hodgson found was the inability of Nepal to make remittance by bills as a consequence of her being largely removed from the circle of the Company's exchange. This was a complaint made to him by the Indian traders.¹¹

But what Hodgson considered the biggest barrier was the complex system of custom duties of the Nepal Government. The advalorem duty levied in Kathmandu, Hodgson pointed out, was discriminating and in violation of the Commercial Treaty of 1792 which provided that on all goods, Indian or European, imported from the plains, a custom duty of 2½% advalorem in the invoice price. This provision, "the supineness of Mr. Gardner," wrote campbell, "permitted the Nepalese to infringe regularly and systematically". The duty actually levied was as high as six to ten percent of the invoice price. On the other hand, duties levied by the company on goods coming into India was 2½% advalorem on the invoice price. "Thus we have given", in Campbell's words again, "for upwards of 40 years, a clear advantage of 7½% of Nepal produce over the same description of commodities the produce of our land."¹³

The actual trade of Nepal with India was much more than what could be calculated on the basis of duties levied. The bulk of the trade was conducted close to the frontier and since there were no outposts on patrols, maintained of the transaction escaped duties.

-
11. FPC 10 July 1834, Nos. 144-151: Hodgson to Traveyan, 9 May 1834. Also Hasrat, op. cit., p. 230.
 12. IPD to the CODs. No. 29 of 13 July 1835 and enclosures.
 13. Campbell's sketches.

Transit duties were no less complicated. Not all goods were subject to taxes however: some were partially exempted.¹⁴ The following details were produced as an illustration:

Tokdari

at Moorliah	2 anna per load
at Bichiakok	2 anna per load
at Hitaunda	2 anna per load

Sayer

at Chissapany	1 anna per 3 Seers
---------------	--------------------

Zamindary

at Chitlong	2 anna per man's load
at Thankote	4 anna per man's load

A further duty was levied at the rate of 10 annas 10 paise per load on all goods of the plains transported to Tibet from Kathmandu.

Hodgson, however, advised against at coercing Nepal into immediately changing her policies and enforcing the provisions of the Commercial Treaty. The reasons, he explained were:

We have acquiesced so long and have now such important political reasons for further acquiescence, if by it we may hope ultimately to obtain our ends of promoting and binding this nation (Nepal) to us through our command over its wants, that our past sacrifices and future aims alike seems to counsel forbearance from all but general and persuasive reforms.¹⁵

He would “explain” and “advise” Nepal into gradually conceding reciprocally in terms of trade making them fully aware

14. The exempted items were such as golds, spices, military armaments etc.

15. FPC 1? June 1834, No. 140; Hodgson to Trevelyan, 31 May 1834.

at the same it was British goods and not “supineness or non-information” that permitted non-fulfilment of the treaty so long.

COMMERCIAL TREATY: HODGSON'S SUGGESTIONS

The attitude of the Government of India was one of caution. While giving a free hand to the Resident to obtain such concessions as he could obtain for Indian traders they were not prepared for any decision in regard to the commercial treaty so long as it was not ascertained whether Nepal considered it in force or not. Hodgson was accordingly instructed, in a letter dated 10 July from Trevelyan, to bring this subject to the notice of the Darbar so that the doubt could be cleared.¹⁶

Clarification came to Hodgson in a curious way. In the course of his enquiry into the custom duties, he discovered that the Company's customs had been enormously charging full duty of 10% advalorem on the invoice on the timber from Nepal, while on all other goods a uniform duty of 2½% was being levied. This was due, as the Magistrate of Murshidabad reported to Hodgson, to timber being accidentally omitted from the schedule of commodities permitted entry into the Company territories. The Darbar when they came to know of this, immediately preferred the claim and applied to the Resident seeking rectification of the mistake. To Hodgson, this was an obvious recognition of the Treaty and it deprived Nepal of her only plausible pretext for violating it. Hodgson immediately brought this fact to the notice of the Government of India, declaring: “we have hold on the Darbar in case of need”, and

shall we (he asked) at once and unconditionally rectify the casual omission of the timber as produce of Nepal in our custom duty schedule or shall we hold back the rectification a while, avow the omission as a fortunate accident and use it to point our argu-

16. FPC 10 July 1834, No. 151: Trevelyan to Hodgson. 10 July 1834: IPD to the COD's No. 29 of 13 July 1835.

ment in favour of the gradual and voluntary reforming by the Darbar itself of its past omission and commission which alone at present we profess to seek.¹⁷

Shortly afterwards, Trevelyan's letter of 10 July reached Kathmandu and Hodgson at once took up the question with the Darbar. In a memorandum, written in Gorkhali, he pointed out that the Company from the very beginning had been observing all the provisions of the Commercial Treaty of 1792. If Nepal recognised its validity, the higher duties levied on goods from India was in violation of it. It was left to Bhim Sen Thapa to clarify the Darbar's position *vis-a-vis* the treaty.¹⁸

Brian Hodgson at this stage seemed fully convinced that it was Bhim Sen who was responsible for the deliberate violation by Nepal of the treaty. The reasons he assigned for this was thus stated:

the desire to evade the full and equal operation of the Treaty of 1792, proceeds from the ministers' unwillingness to admit of such an intercourse between the two countries as much as if it takes place under the quiet commercial advantages resulting from the British connection evident to all classes in Nepal and counteract the false reports regarding the spirit of enforcement by which the British Government is actuated, which are privately but studiously circulated by Bhim Sen to serve his own ambition and hostile purpose.¹⁹

He was equally certain that these problems would be solved if the British ignored the *Mukhtiar* and dealt directly with

17. FPC 19 July 1834, No. 90: Hodgson to Trevelyan, 6 July 1834.

18. FPC 21 August 1834, Nos. 37-38: Hodgson to Trevelyan, 2 August 1834. Enclosures, Translation of Memorandum delivered to the Darbar, 1 August 1834.

19. DFPC 9 October 1834, No. 17: Hodgson to Trevelyan, 20 September 1834.

the Maharaja. It was not at all unlikely that Bhim Sen had been misleading the Maharaja. "It is therefore highly advisable", wrote Hodgson on 20 September to Trevelyan, "that the sentiment of the Raja, the nominal chief of Nepal should be distinctly ascertained" from him directly. The maintenance of direct relations with the Maharaja now become an object of some importance. Already important concessions in this regard had been obtained early in the year. But such access was of little value so long as the Maharaja was unable to exercise the reigns of Government. Hodgson therefore suggested that the British Government should demand that the majority of Rajendra be publicly acknowledged. This was "the only mode in which the disastrous consequences which will in all probability result from continuance of the present state of affairs can be averted".²⁰

On 23 September in a meeting with Bhim Sen and his colleagues, Hodgson was informed that the Maharaja had desired the *status quo* in respect of the Treaty and that it be allowed to continue for five or six years longer on the grounds that this had been going on for so long. Hodgson agreed to forward this wish to Fort William, but knowing fully well that this was Bhim Sen's rather than the Maharaja's proposal added that he would recommend only one year. He also made it clear that its acceptance would solely rest with the Government of India. The importance of one year was fully explained to the Government of India:

a year's pause may afford some quiet solution of our difficulties growing out of the anomolous co-existence of a *defecto* and *dejure* ruler in Nepal.

20. FPC 9 October 1834, No. 17. Hodgson to Trevelyan, 20 September, 1834. Hodgson continued to explain that "it is not possible however that the result of such a measure might be to drive the minister or disparation and induce him to come to an open rupture with our Government and the adoption of it cannot be remanded by the Resident, who is unacquainted with the degree of importance attached by his Government to an alliance with Nepal and knows not whether it would be advisable at the present time to induce the risk by which the measure in question might possibly be attended".

The treaty cannot wholly justify a demand for the removal of existing hinderance to trade arising from the adulterated and prohibited of our coins.

The grant for a year's grace may be made conditionally upon their removal and unless they be removed, the treaty will not ensure the unhampered commerce, we seek.

So long as we hold this important concession over the Darbar we have a surety, of considerable value, for its good behaviour towards us during the period, which promises to be criticals.

It is, I apprehend our business to use every expedient of patience and tenderness to win their rude and fierce people to better course on every dispute of their own suicidal procession.²¹

When Mathbar Singh, Bhim Sen's nephew came to see Hodgson with a message that the one year's grace was acceptable to the *Mukhtiar* and Maharaja, he was told this would granted provided the Government of India was satisfied that the Treaty was, at the end of that period, made operative in its real spirit and meaning.²²

SUGGESTION'S NEGATIVATED: HODGSON CENSURED

Hodgson's proceedings were not considered satisfactory by the Vice-President-in-Council. He was curtly reminded to ascertain, as earlier instructed, whether the Darbar did or did not recognise the treaty. If they did, its provisions would have to be carried into effect on both sides. If they did not, the Company would then be at liberty to put any amount of duties it may deem proper on the commerce of Nepal. The proposal of the Darbar that the treaty be enforced on one side only could not be acceded to and Hodgson,

21. FPC 9 October, 1834, No. 18: Hodgson to Trevelyan, 23 September, 1834.

22. *Ibid.*

it was the wish of the Vice-President-in-Council, was to attached no importance to any such proposals of the Darbar. Nepal, it seemed evident, would be glad to adopt the treaty so long as it was beneficial to themselves. On the other hand, they could hardly be expected to accept its validity if they did not consider it advantages. "The only thing requisite", Hodgson was made to understand, "is to make them understand that the treaty must be binding on both parties or on neither".²³

Hodgson was also cautioned in the strongest terms against any display of undue anxiety or eagerness towards weakening the Mukhtiar's power;

It is no concern to the British Government whether the Raja rules the minister or the minister rules the Raja, your business is with the Government as you find it.

It seemed obvious to the Vice-President-in-Council that any measures adopted by the Resident with a view to weakening the ruling party, could only generate hostile feelings. As the Company did not propose to interfere in the domestic politics of the kingdom, the question "whether the Minister does or does not exercise too much power" was for the Maharaja and the people to decide. It was not a question for the Resident: "Your duty is strict neutrality and conciliatory and inoffensive conduct towards all". Any advance by the Maharaja was to be met with cordiality, but the Government,

does not anticipate any advantage from attempting to force a more intimate intercourse with the Raja is not sought by him and dreaded by the minister as injurious to his own interests, will naturally be resisted by all his influence, by which means you and the actual ruler of the state would be placed in continual opposition, a state of things manifestly undesirable.²⁴

23. FPC 9 October 1834, No. 19: Trevelyan to Hodgson, 9 October, 1834. Also IPD to the Court of Directors, No. 29 of 13 July 1835, Para-68.

24. *Ibid.*

On receiving these strictures, Hodgson expressed regrets in his usual a long and rambling fashion that his earnestness had been misunderstood by the Government. Going back over the history of British relations with Nepal he drew attention of Government of India to the efforts made since the early days of the Company in Bengal to open trade with the Himalayan regions. The opportunities that were seized in 1792 and again in 1802 and the instructions that were issued to the Residents then show that commerce was clearly the primary object of the missions. The Treaty of Sagauli in 1816 however contained no provision confirming the earlier Commercial Treaty. Although Nepal had consistently violated its provisions the distinct appeal of the Darbar for its unilateral operation for a time clearly indicated that the Darbar had regarded it as valid. He was "fully convinced that through a free and favoured commerce or not at all shall we obtain a permanently secure, peaceful connection with Nepal", and regretted that "an opportunity for pressing the acceptance of such commerce on the Darbar . . . will not again recur".

Hodgson was convinced that justice required of him to disassociate the Maharaja and the Chiefs from the "determined spirit of alienation and hostility" of Bhim Sen Thapa. Hence, it was necessary to have direct access to the Maharaja. He asked the Government to consider if it was

fitting for its representative to be excluded from fair access to the only avowedly responsible head of state under a plea (of minority) which had become utterly unteanable and indecent whilst the sufference of it materially contributed in the maintenance of the evils to which we are exposed.²⁵

25. FPC 13 November 1834, No. 38: Hodgson to Trevelyan, 29 October 1834. He continued, "Law, opinion and the recent precedent might suffice to consider me of my right to access to the Rajah; but had not my continued acquiescence in the details of that right produced a general impression of my partizanship and had not that impression been pressed into the service of politics most injurious to the interest, of my Government".

Access to the Maharaja and the Treaty of 1792 appeared to him as remedies: "legitimate remedies for the gravest evils affecting ourselves, whether or not I overstated their remedial efficacy or in other words their importance", it was for Government to decide. But deplored the "mischance which has turned its whole attention from the evils to the proposed cures". He concluded with the hope that the facts stated

will vindicate me from the suspicion of a desire to interfere with the domestic affairs of this Court in reference to access to the Raja; and will demonstrate that my idea of the serious nature of the question at issue in regard to the Treaty rested upon a careful survey of the past and was supported by the tenore of my recorded instruction.²⁶

TREATY REJECTED: NEW AGREEMENT PROPOSED

In view of some excitement in Kathmandu over recent development in Rajputana,²⁷ Hodgson delayed acting upon the instruction of Government of India. It was on 8 November that he sent his *Munshi* to the Darbar to tell the *Mukhtiar* that the Company could no longer consent to the unilateral operation of the Treaty and that the Darbar was free to recognise or decline its validity. It was to be made clear to Bhim Sen Thapa that in the event of the Treaty not

26. *Ibid.* Hodgson continued "the Darbar's alienation was still working the most injurious and deplorable effects. The economic circumstances of Nepal seemed to me to justify the notion the good will of the Country through our control over its wants, whilst the relations of its Government . . . to be one of such great obligation on her side as to render it nearly certain that we had put formally to signify our claims and expectation in relations to commerce to obtain her acquiescence therein.

27. Campbell's sketches, *op.cit.*, 1834. It as reported that "the inimical temper and views of the Darbar about this period towards the British Government appeared to have been strengthened by reports prevalent at Kathmandu, of our having marched the whole of our available force to the westward against Man Singh of Jodhpur and thereby having left our territories on Nepal frontier unprotected".

been recognised, the Government of India would consider itself free to levy such duties as it deemed fit on Nepal's goods.²⁸ Mathar Singh himself came to the Residency to say that the Darbar had declined to recognise the Treaty but that they wished to continue its trade relations with the Company, "without the form of the old treaties"—if the Government of India agreed to it. Hodgson agreed to forward to Calcutta any specific proposal which the Darbar may have in this regard.²⁹

The non-recognition of the Treaty by Nepal was a bitter disappointment to Hodgson. All his past effort seemed wasted and his hopes to use the threat of higher custom duties to force the Darbar into following provision of the Treaty seemed lost. He was fully aware of the fear of the Darbar that the Company may, if they recognised the treaty, some day make retrospective claim for forbearance by the Government of India was what the Darbar wanted and Hodgson was quite sure that they were lately satisfied in this regard. Raising of the Custom duties of Nepalese goods would not have led to any resentment for the Darbar was prepared for it the moment they were told that the Company was no longer prepared to accept a one sided operation of the treaty. That the Darbar would relent was quite clear:

28. FPC 21 November 1834, No. 156: Hodgson to Trevelyan, 8 November 1834.

29. FPC 2 December 1834, No. 87-89: Hodgson to Trevelyan, 12 November 1834. Hodgson on the same day in a huff, issued circulats to all Collectors of Customs informing them that the Commercial Treaty of 1792 with Nepal was no longer in operation and that the duty of 2½% so long levied on Nepalese goods ceased to have any validity. He further told them that pending instructions from Government, they were at liberty to charge full custom duties. Hodgson was immediately censured for exceeding his instruction, and was told that the Governor-General-in Council was "concerned at the precipitating with which you have adopted that measure, which, one likely to compromise the existing good feelings between the two Governments, though obviously where been left for the decision of superior authority. Since the Government of India had no instruction of accepting any measures which might be disagreeable to the Darbar", Hodgson was instructed to inform all the Collectors that it was Government desire that they should to levy duties as before.

I gather distinctly the conviction that had Government seem fit to take higher ground with it (the Darbar) upon the entire matter of its (treaty) obligation to us, it as prepared for considerable concessions in reference to more points than one.³⁰

On 1 December, Fateh Jung Shah brought in a message from the Maharaja offering a new agreement incorporating the "sum and substance" of the Treaty of 1792 and 1801 in so far as trade was concerned. The main feature of the proposal was the duty of 4% advelorem on the invoice to be levied once and for all at the *Sadar* station. It was not clear whether what was proposed was to be a treaty or a less formal agreement. Hodgson would have liked to include in its provisions removing the existing adulteration of the Company's coins and withdrawing restrictions on its entry into Nepal. He hoped that the agreement would be "the first step" towards solving these problems. He accordingly welcomed the Maharaja's proposal and recommended its approval to the Governor-General.³¹

Unfortunately for the Resident the impression in Calcutta somehow was that Hodgson had extracted the Maharaja's proposal. The Resident was informed in reply that

30. FPC 15 January 1835, No. 43: Hodgson to Macnaghten, 2 December 1834. In the same despatch, Hodgson remarked that "the blustering attitude of this Darbar cannot indeed deceive me, but I know too well its false position and bias to do or even to suggest anything calculated to bring about disturbances".

31. FPC 19 December 1834, Nos. 9-10: Hodgson to Macnaghten, 2 December 1834. Taking advantage of the situation Hodgson urged the Government to demand an explanation from Darbar for her earlier hostile attitude, "I have no hesitation in saying that my judgement, the protection and encouragement of commerce affords a probable means of such prevention. At least, the experiment of its efficacy seems well worthy of trial and though I am of the ignorant of Asiatic ruler upon this subject I cannot contemplate the great and increasing dependence of Nepal both for sale and purchase on our markets without being convinced that by prudent preserverance we may succeed in binding the country to us and gradually overcoming the exclusive martial profession of its Government".

while the Governor General-in-Council would favourably consider any proposal for promoting trade between the two countries which might be "spontaneously suggested" by the Darbar.

It is not deemed necessary that you should evince any eager dispositions to bring about this result however itself desirable.

It was also considered necessary to have a distinct understanding of the term "*Sadar* station" For if it meant Kathmandu, British goods might travel within a mile of the station and vice-versa without being subject to any duties at all.³²

Hodgson vehemently protested against this censure. The initiative came from the Darbar itself, he wrote to Macnaghten on 30 December. The proposal was complete so far as the Darbar was concerned, and it only required the general approval of the Government before the details of its provisions could be entered into.³³ The reason for this offer was simple enough: it was the anxiety that the rejection of the treaty would provoke the Company into adopting a hard line that actually led Fateh Jung's offer. There was indeed a sudden change in the tone of the relations of the Darbar with the Resident from December itself. Not only was Hodgson's desire to change his residence agreed to but measures were taken for the early completion of the bungalow. In these circumstances, Hodgson's conclusion was that:

32. *Ibid.* Macnaghten to Hodgson, 13 December 1834.

33. FPC 15 January 1835, No. 44: Hodgson to Trevelyan, 30 December 1834. Of the Governor-General accusation of his influencing the Darbar, Hodgson wrote, "with reference to the injunction laid upon me to avoid any eager disposition to bring about a 'spontaneous' proposition, it would seem to be presumed that which I reported on the 2nd instant was not altogether voluntary. To some earnestness in discussing the subject of the treaty of 1792 with the Darbar I readily pleas guilty, but that the proposition of Fateh Jung was one unduly produced procured by me no one I fancy can image where adverts to the more than independent carriage of the Darbar in relation to the Residency from 1816 to the present hour".

the recent proposition would not have been made, could the Darbar have foreseen our willingness to suffer the continued unilateral operation of the old treaty notwithstanding the deliberate denunciation of its validity by the Darbar.

The Darbar, he added, was daily enquiring if the proposal had been accepted but he gave no hint of the receipt of Magnaghten's letter so that the Government of India could decide how far and in what form advantage could be taken of Fateh Jung's proposal.³⁴

On 4 January, Hodgson again addressed Macnaghten on the subject, disclaiming any influence upon the Darbar's proposal:

Advice may readily amount to command, at any on all of the Darbars of the plains, but this state exhibits no single link or dependence on our power; and the records of the Residency afford abundant testimony that it has always felt and arrested its independence with more than sufficient energy...³⁵

He explained in detail the reasons behind the Darbar's offer for a new treaty so soon after declining to recognise the old. The Treaty of 1792 was rejected not only because of fear of British claims for compensation, but also because the duty was considered too low and both that treaty and the subsequent one of 1801 contained provisions having nothing to do with commerce. The new treaty was important to them as its acceptance by the British would debar the latter from claiming compensation on the basis of the earlier treaties. The new treaty also offered a moderate custom duty bringing about an average between the cost almost nominal rate and the heavy one of British regulations. Referring to what he considered loss of ground, Hodgson

34. *Ibid.*

35. FPC 23 January 1835, No. 51; Hodgson to Macnaghten, 4 January 1835.

added that "the boon which might have been conceded with grace at the commencement of this discussion could hardly be granted now without exciting mischevious surmises".³⁶

On 7 January, a senior *Bharadar* on behalf of the Darbar called at the Residency to enquire whether the Government of India's sanction to the proposal had been received or not. Hodgson again gave no induction of the view of his Government. He only told them, as if the suggestion was his, that the Governor-General would always consider any suggestion of the Darbar "spontaneously" made for the promotion of trade between the two countries. The *Bharadars*, Sardar Daryan Singh, left the Residency but again called after three hours stating that the proposal of Feteh Jung was the "deliberate and spontaneous suggestion of the Court with an eye to its own advantage". Hodgson took advantage of this meeting to seek clarification on various matters of detail including the meaning of *sadar* station. A hint was also given that the agreement could take the form of something less than a formal treaty. The meeting was reported to Calcutta the following day with recommendation that proposal be accepted by the Government of India.³⁷

DRAFT TREATY

Meanwhile, Hodgson as several letters had been considered by the Governor-General-in-Council. On 15 January, he was informed that the Government of India had never expressed its intention to consent to higher duties on British goods in Nepal and lower duties on Nepal's in the Company's territories.³⁸ A more detailed statement of the Darbar's

36. *Ibid.*

37. *Ibid.* No. 52: Hodgson to Macnaghten, 8 January 1835.

38. FPC 15 January 1835, No. 45: Macnaghten to Hodgson, 16 January 1835. What the Governor-General-in-Council objected to, Hodgson was informed was "you took upon yourself to abrogate the existing arrangement on your own authority by writing to the different collectors of Custom desiring them to levy the full rate of duty with reference to which you are told that you have exceeded your powers and you were directed by us for reverting to the status in which they were before your acted in this matter".

proposition was what was actually required, before a decision could be arrived at. Hodgson understood from this that the Government of India had agreed to the proposed treaty.³⁹ He at once informed Fateh Jung that his offer of a new trade agreement was agreed to but that a more detailed proposition was required before formal approval could be granted by the Government of India. In anticipation of this, draft on the model of the Treaty of 1792, which was what Hodgson also thinking of was already under preparation in the Darbar.⁴⁰ In March 1835, a series of discussions between Hodgson and the Darbar “conducted in a very friendly and frank spirit” led to the finalisation of the Draft. On 24 March, Hodgson forwarded this to the Governor-General for early approval as the Darbar was anxious that the treaty be put effect at the beginning of *Baisakh*, the new year.

In forwarding the draft⁴¹ Hodgson wrote that compared to earlier treaties, the advantage to be gained by the proposed new treaty was substantial. British trade with Nepal had been so long crippled by heavy duties levied without principle and peace-meal at several unassigned custom houses. By the new treaty, uniform and moderate custom duties of 4% *adveloram Khuldar* and 5% *Mahendra Mullee* would be levied on the respective goods of India and Nepal.

39. FPC 24 February 1835, No. 48: Hodgson to Macnaghten, 6 February 1835. Hodgson thus wrote: “It is with great satisfaction that I gather from the opening words of your despatch . . . that the tenor of your prior despatch of the 19th December which seemed to imply that a distinct proposition offered by me to Government in the name of the Darbar, was not recognised as the Darbar . . . by Government were not meant to convey the sense I fear they carried: *viz.*, that this proposal was regarded by Government as something other than my statement made it and that my zeal was deemed to have outrun my direction to the extent of having caused me to make an inaccurate report of my transactions with the darbar. The relief from this painful impression under which I have suffered for more than a month is grateful indeed and the more necessary because with so capricious a people as the Nepalese to deal with it is always sufficiently difficult for the Resident to give the relation transaction with them that degree of consistency which Govt. naturally looks for”.

40. *Ibid.*

41. For details of its provisions, see Appendix-G.

No other duties would be levied either at the fixed custom houses or in transit. The new-treaty also fixed the custom stations for collection of duties once and for all. The new instrument further afforded an advantages for both Indian and Nepalese merchants. Earlier too, the Nepalese traders who imported goods from India were exempted from paying all duties and likewise the Indian traders when they once crossed the boundary found their goods also not liable to duty. Therefore, the new agreement if applied would check the illegal infiltrations of goods removing gradually the inequality.

In certain respects, however, the proposed treaty felt short of Hodgson's expectations. In the first place there was no mention of the 'right of search'. There were frequent complaints by Nepalese traders of indiscriminate search and exaction on their goods in the Company's territories. It was only agreed that no search should be made once the custom duties were paid. Hodgson also assured the Darbar that its traders in British territories would no longer be harassed on this account. Secondly, the question of adulterated coins was left unsettled. Hodgson had in fact proposed an article to the effect that there should be no legal restrictions to the entry of British coins into Nepal. The Darbar, while agreeing to the reasonableness of the request, declined assent, and Hodgson in the interest of the treaty as a whole did not press the matter any further.⁴²

The Board of Customs, Salt and Opium in India considered the draft proposed on. The duty of four percent advelorem duty on all Nepalese goods that entered into the British territories was too low to be accepted. If further observed that important provisions were omitted in the treaty to be concluded. Therefore, the Government of India, on the objection raised by the Board of Customs, resolved to advice the Resident that "it is not advisable to make any alteration in the transit duty which are at present levied on imports from Nepal territories". However, he was informed that the proposal was placed before the Board of Control for

42. FPC 20 July 1835, No. 18: Hodgson to Macnaghten, 25 March, 1835.

consideration.⁴³ On 21 July, Hodgson once again reported Darbar's eagerness to know the delay in accepting the proposition of the Commercial treaty., He explained to the Darbar the reason for delay was the new arrangement of the Custom Department which required the approval of the Board of Control.⁴⁴

43. FPC 20 July 1835, Nos. 20-21; An Exact from the Proceedings of the Hon'ble Governor-General-in-Council, 1 July 1835.

44. FPC 10 August 1835, Nos. 36-37; Hodgson to Macnaghten, 21 July 1835, and Macnaghten to Hodgson 10 August 1835.

CHAPTER-IV

FALL OF BHIM SEN THAPA

Hodgson saw the proposed Commercial Treaty as a concession to the British susceptibility, but in reality it was actuated by the growing opposition in Kathmandu to Bhim Sen. Towards the close of 1834, Ranjung Pande, son of Damodar Pande whom Bhim Sen had ousted way back in 1803, petitioned the Maharaja for the return of his family's properties and honours. Revival of these claims, thirty one years after their confiscation and favourable response of the Maharaja towards Ranjung clearly indicated that the Pandes had already gained considerable ground. From that date may be reckoned" observed Assistant Resident, J.R. Tickell, "the commencement of a counter-revolution, and of those intrigues of the Kala Pandes, which eventually succeeded so well in overthrow of their rivals and in repaying the cruelties they themselves suffered at his (Bhim Sen) hands".¹ The return of the Pandes was made easy by the attitude of the senior Maharani Samrajaya Lakshmi Devi. This energetic and ambitious lady had been constantly urging the Maharaja to assert himself against his minister and for this purpose was sympathetic towards and even materially added any faction² opposed to the Thapas. The Pandes were to profit immensely from this.

That the Maharaja would sooner or later wish to assume the reigns of Government was Bhim Sen's main worry.

1. Tickell's events in Nepal 1834.
2. For details of the various contending factions, see Hunter, *op. cit.*, pp. 143-et. seqq.

By the death of the Queen Regent in 1832, he had lost his principal supporter. The attainment of majority by the Maharaja at the same time deprived Bhim Sen of the only excuse for absolute rule in the name of the minor Raja. It was said of Bhim Sen that since then he had resorted to every stratagem to prevent the Maharaja from assuming control of the affairs of state so as to continue his ministerial rule. He was even said to have attempted to lead the youthful prince astrays into debanchery, so that he did not develop any ambition for government. When this failed the Maharaja was surrounded with priests and *Brahmins* to impress upon the young mind the importance of religious over temporal matters. During this time Bhim Sen deliberately represented the Maharaja to his subjects as well as the Residency as indifferent to the affairs of the kingdom and wholly given to religious activities. When all such methods failed and the Maharaja was daily giving evidence of his interest in Government, Bhim Sen worked for his abdication. On 26 March 1833, Assistant Resident Campbell wrote:

The minister has been for some months back busily engaged in trying to get the Raja to abdicate in favour of his eldest son, and has industriously propagated a belief at Kathmandu that this measure will are long take place. The *Rani's* name is now by him on most occasions, instead of the Raja.³

While the Maharaja was kept confined to the Palace, every opportunity was taken to exhibit his son, the princeling, to the public. When the Prince moved out he was invariably accompanied by the minister and a large number of chiefs.⁴

3. FPC 24 April 1837, Nos. 82-84. Memorandum regarding a mission from the Gorkha Darbar to the Governor General of India at Calcutta in 1835-36: by a Campbell, officiating Assistant Resident attached to the mission.

4. *Ibid.* Dr. Campbell describes the following incident in illustration: "For some days past the little prince has been having lessons in riding from the old minister; yesterday he was mounted on a pony and led out of the palace and attended by all the Sirdars; the minister bare-footed holding him on and running alongside the urchin's horse traversed the principal streets of the city".

Samrajya Lakshmi Devi, apprehensive that the Maharaja's inability to assert himself might deprive her and her children of their rightful position in the kingdom gave in to the mechanisation of the minister for a time. On 19 April she publicly arraigned her husband:

You are an independent Raja indeed. You are a slave of Bhim Sen . . . a sheep being led to the slaughter. Has he bewitched you or has he poured lead into your ears rendering you deaf . . . Let me and my children depart and leave you to the fate your imbecility deserves, or . . . you become religious go to Benaras to bathe and pray and leave me with our eldest boy to rule the country and try if a woman cannot succeed where a man has failed in annihilating the Thapas and asserting the lawful rights of sovereignty among her own subjects.⁵

Bhim Sen's abdication plans failed: "The Raja's prudence in tacitly bearing with his ills", Campbell points out", deprived the minister of all pretexts for the employment of force".

MISSION TO INDIA PROPOSED

On 27th April 1835 at a religious procession to which the Residency was invited with the Maharaja and the Darbar, Bhim Sen casually told Hodgson that he had a great desire to see England and if it were possible he or his nephew, Mathbar Singh Thapa would like to visit England soon.⁶ A formal proposal was made two weeks later in the name of the Maharaja that he would like Mathbar Singh to proceed to Europe to see for himself the recent developments in the arts and the sciences there, particularly of England.⁷

5. *Ibid.*

6. Campbell's sketches.

7. FPC 25 May 1835, No. 34: Hodgson to the Political Secretary to the Government of India, 10 May 1835.

A general in the Nepal Army and since 1834 in command of the prestigious and important eastern region, Mathbar was extremely popular with all ranks. Next only to Bhim Sen himself in the Thapa faction he was destined to play a pivotal role in the Government of the kingdom. At any rate, this was how Hodgson saw him. The fate of Anglo-Gorkha relations after Bhim Sen was a subject of great concern to the Resident. For without an equally capable successor it seemed almost certain that it would be very difficult to keep the army and the military classes under adequate restraint. Only a year ago Hodgson had recorded:

Bhim Sen is old, and a very few years must necessitate his retirement. There is no statesman of Nepal with a title of his weight of character, or reputation to succeed him and it is here the general and just opinion that a feebler successor would soon behold a masterless soldiery defying the deliberate will of the state, when we should become at once exposed to the hazard of precipitate assault and to the almost certain loss of the existing advantages of the alliances.⁸

If the object of Bhim Sen's proposed mission was to prepare Mathbar Singh as his successor it was welcomed by Hodgson. Mathbar Singh in Hodgson words, "is in the prime of life, the nephew of the minister Bhim Sen Thapa, his probable successor in the ministry frank, intelligent, well-bred and free from all discreditable personal habits" In a situation where the military resources were constantly increasing Hodgson thought that Mathbar Singh won over and bound to the British interests at the outset promised the best hope for the peaceful and friendly relations between the two states. He accordingly recommended that the mission be accepted by the Governor General in the following words:

8. Hodgson: *Recorded and Unrecorded Notes (1834): Nepal Residency Papers*. For Extract see B.J. Hasrat, *op. cit.*, p. 239 f.

I conceive that it will be worth the while to afford him (Mathbar Singh) some protection and countenance as could hardly fail to bind this probable future administrator of the Nepalese Government to us by the double tie of gratitude and of complete conviction of our unassailable strength.⁹

No sooner had the Governor General-in-Council assented¹⁰ than rumours appeared in Kathmandu that the object of the proposed mission was not an entirely complimentary one and that Bhim Sen had ulterior motives behind it. For a time these rumours were too vague for Hodgson to take any notice of them. But after putting together many indications Hodgson revised his opinion. On 14 June he wrote to Macnaghten that he was inclined to believe that the subject of the removal of the Residency and the restoration of Kumaon were in reality what Bhim Sen wanted the mission to take up in England if it failed to evoke any response in Calcutta. A few days after this, when Mathbar Singh himself virtually admitted that there were indeed other objectives than the mere exchange of compliments as the Resident was earlier given to understand, Hodgson confronted Bhim Sen, and the latter in Campbell's account:

acknowledged that the existence of the rumours and the folly of his having jestingly said a few days previous that the Resident had seduced his nephew into making the voyage to England.¹¹

-
9. FPC 25 May 1835, No. 34: Hodgson to the Political Secretary to the Government of India, 10 May 1835. Hodgson's relations with the Darbar was cordial enough for him to declare the proposal of Bhim Sen to be "a most unequivocal and remarkable demonstration of the truth of its profession of future cordiality assuming the sincerity of that proposition which thus far I see no reason to doubt".
 10. *Ibid.* No. 35: Government to Hodgson, 25 May 1835.
 11. FPC 24 April 1837 Nos. 82-84: Memorandum regarding a Mission from the Gorkha Darbar to the Governor General of India at Calcutta in 1835-36, by A. Campbell, officiating Assistant Resident attached to the Mission.

Bhim Sen denied that there was any truth in these rumours. But as discussion on the details of the mission progressed, Hodgson's suspicious deepened.¹² On 2 October he and Campbell met the Maharaja and asked him pointedly of the objects he had in mind in proposing the mission. The latter in Bhim Sen's presence replied:

My most anxious and sincere desire is to be on the most friendly footing with the Company's Government, and to attain that end my heart's wish is to do in all things that may equally rebound to my own credit and that of the Resident. In sending the mission to Calcutta I have no purpose whatever except the testifying my anxiety for an increase of friendly feelings between the two states.¹³

This was the first occasion, Campbell later noted, when the young Maharaja had shown any considerable degree of self-possession and capacity for doing business. That the Maharaja was speaking his own mind and with sincerity neither he nor Hodgson doubted. By now it was the Maharaja and not Mathbar Singh or any of the Thapas that the Resident began looking forward to.

MAHARANI SAMRAJYA LAKSHMI DEVI

On 8 November there was an uproar in the Darbar following the Maharani's quitting the palace with her chil-

12. *Ibid.* Campbell thus describes a meeting between the Resident and the minister: "I was present at the interview and came away much disappointed and surprised. The minister's tone was undecided as to the time of despatching the mission as well as regarding its objects. I, however, fixed him to giving one distinct answer by saying that if I understood him alright the sole purpose in view was the increasing and strengthening the existing friendship between both states. He looked a little posed at the pointedness of my question, but, after a little hesitation replied yes, nothing whatever more. Nevertheless, he is not to be believed or trusted-and it is to me still doubtful whether he be sincere in his present expressions of a wish to manifest distinctly by this act the good will of the Darbar to our Government or have not other purposes under it."

13. *Ibid.*

dren at midnight. Hodgson's informer maintained that the Maharani, Samrajya Lakshmi Devi, had been disgusted at his husband's inability to resist his minister's demand for special powers for the mission to negotiate in Calcutta or in England.¹⁴ The Maharaja, Hodgson was further informed, did not finally succumb to these pressures because this would have meant going against the assurance made to the Resident and to the Governor General of India that there were no ulterior motives behind the mission. But Hodgson suspected that it was probably because the Maharaja feared that if Mathbar were successful in obtaining the concessions, i.e., the retrocession of Kumaon or the withdrawal of the Residency, from the British, Thapa supremacy would be further strengthened and his own fate sealed. Hodgson was unwilling to do anything that might lead to this result. He therefore counselled forbearance from any negotiation with the Thapas.

Power is wholly on one side, right on the other. But endurance has nearly gone to length amongst proud and patriotic people and the sole stay of the stronger party is an old man of 65 whose health and even sickness will be the instant signal for a struggle between the several grown members of his family, during which struggle the amiable intelligent young prince can scarcely fail to redeem his own with the voice and aid of nobles.¹⁵

Two days later, after the storm had blown over, Hodgson was given yet another story; that the late uproar in the palace was occasioned not by Bhim Sen's seeking special power for the mission¹⁶ but by his demand to be made minister for life.¹⁷ In reporting this to the Govern-

14. *Ibid.*

15. FPC 23 November 1835, Nos. 25-28; Hodgson to Macneughten, 10 November 1836.

16. *Ibid.*

17. *Ibid.*

ment of India, Hodgson said that the mission could proceed as agreed to for, shorn of ulterior motives it would not be opposed by the weaker but now assertive factions and that it may produce a better spirit in the Darbar. A little later Hodgson confirmed that the mission so long as it remained of a complimentary nature had wide support and that it was bound to produce in the Thapa faction a rational attitude towards the British and keep "things quiet" in the Darbar "till the decay or demise of the old minister shall enable the amiable and eminently prudent young sovereign to come into the exercise of his authority".

Further,

The minister is of great age and cannot much endure... with reference to the conflicting claims of the minister's grown members of his family and to the vast number of men trained to arms by the rotation system with which this country abounds it is of much consequence to the peace of this country (Nepal) and possibly to our own that the young Raja should quietly expect his opportunity and be evinced to avail himself of it; for his lawful authority and admirable character offer guarantee for peace after the removal of Bhim Sen in the course of nature such as we might look for in vain elsewhere.

If the Maharaja had lately shown sign of asserting himself it was almost entirely because of the firmness exhibited by Maharani Samrajya Lakshmi Devi. It was clear to Bhim Sen that it would be difficult for him to overcome the opposition of the Maharani if he had any intention of using the mission to his own advantage. In open Darbar she declared that the question of the recovery of the territories lost to the company in the late war was one for the Maharaja to decide through negotiations; if necessary with the Resident who was the accredited representative of the Government of India. Should the Maharaja require any assistance in this regard he would turn to the Government in

Calcutta. Samrajya Lakshmi Devi in fact took positive steps to strengthen the hands of the Maharaja. She persuaded Rajendra to raise a regiment exclusively under his control; and when the Maharaja failed to obtain funds from the minister for the purpose she rebuked him: "You have given a *sunnad* making once for all everything to the minister, who with his family and creatures eat up all so that neither have we any right nor even means to provide for our children".¹⁸ She demanded that if there were no funds for a new regiment, fifty thousand rupees from the Terai revenues for the children. When the Maharaja said that this was not possible, Samrajya Lakshmi Devi angrily burst out:

You are no Raja, others rule and spend.
You have your mere *Gaddi* and mouthful to eat. Such too is my share and your children...
will no longer partake it on a pageant throne.¹⁹

MISSION FAILED: BHIM SEN'S ATTITUDE CHANGED

In November 1835, all details of the mission had been finalised* and on 26th it left Kathmandu under Mathbar Singh Thapa with an escort of six hundred and fifty men. It was accompanied by Dr. Alan Campbell, Assistant Resident. In India, the mission was well received and Mathbar Singh Thapa was given full military honours. On 20 March 1836 it returned to Nepal after a stay of nearly four months.²⁰ Hodgson, as he passed through the ranks of the escort on

18. FPC 23 November 1835, No. 27. Hodgson to Macnaghten, 14 November 1836.

19. *Ibid.* No. 28. An extract from a paper of Secret Intelligence, 10 November 1835. As the Maharani left the palace, Rajendra reproached Pushkar Shah, the Raj Guru for passing ill animity in the Darbar and called him "a traitor to the family" for not opposing the minister's excess.

* As the mission was preparing to leave the Darbar had prepared letters to the British Sovereign and the Governor General which materially differed from the texts agreed upon by the Resident. It was only after Hodgson's threat that the Mission may be cancelled that the Darbar adhered to the complimentary letters earlier drafted.

20. FPC 24 April 1837, Nos. 82-84. Campbell Memorandum.

his way to the Darbar to receive the mission found "very agreeable countenances and cheerful replies of men heretofore unusually haughty and reserved towards us".²¹ But to Bhim Sen Thapa the mission was clearly a failure.

It had become plain to Mathbar Singh by the time he reached Calcutta that despite the military and civil compliments he had received, the British considered his mission no more than a private and friendly visit of a representative of a neighbouring state. Dr. Campbell, never an admirer of the Thapas and lately very critical of them, prevented Mathbar Singh from entering into any discussion on political subjects either with himself or with other officials in Calcutta. It was also made clear to Mathbar Singh that in such matters the Government of India would not by pass the Resident. Mathbar's personal request for a land grant in India also remained unrealised. Bhim Sen, who it was made known, was prepared to lift restrictions upon the Resident and his followers and on trade in return for concessions and favours, found the British unresponsive. The attitude of the Government of India, in Dr. Campbell's opinion:

had the effect of clearly and forcibly demonstrating to the minister and to the Raja our firm determination not to come forward to aid the evil and selfish desire of the former or to thwart the legitimate expectation of the latter, by interfering with his efforts at attaining the right from which he (the Raja) has been so long excluded.²²

-
21. FPC 11 April 1836: Nos. 35-37: Hodgson to Macnaghten, 20 March 1836, and also FPC 18 April 1836, Nos. 57-58: Hodgson to Macnaghten, 5 April 1836.
22. FPC 24 April 1837, Nos. 82-84: As regards the objects of the mission, Campbell writes: "I consider the mission to have been proposed with two real objects in view, different from avowed ones. First, to deceive us as by professions of friendship and change for the future, as to induce us to withdraw the Residency and thus leave the field more open for increase usurpation by the minister and, Second (the first failing) to deceive us as far as by friendly professions and promises from the minister (the sole ruler at the time) of laying the country to us, and should lead us to enter into league with him by giving a grant

The mission, therefore, brought neither personal gains for Mathbar nor for the Thapas single piece of evidence of achievement which they could cash upon the domestic front. The result was indeed quite the reverse of Hodgson's fond hope of "an excellent effect on the general temper of the Nepalese towards our Government".

The first indication of this came in March when the Darbar refused to accept the Report of Colonel Lloyd on the Nepal-Sikkim boundary and revived Nepal's claims to Kopilashi.²³ This was followed by a refusal to allow British officer to follow up the Thugi operations into the Nepal frontier where these criminals had taken refuge.²⁴ A month later Nepal's intransigence became more apparent. In June 1836, Hodgson wrote to Macnaghten that if the idea of the new Commercial Treaty had been abandoned and if Nepal were to enjoy virtual exemption of the custom duties it would be better to remove all custom houses on the frontier and ini-

of land to Mathbar Singh, and thus help to perpetuate his rule against all attempts of the Raja to displace him. The trip to England was mere pretence for the gaining of one of both these objects. Its immediate abandonment by the Darbar on the Resident's message just before the mission started, to the effect that it had better not go, then that any expectation should attach to it, is a clear proof of it".

23. FPC 16 October 1835, Nos. 89-92: For details see "Summary of Correspondence regarding disputed boundary between the states of Nepal and Sikkim" by R.B. Pemberton. The Nepal-Sikkim boundary though roughly defined by treaties following the Anglo-Gorkha War (1814-16) had never been properly demarcated which led to petty disputes. The most difficult problem related to a tract of land called Kpilashi situated between two branches of the Mechi river, called the old and new. Sikkim had possession of his tract since 1817, but were practically dispossessed by Nepalese ryots who crossed over the old Mechi (western) and began cultivation after 1830. The Government of India decided that the old Mechi was the boundary and in 1834 the Darbar accepted this verdict. Problems, however, continued when efforts were made to demarcate the boundary and new areas of dispute, particularly the Siddhi-Khola, surfaced. The Government decided to send a joint Boundary Commission under Colonel Lloyd and representatives of Nepal and Sikkim to determine and demarcate the boundary once for all. Colonel Lloyd after much trouble submitted his report to the Government in earlier 1836.
24. FPC 6 June 1836, Nos. 88-92: Hodgson to Government, 10 May 1836.

tiate free trade.²⁵ The occasion should be taken, when the Darbar was informed of this decision, to express a hope that Nepal would not lag behind in doing likewise. When Hodgson approached the Darbar on the subject after obtaining approval of the Governor General-in-Council he found their response negative. He was informed in a cryptic message:

The Darbar proposes to do in regard to trade as it has heretofore done.

Hodgson adopting a conciliatory manner, again suggested to the Darbar sometime afterwards that they show in some way their appreciation of the Government of India's friendship, but this too had no effect. The incident as Hodgson wrote to Fort William clearly proved how sincere the Darbar's recent professions of friendship were. "This proof, I believe", Hodgson said:

was worth having in all the distinction it now nears; because there has been for some time past an ostentation of semblance of cordiality which it was desirable to test the sincerity of.

The appearance of friendship on the part of Darbar was probably dictated by the necessity of keeping well with the British. Hodgson believed that this was not strong enough to have any permanent effect upon its future policy. It appeared certain to him that the Darbar was merely taking advantage of British forbearance. Yet he would continue this state of affairs if only because, as he explained:

Her reformation is in the womb of time and must proceed slowly from change in her institutions and habits. But whatever

25. FPC 27 July 1836, Nos. 25-27: Hodgson to Government, 10 June 1836. For, Hodgson explained, "The Dabar is apt to imagine that it can outwit us, by reasons of the small share of attention, Government can afford to its proceedings and the stress of our vast affairs . . . the passing over in silence the question of the treaty might tend to strengthen such a notion".

forbearance we exercise towards her in the meanwhile will be profitable only in proportion as it is seasoned with vigilance.²⁶

THE OPPOSITION: HODGSON'S SUGGESTION

Not long after the return of the Mission Mathbar Singh found himself openly charged by Ranjung Pande of illicit relations with his brother's widow. The charge was ultimately dropped,²⁷ there being in all probability no foundation to it. But the fact that Ranjung went scot free was seen by Hodgson to "imply a serious diminution of the minister's power". During the *Dashera* the Pandes openly defied Bhim Sen turning the festival "more like an overt strife of parties than we have been accustomed to under Bhim Sen". At one stage it was even thought that the former would succeed in fully reducing the minister's power and authority.

The mounting opposition Hodgson saw as essentially a reaction to the encroachment by the military under Bhim Sen upon the rights and privileges of the sovereign and the old aristocracy. The opposition consisted of the civilian Councillors and "almost all the ancient families of state and founders of her greatness in past times". These were the men who suffered most at the hands of the "military party" since the turn of the century and who had been deprived of the most ordinary share of the wealth and honours of state.* Maharaja Rajendra, Hodgson said, was the head of this party. Twenty three years old and the father of six children, Hodgson found him "amiable, prudent and well disposed towards us". Having suffered like his ancestors from the

26. FPC 15 August 1836, Nos. 23-24: Hodgson to Macnaghten, 27 July 1836 & Hodgson to Macnaghten, 28 July 1836.

27. FPC 12 December 1836, Nos. 36-37: Hodgson to Macnaghten, 17 November 1836. According to Hodgson the charge was dropped because it proved too strong a step for the Pandes who preferred to concentrate on ensuring the recognition of the Maharaja's authority. "If this be so", Hodgson said, "that party is guided by a prudence which aided by the general current of events ought are long to make it influential if not preponderant".

* The Kala Pandes, who had the support of Senior Maharani Samrajya Lakshmi Devi were clearly the most important faction in the group.

rise of the military and have no admirer of things martial he was inclined towards a pacific policy. "The Raja and his friends", wrote Hodgson,

are now natural allies: and the general tendency of events is daily adding something to their influence by throwing into deeper shade the splendour of the military profession.²⁸

Bhim Sen and the Thapa faction on the other hand represented the military interests; "a race of men who for the last fortyfive years have dragged the country and its princes at the heels of the military car". The army had been the sole means of their power and influence and hence its consistent patronage by Bhim Sen. Not surprisingly its strength had steadily grown from ten thousand men at the termination of the last war to seventeen thousand strong in 1836.

The intensification of the Darbar politics which under ordinary circumstances would have been of little consequence to the Company now acquired new importance. The probability of violence in the kingdom splitting over the frontier and the difficulty of fixing on the Darbar the responsibility for actions of its local functionaries was always a matter of concern. But the crux of the problem was, as Hodgson pointed out, a fundamental one:

It is one thing to curb the specific current evils incidental to our contact with this state along 700 miles of critical territory. It is another thing to reach and effect those institutions and habits upon which rest its

28. *Ibid.* Hodgson to Macnaghten, 17 November 1836. "The military genius of the institutions of this kingdom must be understood to be a common quantity affecting in same degree the genuine sentiments of both the . . . parties", wrote Hodgson in further explanation, "as all the personal interests of one are now promoted and all the personal interests of the other now crossed by an exclusive and absorbing patronage of army we may easily and safely infer that relative inclination of the two towards persistency therein".

integral military strength—a military strength which cannot be exercised except at our cost unless in the event of civil war and that is one issue which judging of this by the history and character of this nation I deem a very improbable one.²⁹

In the opposition to the Thapas, Hodgson saw the likelihood of change in the natural character of the Gorkhas: a change “interesting to us in many respects and which will probably be both in course and results capable of being honourably and advantageously biased by us”. Yet, it was clear that so long as Bhim Sen maintained his control “by military means” this transformation could not be anticipated, unless Hodgson added, “we should deem it expedient to interpose by public . . . against the policy of Nepal”. But such interference, if only by threat, he was equally certain, could not immediately be resorted to as it was likely to produce turbulence in the kingdom:

if the parties tend to an equilibrium such a remonstrance well timed may cast the balance on the right side without turbulence; and if they do not tend to an equilibrium and the past policy of this state thus promise to be continued without relaxation the question will then arise is it worthwhile to interpose at whatever risk and with or without reference to the parties.³⁰

The answer so far as Hodgson was concerned was provided by the age of the minister. Bhim Sen at sixtyfour years was hale and strong and was likely to continue or about another five years. If, however, his health failed and he was forced into retirement it was likely that the opposition would come to power and the Maharaja would be able to influence

29. *Ibid.* Hodgson thus explained; “The character of the soldiery is remarkable for its unsophisticated nationality and hence probably it has arisen that history of Nepal full as it is of party turbulence exhibits not one instance of Civil War”.

30. *Ibid.*

the Darbar into adopting a pacific policy. But this too required the active co-operation of the British.³¹

The Governor General-in-Council read this report with great interests but it was considered premature to discuss the question whether it will ever become the interests and policy of the British Government to protest against the aggressive attitude assumed by Nepal. This would only be determined by events. Hodgson was, however, instructed to keep a close watch and report accurately upon developments in the Darbar. In conclusion the Governor General-in-Council expressed satisfaction at the growing influence of those whom Hodgson had called "the friend of peace and our material allies".³²

RAJENDRA: CONSOLIDATION OF AUTHORITY

During the annual *Panjani* in February 1837, the Maharaja made several important changes in the administration. Mathbar Singh, Umakant, the Darbar Treasurer, and several Thapa *Bharadars* were turned out of office and their places handed over to the Pande rivals. Even the highest judicial office of the Country which under the Thapas was held by a lieutenant or a captain in the army was now assigned to a *Brahmin* with legal knowledge. Ranjung Pande had not received any office but practically all his relatives and supporters were provided for. He himself was looked upon by the Maharaja "with unlooked for consideration". Bhim Sen's brother, Ranbir Singh Thapa, who acquiesced in these changes without a murmur was allowed to remain in office.³³

31. *Ibid.* As he pointed out: "The race of military mayors of the palace who have heretofore defied their sovereign with one hand and their neighbour with the other, must cease with General Bhim Sen under the most ordinary and legitimate countenance on our part to the rightful sovereign whom it is remarkable enough these mayors of the palace have always obstructed our intercourse with since (1792) that matured that system by which all the princes of Nepal have alike suffered and a clear perception, of which (unless I am much mistaken) furnishes the key to a great deal of what has been most hostile and repulsive to us in the conduct of this Darbar for the last 45 years".

32. *Ibid.* No. 37: Macnaghten to Hodgson, 12 December 1836.

33. Tickell, Events in Nepal, 1837.

The minister's scheme of retrenchment and pay cuts of the chiefs and the soldiery earlier approved by the Maharaja had now been carried into effect. With the saving effected Bhim Sen raised new regiment bringing the total strength of the army to about nineteen thousand men. This addition, and the fact that Bhim Sen and his adopted son Sher Jung, alone were exempted from the reduced scale of salary and continued to draw their earlier higher pay was seen by many as an indication of his continued authority. It was said that the Maharaja consequently dared not remove him from office or even oppose such a measure as the augmentation of the army. Hodgson was however optimistic:

the Raja (he said) is gradually acquiring fresh confidence in his intercourse with me, and, so soon as his position and character become a little more firm I anticipate the best results from his spontaneous conduct. But I considered it on my account inexpedient to manifest otherwise than by the courtesy equal to his own, my interests in his progress towards independently action.³⁴

As weeks progressed Hodgson became increasingly anxious of a change of Government. Although Bhim Sen Thapa's earlier stand against the Company showed sign of softening.³⁵ Hodgson considered the minister's conduct unsatisfactory so long as the Darbar denied him the privilege of riding around the countryside for his "health and recreation". On 11 April, he wrote to Macnaghten on the subject in a private letter, because he explained "I do not care to make my personal grievances here the subject of public complaint". In the post-script he added:

34. FPC 20 March 1837, no. 88: Hodgson to Macnaghten, 4 March 1837.
 35. FPC 20 February 1837, No. 31: Hodgson to Macnaghten, 23 January 1837. The Darbar had finally agreed to the surrender of the fugitives, though on a reciprocal basis, from the Thugi operation in India. Also see 12 June 1837, No. 46-48.

we ought however to have decency in all respects; and soon, no doubt, shall have. The . . . (?) impertinence of the Darbar, to show its power forsooth, is occasionally very amusing, but time, peace and an unincumbered alliance (affording no occasion for any sort of interference) are doing their work: *felix sit finis*.³⁶

The stripping of Bhim Sen's authority by the Maharaja was gradual and seemed well planned. In June, he instituted an investigation into the minister's administration of the courts of justice, of the State Mint and of the lands assigned to the soldiery as *Jagirs*. The object was not so much to incriminate him as much as to induce him to tender his resignation out of humiliation. Hodgson believed, if he did not hope, that this object "will be effected without turmoil" and that a change in the administration was "inevitable".³⁷

As the opposition developed Rangnath Pandit emerged as a major contender for the office of *Mukhtiar*. Hodgson spoke well of him and in view of later developments the Resident's views are worth quoting:

he is an accomplished scholar and a man of the world who, with the assistance of one able brother, and the countenance and concurrence of his sovereign believes (as I think truly) that he could direct the affairs of this kingdom with energy and success.³⁸

But it was not likely that next *Mukhtiar* would be given the unlimited powers which Bhim Sen Thapa had enjoyed. The Maharaja, it was widely believed, "instructed by his own experience and by that of his ancestors", intended to main-

36. FPC 11 May 1837, No. 55: Hodgson to Macnaghten 1 May 1837. The later, because of the importance of the subject, placed the letter on official record.

37. FPC 3 July 1837, Nos. 37-38: Hodgson to Macnaghten, 15 June 1837.

38. *Ibid.*

tain general control over the Government so that no one could exercise any “domineering” influence. This seemed to Hodgson very likely because the Maharaja possessed talents and wisdom sufficient for the purpose and “any minister he may select, in opposition to the Thapas, must for sometime, took perpetually to him for support.”³⁹

By the middle of July *Sankranti* had passed, the time when Hodgson had expected the change. It now seemed that it would not be a month or two before this would come about. A protracted struggle in the Darbar was what Hodgson feared as it was likely to provide “scope for the unusual operation of national prejudices”. More especially he felt certain, Bhim Sen would take advantage of the situation to foment trouble with the British in order to divert the attention of the state of external affairs. He elaborated these views in his despatch of 18 July to the political Secretary in Fort William.⁴⁰ At the same time he prepared a confidential report⁴¹ for Lord Auckland in which he suggested a more active policy.

“There is no probability of a contest between the parties, and would not their cutting each other's throats be a sufficient security for us?” he asked. But a civil war could not be expected nor would it be of advantage to the British if it ever occurred. Civil Wars have a tendency to feed rather than to quench martial spirit and power; and at any rate if it broke out it was likely that it would be diverted towards the British before it raged three months. So long as order prevailed it would be possible, if it were thought expedient, he said, to take the initiative and ensure the opposition's suc-

39. *Ibid.* The whole of Hodgson's despatch of 15 June exudes unrestrained optimism. “An administration so constituted (purely Civil War) and guided by a sovereign of so amiable and intelligent character Nepal has not known for 50 years,” he wrote, “And though political prophesy be hazardous even to a proverb, I cannot help indulging anticipation more favourable than any which there has been reasonable ground to entertain since we first came into the intimate connexion with this state”.

40. FPC 14 August 1837, no. 34: Hodgson to Macnaghten, 18 July 1837.

41. Confidential Report by Hodgson for Lord Auckland, in *Hodgson Papers*. For extract, see Hasrat, *op. cit.*, p. 244 f.

cession to power. This course of action would be advisable only if it became certain that Bhim Sen was preparing for a confrontation with the Company. Otherwise, Hodgson was prepared to watch events "until the expected change occurs; or, until having occurred, it produce no amendment or promise of amendment".

If the change came not soon or came without improvement, I would take the first fair occasion of a reckoning with Nepal. If the change seems to tremble in balance, wanting but a simple manifestation on our part in favour of the legitimate head of that State, that manifestation should be made by-and-by and under a distincter (sic) probability of quiet efficacy than now exists.⁴²

This could not really be called interference. After all, the Government of India was entitled to have its views and purposes clearly stated in the Darbar. A properly worded communication from the Governor General to the Maharaj would suffice Hodgson concluded.⁴³

Much to Hodgson's surprise the Maharaja suddenly announced a second *Panjani*, a complete break with the practices of the last thirty years. Its object was to reassert a royal prerogative, nevertheless it saw important changes. Ranjung Pande was reinstated in possession of his family lands and his brother Rana Dal Pande was made a *Kazi*. Rajendra himself selected the composition of the quinquennial mission to Peking, and appointed Pushkar Shah of the Chautrias to head it. At a general parade of troops, the Maharaja ordered all new officers to discontinue their attendance on the chiefs.⁴⁴ The patronage of the army from which Bhim Sen derived his power now passed into the hands of the sovereign.

42. *Ibid.*

43. *Ibid.*

44. Tickell, *Events in Nepal*, 1837.

BHIM SEN THAPA REMOVED

These change sealed the fate of Bhim Sen Thapa. But his exit turned out to be a less dramatic affair. Assistant Resident, S.R. Tickell in his *Events in Nepal* describes what actually happened

On 24th July the Raja's youngest son died suddenly and a rumour quickly circulated through the Palace that the child had been fallen victim to poison intended for its mother, the Maharani. This was followed by a report that the instigator of this was Bhim Sen or some of his party. The alarm soon spread from the palace through the city, and in the confusion that issued, Ranjung was suddenly appointed Minister of State, and Bhim Sen seized, ironed and thrown into prison, while the whole of his family were placed under close arrest.⁴⁵

The Government of India fearing disturbances in Kathmandu instructed the Resident to express the sympathy of the British Government to the Maharaja and assure him of its readiness to concur to any measure which may be conducive to the safety and peace of his kingdom.⁴⁶ But Hodgson had no such fears: "The sudden noiseless and complete fall of General Bhim Sen", he wrote, "demonstrate that no one here can make head against that Raja", and I should say that the Raja will be his own master in future.⁴⁷

45. *Ibid.*

46. FPC 14 August 1837, Nos. 35-36: Hodgson to Government 29 July 1837 and Government to Hodgson, 14 August 1837.

47. *Ibid.*

CHAPTER-V

HODGSON, AUCKLAND AND DARBAR POLITICS

For sometime the atmosphere in Kathmandu remained very tense. The Thapas continued to be persecuted and their lands and property confiscated. Such was the feeling against them that Hodgson feared that the fallen minister and his followers might be subjected to the cruelties which they themselves inflicted upon their adversaries on their march to power decades ago. When enquiries were instituted against alleged misappropriation of state funds during their years in power Hodgson was happy that this would, at least for a time, act as a diversion from certain bloodshed. Meanwhile, he even talked to leading *Bharadars* about the importance of avoiding excess and maintaining peace in the kingdom.¹ Within the Darbar too an intense struggle for

-
1. FPC 21 August 1837; Nos. 39-42: Hodgson thus informed the Secretary, 2 August; "I have endeavoured privately to impress upon Krishna Ram . . . (who alone can be safely spoken to) the consequence to the Raja and his family of reviving and perpetuating those ferocity of past times which turned the Darbar into a gladiators arena, and must if not now stayed, destroyed the peace and safety of the royal family, render even every transfer of power a mortal struggle and deprive the throne of the service of many of its best and most virtuous subjects". He hoped his suggestions would make an impression upon Krishna Ram who "by conveying that impression to the mind of his young sovereign to induce the latter to persist in his present apparent inclination towards mercy, despite the solicitation of some who being conversent only with the remote past point to it for precedents".

power ensued. The Pandes by no means filled the vacuum caused by the exit of the Thapas; indeed the nature and extent of Ranjung Pande's authority as well as that of the new Councillors remained vague. It did not taken too long however for a clear picture to emerge. On 12 August, Hodgson wrote to the Government of India:

The Raja (though of) more than average sense and prudence cannot at once assume the habits of positive command befitting the exigency but so foreign to his present situation. Rangnath relying (I think falsely) on the direction of the immediate feature of His Highness's character aims at building thereon uncontrolled influence over the Darbar with the aid and concurrence of His Highness's somewhat imperious consort.²

HODGSON'S RECOMMENDATION: FIRM ACTION

That Rangnath had made considerable headway in this direction was quite evident; most of the new Councillors who had recently taken a lead in the Darbar had come under his influence. All those whom the Resident considered the "Raja's safer Councillors" had been pushed to the background. The Raja himself was content to make only inferior appointments. The prospect of Rangnath exercising upon the Raja the same kind of influence and on the relations with the Residency the same sort of control as Bhim Sen did could not have been a happy one for Hodgson. And there was good ground for this anxiety. The Maharaja sent to Hodgson a report by one of Nepali agents in Lucknow alleging British interference in a succession question in that state, of want-only killing three hundred men and looting the city. The *Munshi* who delivered this however added "with an air of civil impertinance", as Hodgson put it, "that he was instructed to experts . . . the Maharaja's disapprobation of such doings". This was instantly denied but the incident led, as Hodgson demanded, to the consideration of

2. *Ibid.*

the appointment of a suitable person of rank as a channel of communication between the Resident and the Darbar. The position was offered to Rangnath's brother who said that he would have gladly accepted it "if exempted from Rangnath's intervention". He declined as he was convinced that his brother would insist upon exercising his control.³

Hodgson's immediate concern was to see the system, of direct intercourse with the Maharaja quickly and fully established. He formed close enough contacts with that section in the Darbar who shared, for their own reasons, his point of view.⁴ He thus expressed his fear to Government:

Rangnath may possibly take possession of me in the style of his predecessor unless Government should see fit to interfere.

Certainly it is neither decent nor expedient that I should be made over to the minister of this state . . .

I also apprehend that if Rangnath's presumption be silently acquiesced by us, inconveniences which a little firmness on the part of my superior might now remedy will pass into established usage.⁵

The inconveniences, he went on to say, were in themselves not very great. It was the consequence that was to be guarded against. For,

3. *Ibid.* Hodgson to Macnaghten, 3 August 1837. "That which Rangnath's own brother felt to be unsafe and discreditable", Hodgson concluded, "may perhaps be reasonably objected to by us".
4. *Ibid.* Hodgson thus wrote: "I have done what prudently could indirectly to countenance those who desire to see me in direct communication with the Raja and His Highness by this means the master of the Darbar. By my declining to concern myself when asked with domestic affairs of the Darbar has deprived me of the influence I might have assumed, but could not wisely and had left me an almost forgotten spectator of struggle too vehement to admit the waste of a thought upon as avowed neutral".
5. *Ibid.*

amongst native statemen one successful encroachment always begets another and if the Resident is to influence the policy and conduct of this Darbar beyond the prevention of positive aggression he should have the direct and virtual access to the throne which has been heretofore denied on the score of the Raja's minority.⁶

Rather than he himself take up the issue Hodgson felt it would have a better effect if the protest came from the Governor General. The latter seeing the weight of the Resident's argument, gave him a free hand to take up the question with the Maharaja in the name of the Government of India. Hodgson was at the same time impressed upon the necessity of maintaining personal and cordial relations with the Maharaja.

For a while Hodgson had no difficulty in obtaining personal access to the Maharaja.⁷ Although the channel of communication between the Darbar and the Residency was yet to be finalised it looked as if Krishna Ram, the Maharaja Guru, with whom Hodgson had an excellent rapport would soon be appointed to the post. Yet less than three weeks later all this proved illusory. On 24 September he wrote to Fort William in dejection that his expectations of an improvement in the attitude of the Darbar towards the Residency was "nearly extinguished". No effort had been made to remove obstacles in the functioning of the Residency nor any courtesy extended to the Resident. In the Maharaja he found "there is too much proof not only of weakness but something worse in the character". There was evidence, he said that the Maharaja's head had been turned by his sudden accession to

-
6. *Ibid.* Macnaghten to Hodgson, 21 August. The instructions, "You are at liberty, should you deem it advisable to wait upon the Raja and to express on the part of your Government its earnest desire that upon all occasions of interest in regard to the relations of the two states you should be permitted to communicate freely and directly with His Highness".
 7. FPC 9 October 1837, nos. 76-77: Hodgson to Macnaghten, 5 September 1837.

power and wealth.* What was worse it now appeared that the “dangerous” Rangnath was exercising, along with the senior Rani an undue influence upon him. In this new and unexpected situation Hodgson thought that there were only two possible options open to the British. One, the Resident could put himself behind the moderate and friendly section in the Darbar enabling to control it. But he was certain this would “never succeed, because:

to seek the virtual Premiership of this extraordinary prejudiced and not less remarkable national Darbar would I think be a pretty certain way of causing the most furious party (and) opponents sooner or later, to overlook all their wrong done in order to unite against foreign influence.⁸

The second was to issue a reprimand to the Darbar. This was what Hodgson had in mind. He accordingly prepared a draft* and submitted for the consideration of the Governor General. This note backed by a military demonstration, he said he was “almost certain would succeed”.⁹

LORD AUCKLAND'S MINUTE

Governor General Lord Auckland recorded a minute on 3 October on Hodgson latest communication in which he declared: “I am very little inclined to follow the advise or adopt the opinion of Mr. Hodgson”. Since his arrival in India a year back Lord Auckland had carefully studied the Nepal situation. In August last when Dr. Campbell's “Sketch of British Relations with Nepal” was placed before him he entirely disagreed with its conclusion: “The Gorkhas may be fierce, false and barbarous people,” he noted, “but for

* The confiscation of Thapa property was said to have yielded more than a crore of rupees.

8. FPC 9 October 1837; Nos. 46-49: Hodgson to Macnaghten, 2^d September, 1837.

* For full text of Draft see Appendix - H.

9. FPC 9 October 1837, Nos. 46-49: Hodgson to Macnaghten, 24 September 1837.

more than twenty years they have respected our frontier, and though ungraciously, have observed the conditions of their treaty".¹⁰ He quickly recognised that Nepal was then passing through a period of "transition" and that:

It is not extraordinary that so surrounded by angry and conflicting parties, ill established in his throne, with men on every side of him struggling for power, each ready to mis-represent the views of the others the Rajah should be timid and uncertain in action, little to be trusted in all that he says at present and still less in promise, if he should be induced to promise, anything for the future¹¹

The position of the Maharaja was yet to be fully consolidated and a counter revolution could not be ruled out. Therefore, far from interfering in Darbar politics "the surest method of bringing all these parties together and uniting them in angry array against us". Lord Auckland felt that Hodgson should stay aloof. Likewise, a military demonstration would be unwise and "would justify an appeal". As regards reports of intrigues with foreign power, Lord Auckland was not disposed to give much importance to them either. He wrote:

an offensive alliance (by Nepal) with Ranjeet Singh, with the discontented chiefs of Rajpootana and with the court of Peking, there is nothing of authority given, and lastly, it is inconvenient and it is galling, but it is not new nor is it contrary to the treaty, that

-
10. FPC 18 September 1837, No. 72: Auckland's Minute of 28 August on Campbell papers on Nepal. Auckland's observation that followed is interesting: "They are not strongly prejudiced in favour of responsible intercourse with British India and if a Ghoorkha were to undertake a counter-dissertation he would not be at a loss for instance in the history of India favourable to the repulsiveness of Nepal's policy. We have no right to quarrel with this . . ."
11. FPC 9 October 1837, Nos. 47-49 Macnaghten to Hodgson, 9 October 1837.

the policy of Nepal in its relations with foreigners is rather Chinese than British. Peace and commerce may be possible with time break through a repulsiveness which is essentially national but certainly demonstration of anger would not do so.¹²

Lord Auckland however agreed that Nepal was indeed "our most dangerous neighbour placed amidst mountain almost inaccessible with a warlike, well armed and well disciplined population". Yet, he was not prepared to force any change in its national habits or policy which was better left to time.

Hodgson's draft was set aside and Auckland directed that the letter of condolence to the Maharaja on the loss of his infant child, the draft of which was approved in Council the day before, should be modified with following addition:

My satisfaction is not however unmingled with regret; for I have heard from my representative at your Court that two months have elapsed without any provisions having been made for the conduct of our current business.

To the good sense of Your Highness the British Government must look for the correction of the system which has been following by the Darbar at Catmandoo for the last twenty years.¹³

Instructions to Hodgson on the basis of the Governor General's minute was issued by Macnaghten in his despatch of 9 October. The delivery of the revised condolence letter of the Governor General to the Maharaja, which accompanied the instructions, was left to Hodgson's discretion.

12. *Ibid.*

13. *Ibid.* Lord Auckland to the Maharaja of Nepal, 9 October 1837. Lord Auckland continued; "your Highness is aware that during the whole course of this period both as regards commercial concerns, liberty of Ingress into the Company's".

RANJUNG PANDE: ANTI - BRITISH INTRIGUES

Within the Darbar, the contest among the several factions for exclusive power continued unabated. The Pandes headed the militant section in the Darbar and the Maharaja, not merely acquiesced in their activities but, it was said, also encouraged them.¹⁴ With Rajendra's and senior Maharani Samrajya Lakshmi Devi's support, the Pandes soon emerged as the strongest party in the Darbar. They were bitterly hostile to the British and this sentiment became the linch pin of their policy. They aimed at spinning a net work of intrigues with Lahore, Kabul and the Indian states against the British Government. They further tried to contact and arouse anti-British sentiments in the protected states of the Company. Hodgson had kept the Government informed of these developments:

They (Pandés) saw that they must be war minister or no ministers at all, for their long exiled had stripped them of all legitimate weight among their fellow nobles . . . Thus all circumstances of their character and position conspired to make the Kala Pandés determind opponents of responsible intercourse with our Government at Kathmandu and of that peace and good neighbourhood which could by such means only be secured to us.¹⁵

As it turned out, Hodgson's fears of a possible alliance or intrigues between Kathmandu and Lahore was not entirely without foundation. Situated close to the storm centre on the North-West Punjab soon became highly prized by Nepal as an object of alliance. As early as in May 1837, Nepalese missions were despatched to Lahore. They were reported to have received a warm welcome from Maharaja Ranjit Singh. A few days later, another emmisary Ek Krishna

14. Ramakant, *op.cit.*, p. 146; Resident's Diary-1 to 23 January 1938.

15. FSC 7 September 1837, No. 88: Hodgson to Macnaghten, 22 June 1837.

Baid reached Lahore. Advantages were also taken from the presence of Bhopan Singh Thapa, a Gorkha officer of the French legion at the time in Khalsa army, to forge an alliance between Kathmandu and Lahore.¹⁶ Nothing came of Nepalese overtures at that time. Ranjit Singh had a more realistic view of the British position in India to entertain any anti-British alliance with Nepal. Besides, he was at this moment, occupied with a tribal insurrection in Attock. To the British Government he assured that his recent coquetry with Kathmandu had no ulterior design. "Adverting to the present disposition of His Highness", reported Captain Wade,

I have no idea that Ranjit Singh will not listen to any overture of hostile tendency to the British Government which either the ambition or military spirit of the Nepalese may induce them to make.¹⁷

But it was reported that the Dogra Raja, Gulab Singh was more interested on forging an alliance with Nepal. A direct intercourse with Nepal not only promote commerce between Lhasa and Ladakh but would also:

establish a direct intercourse with a power which he (Gulab singh) thinks will not only tend greatly to augment his present influence but lead to an alliance which may at some future period be of reciprocal importance.¹⁸

RANGNATH PANDIT : INTRIGUES CONTINUED

Towards the close of the year, intrigues increased and the "able (though) utterly unprincipled", Rangnath Pandit replaced Ranjung Pande as Mukhtiar.¹⁹ One of the first acts

-
16. FPC 12 June 1837, Nos. 41-42: Wade to Macnaghten, 27 May 1837 and Macnaghten to Wade, 12 June 1837.
 17. FPC 21 August 1837, No. 35: Wade to Macnaghten, 20 July 1837.
 18. FPC 12 June 1837, No. 35: Wade to Macnaghten, 27 May 1837.
 19. FPC 27 December 1837, No. 57: Campbell to Macnaghten, 8 December 1837.

that the new *Mukhtiar* was to release Bhim Sen Thapa. On 16 December, he secured an audience for the old man who was received at the Darbar by the Maharaja and Maharanis, pardoned and sent him home with honour. Crowded of people and soldiers followed him home in felicitation. Bhim Sen's garden house was restore to him but only the fraction of his former lands were returned.²⁰ Ranjung Pande was of course, stunned at the sudden reversal of events. For a short time it seemed that he had achieved the success, he ambitioned. But now it appeared that this all had been a cruel play. The short tenure of the *Mukhtiarship* had perhaps hurt his chance more than it help him. Dr. Campbell, who was invited to witness the elephant fighting remarked that "Ranjung Pande was quiet, thoughtful and apparently in low spirit. . . ²¹ Ranjung thereafter, immediately approached the Maharaja for permission to leave Kathmandu for plain. But Rajendra persuaded him to remain in Kathmandu and held out to him some hope of present remuneration and future employment in the administration.²² Quite possibly, the Maharaja felt that it would be useful to have some one like Ranjung close at hand, as a counterbalance to the pro-Thapa in the administration.

In January 1838 *Panjani*, Ranjung was rewarded for his efforts the post of Commander in the armed force.²³ Rangnath Pandit, on the other hand, was steadily losing popularity. His suggested reforms and retrenchments of military emoluments now came home to rest, and the correctly identified *Mukhtiar* with this very unpopular policy. Thus, he turned his attention towards anti-British intrigues

20. FPC 3 January 1838, No. 37: Campbell to Macnaghten, 11 December 1837.

21. Tickell, *op.cit.*, 1837: Nepali, C.R., *op.cit.*, p. 282.

22. FPC 17 January 1838, No. 34: Campbell to Macnaghten, 30 December 1837. Campbell observed that "how matter may issue in regards of party interest I know not, nor can I yet pronounce an opinion on the wisdom or fully of the Raja's conduct in allowing the Thapas such liberty to action as they now have, on the scene of contention for ascendancy. His Highness's depth of intellect is still to me riddle, as is the sincerity of his family manifestation towards me and our Government".

with the various Indian states. As a recent scholar sums up:

envoys were sent in all directions; in November 1837 to Nagpur; in January 1838 to Banaras, Rewa, Burma and Afghanistan; the following month to Allahabad, Bhuratpur and Udaipur (Rajasthan), Hyderabad, Lahore and Kutch Bihar (Assam); in march to Rewa Banaras, Mathura, Lahore and Kotah; in April to Hardwar, Bhutan, Gwalior, Scindia and lahore again.²⁴

Meanwhile, in the North-West the crisis deepened. Persia besieged Herat; and the advance of Russian army towards Kabul posed a danger for the British Government. In December 1837, an envoy of Heart arrived at Kathmandu. In exchange for secret intelligence, the Darbar sent Indra Bir Khatri to Herat. But he was detained by the British at Ludhiana. In the beginning of 1838, Darbar tried to exploit the relations between the Government of India and the Burmese. Secret emmissaries in the guise of merchants were sent to Ava to convey to its Burmese ill feelings of the Nepalese towards the British and offer military assistance, if they were willing to break off with the British.²⁵ In February Mathabar Singh Thapa was sent to Lahore to report the Nepalese reactions to the events in the North-West and to forge an alliance. But he was detained by the British Government at Ludhiana and kept under strict surveillance.²⁶

Lord Auckland fully appreciated the situation in Kathmandu and was not unaware of the Darbar's intrigues with Indian states. But he was too pre-occupied with Afghan problem to allow an open ruptures with Nepal unless "absolutely driven to take up arms". Such a case would only

23. Tickell, *op.cit.*, 1838.

24. Rose, Leo E., *op.cit.*, 98.

25. FPC 5 February 1838 No. 14: Dr. Campbell to Macnaghten, 22 January 1838; also FPC 14 March 1838, No. 171: Dr. Campbell to Magnachten, 25 February 1838.

26. *Ibid.*

“unite all contending parties in one common cause”. He firmly believed that Indian States would no longer respond to Nepalese overture against the British even at the critical stage since,

the confirmation of British and Sikh alliance* is so complete and so notorious that their (Darbar) failure to attach to their interests, the Maharaja of Lahore can reasonably considered as likely to produce a still greater distaste to engage in their cause among the other powers of Hindustan.²⁷

He was convinced that it was unwise and unnecessary to notice “too openly” and to pry into the details of these intrigues involving almost all the Indian States.²⁸ Hodgson was advised to avoid any confrontation but continue to obtain information on Darbar's activities.

Meanwhile, the Political Agents and Residents in Indian states were instructed regarding hostile dispositions of the princely states. The latter were to be warned against entertaining any Nepalese agents. All correspondence made and received by them were to be strictly watched. Even Ranjit Singh was politely told that the British Government did not welcome his flirtation with the Gorkhas.²⁹

DEFENSIVE MEASURES

The majority of the members of the Supreme Council did not share Lord Auckland's views on the policy to be followed towards Nepal. In June 1838, General Henry Fane, the Commander-in-Chief, regretted that the Company had “allowed a thorn to grow in her side which must greatly paralyze her efforts elsewhere: and which it behoves her to pluck out and eradicate at the earliest

* The Tripartite Treaty between the East India Company, Sikhs and Shah Shuja was concluded on 26 July 1838.

27. FPC 12 September 1838 No. 16: Government to Hodgson, 5 May 1838.

28. *Ibid.*

29. British Museum Additional Manuscript, 37694, Private Letter Book of Auckland, Vol. 3½, p. 9. Colvin to Macnaghten, 9 June 1838. Quoted by Majumdar, K. *op.cit.*, p. 36.

favourable moment".³⁰ What was worse the Nepalese frontier was in a defenceless state. This was brought home to the Government of India in a elaborate minute dated 20 July 1838 by Colonel Morrison, a member of the Governor General's Council. Colonel Morrison urged that no time should be lost in adopting measures for the defence of the frontier. In the event of war with Nepal, the safest means of preventing invasion of the British territories, he wrote, "would be attack the Gorkha and march into their capital". This would require great preparation and hence early planning was necessary. He, therefore, suggested that a field force, not less than five hundred lightly equipped men, should be concentrated at a point to the north of the Ganges between the Gandaki and Kosi rivers, for active military operation, should this become necessary. Such a force would be able to form detachments to proceed to threatened quarters. It should consist of at least one regiment of native cavalry, one European infantry, five native infantry regiments with horse and foot artillery, and if possible, a regiment of regular horse. He also suggested similar concentration of troops at the other strategical points.³¹

Meanwhile, Hodgson reported that an active correspondence still continued between Kathmandu and Lahore. Apart from this, Nepal had secret intercourse with Persia and Burma. The state of feeling against the British in Ava, Kabul and Persia were producing the worse effect on the Darbar. The *Bharadars* were openly divided into two parties: one intent to expel the Resident and embark upon hostilities with the British, and the other, merely temporising till the attitude of Lahore and Ava became clear before throwing in their lot with the former.³²

30. FPC 29 August 1838 No. 3: Sir Henry Fane to Lord Auckland 29 June 1838. See also Rose, Leo E., p. 99. Even the President of the Council in Fort William asked the Government to demand full and detailed explanation from the Government of its anti-British activities. Further, a warning be given to the Gorkhas on the issue of war if explanations were not sent.

31. FSC 20 July 1838 No. 4: Minute by Colonel Morrison, 20 July 1838.

32. FSC 20 July 1838 No. 1: Hodgson to Government, 6 July 1838.

Lord Auckland finally agreed to an army observation to be posted in Gorkhapur under General Ogländer as a "measure of preparation and activity, if necessary". A local corps was raised in Darjeeling to keep watch on the events in Eastern Nepal and Sikkim, which was strongly suspected of having been won over by Nepal.³³ He felt that this would suffice as a defence measure against any attack from Nepal. He made it clear that the object of this concentration of troops was only to keep Nepal in check and that the "important operation which are immediately to be undertaken across India, as well as other consideration, rendered it inexpediency that we should keep to force or a crisis at this time in our relations with Kathmandu".³⁴ Nepal was admittedly unfriendly, but it was undesirable to further strain the relations to a breaking point. As he candidly remarked:

Nepal had given us just cause for offence and stands in a position towards us which is not long to be borne. But it would not be wise to seek more than one great military operation at a time, and unless forced to bring matters to an issue for which I would be prepared, I would bide my time.³⁵

The Resident was accordingly instructed to "refrain from more busy activity, (and) to remain passive but observant spectator of the events around him and to exert the most strenuous and persevering efforts to ward off so serious a contingency" as an open rupture with Nepal.³⁶

HODGSON'S IMPATIENCE

These measures were not without effect on the temper of the Darbar. In August 1838, the missions were openly

33. FSC 12 September 1838 No. 1: Macnaghten, to Hodgson, 28/8/ Also FSC 21 November 1838 No. 147: Minute by Lord Auckland, 28 August 1838.

34. FPC 21 November 1838 No. 147: Minute by Lord Auckland, 28 August 1838. Resident's Diary-1 August to 31 August 1838.

35. BMAM 37694, PLA Vol. 4: Lord Auckland to Princep, 20 August 1838, p. 162. Quoted by Majumdar, K., *op.cit.*, p. 37.

36. FPC 12 September 1838 No. 16: Torrens to Hodgson, 12 September 1838.

recanted and the Resident was furnished with a list of agents recalled from Indian states.³⁷ But Hodgson, the man on the spot, was not convinced of the Darbar's sincerity. His long experience of Nepal told him that Nepalese assurance against hostility towards the British could not be taken at face value. In his despatches to the Government of India, he continued to harp on some decisive measures against Nepal. He was convinced that a clash between the British and the Gorkhas still could not be ruled out. So when Nepal began strengthening her southern border defences, he hastily dashed off circulars to (officer Commanding) the troops at Gorakhpur, and the Magistrates on the frontier cautioning them against likely Nepalese aggression.³⁸ Viewing the problem from Kathmandu, Hodgson was not impressed by the defensive measure lately adopted by the Government and he made no secret of this in his despatches.

Lord Auckland found Hodgson's impatience extremely irksome.³⁹ And for his troubles, he earned a sharp rebuke from Fort William. He was firmly told that his action in writing to the officers on the frontier gave adverse publicity and was damaging to the British interests in the region. He was once again reminded:

you have been distinctly informed (that) steps should not at present be taken which may have the effect of widening difference and increasing alarm . . . His Lordship has yet every reason to hope that by proper meas-

-
37. FSC 17 September 1838 No. 163: Hodgson to Macnaghtne, 24 August 1838. The agents recalled from Indian states were: Indrasbeer Khatree and Khatree and Hanbeer Khatree from Ludhiana; Haridutt from Jodhpur; Bhowani Singh from Hyderabad; Surat Singh from Patna; Kashinath and Ramnath from Gwalior; Kanak Singh from Nagpur; Lacman Pandit and Mannu Singh from Delhi; Bansraj from Udaipur and Lachmannath from Benaras.
38. K. Mojumdar, *op.cit.* p. 38; Resident's Dairy from 1837-1840, Hodgson's manuscripts, Clevelevand Microfilm, National Archives of India, New Delhi from 15 August to 15 September 1838.
39. FSC 21 November 1838 No. 147: Minute by Lord Auckland, 28 August 1838.

ures on our part, peace may at present be preserved with the Nepalese Court, and even if this hope by successive events be diminished, he is desirous that nothing should be undertaken beyond such measures of precaution as are absolutely necessary which may have the effect of facing an irreconcilable difference to a premature issue.⁴⁰

The Government was not totally indifferent to the danger of Nepalese aggression. Already the army authorities were instructed in view of the unsatisfactory relations with Nepal, to obtain military intelligence of the frontier, and to be prepared for further instructions, should hostility between the two states become inevitable. The Governor General, therefore, could not agree that military preparations was as inadequate as Hodgson made them out to be. At any rate, this matter ought to have been the subject of correspondence between the Resident and other officials. It was made clear that Hodgson had exceeded his authority and had taken "an exaggerated view" of "his responsibilities". Finally, the Resident was again impressed with the necessity of preserving peace between the two states.⁴¹

The Maharaja was extremely divided between his fears and ambitions. The Government of India entanglement in Afghanistan tempted him to continue his hostility. Moreover, he was worried that the recent intrigues carried on by the Darbar, had been detected,⁴² and the British might retaliate before the North-Western troubles had actually disabled them.⁴³ The result was that Resident's remonstrances were met with excuses, false promises of satisfaction or

40. FSC 21 November 1838 No. 159: Macnaghten to Hodgson, 22 October 1838.

41. *Ibid.* Hodgson was informed that the Governor General "sees the necessity of watchfulness and of preparation but he sees also the danger of the two countries being, by mistrust led into a competition of armaments and defiance and from there into mutual provocation and war".

42. Resident's Diary, 1 September 1838 to 31 October 1838.

43. *Ibid.*, 1 November to 18 November 1838.

with professed ignorance. However, Hodgson's effort partially succeeded. He wrote to his father in September 1838, describing the situation in Nepal:

the Gorkhas are behaving as chidshly as hostilely, and I fear I shall be unable to keep peace, though I have now discretionary power over three divisions of the army amounting nearly 20,000 men (only 16,000 in his letter to Ellenborough) with which we are to make a Cordon sanitaire to endure pending the absence of the Kabul force from India. I fear the cordon may be broken, despite my cares to preserve it; since it must be seven hundred miles long and liable to attack at any point by an active and enterprising enemy.⁴⁴

By October 1838, besides recalling the agents from India, three more grievances were redressed. First, the Darbar had accepted the valid claims of Sikkim over Koplashi and agreed to a fresh investigation of the dispute with a view to finalising demarcation of boundaries. Second, redress was promised to the British traders who had been denied justice in the Nepalese courts, Finally, the Darbar again admitted its obligation to co-operate in apprehending the Thugs. No sooner had the missions were recanted from Indian States, now emissaries were sent to Jodhpur Mathura and Kanpur. Rumours of British downfall and the Nepalese victory were spread in the plains. *Majela* Guru, a pro-British *Bharadar*, who was twice given the charge of British affairs and was removed both times.⁴⁵ British traders were still being denied justice. To appease the Government of India, the Darbar proposed a complimentary mission on 6 November 1838. It was alleged that the real purpose of the mission was to blind the British to the reality of the Nepalese hostility, to get an opportunity to send new spies under the

44. Sanwal, B.D., *op.cit.*, p. 235.

45. FSC 28 November 1838 No. 41: Hodgson to Government, October 1838.

pretence of bride seeking mission to Rajputana.⁴⁶ But Hodgson did not incline to allow such mission, and only forwarded the letter to the Governor General.

INTRIGUES RENEWED - COUNTER MEASURES PROPOSED

The new year saw a change in the Darbar politics. Since August, power was concentrated in the hand of the Maharaja following the resignation of Rangnath Pandit. The Brahmin *Mukhtiar* had resigned having failed to gain effective control over the Government and because of constant opposition from senior Maharani and her Pande followers. Maharaja Rajendra realised that if the Pandes come to power backed by the senior Maharani, they would overshadow his authority. Hence, he did not appoint any *Mukhtiar* during the *Panjani* of the year, but despatched the prospective Ranjung Pande to the eastern province as Governor. In 1839, urged by the senior Maharani, Rajendra appointed Ranjung Pande as *Mukhtiar*, but without substantial power which he in fact, had to share with Chautira Pushkar Shah. The Pandes believed that if they were to remain in power, it could only be as a "war party". Significantly, the main support of the Pandes came from the army. Moreover, he understood that Maharaja could only have been won over by promising wars and conquests. Consequently, under him the regime started with martial temper raised to the pitch. Blind with his lust for power, he even started grasping money, irrespective of the mode and consequences of accumulations.⁴⁷ Public expenditure was retrenched and the *Bharadars* were forced to pay heavy taxes. The Maharaja was so much under the influence of the Maharani that, despite knowing her aims and that of Ranjung's, he co-operated in their schemes of conquest and war preparations. Anti-British intrigues and missions to various disaffected Indian states were resumed.⁴⁸ In January 1839, Hodgson reported that

46. Nepalese royal family had matrimonial relation with the Rajput families in India. Resident's diary - 1 November to 30 November 1838.

47. Tickell, Events in Nepal, 1838-1839.

48. F. Mojumdar, *op.cit.*, pp. 39-45; Ramakant, *op.cit.*, pp. 154-156.

the Darbar had again resumed its secret correspondence with Indian states and with Lahore.⁴⁹

In the following month, one Nepalese Haridutt Pandit, who was earlier arrested for subversive activities in India, had reached Kathmandu with a letter from Appa Sahib, ex-ruler of Nagpur. A month later, one Biswanath was arrested at Benaras. Some secret letters addressed to the Maharaja of Nepal from Udaipur were also found in his custody. Agents, disguised as *Sadhus* were sent from Nepal to the plains of India to proclaim imminent fall of British 'imperialism' and create anti-British sentiments. It was recorded that within one month as many as five hundred Gorkhas subjects had arrived at Benaras and Patna on the pretext of pilgrimages.⁵⁰ They were disguised as *Pandits*, *Gossains* and *Harkaras*. Agents were posted at different places to serve as links between the Nepalese Darbar and Indian states. The attitude of the Burmese Government towards the British Resident in Ava provided an opportunity for intrigues with the Burmese court. Rumours spread in Kathmandu that Nepal was soon to forge an alliance with the Burmese against the British. There were also intelligence reports that the disaffected nobility of Assam had entertained these agents and were in constant touch with Ava and Kathmandu. Even the Governments of Sikkim and Bhutan were said to have been incited by the Kathmandu Darbar against the English.

During May 1839, with reported instigation by the Ex-peswa, Baji Rao II, intrigues between Nepal and Sikkim and Bhutan were at its height. Further, contacts were said to have been made with the Khasis and the Manipuris. By the middle of 1839, Kathmandu became the centre for agents of Burma, Rewa, Gwalior, Satara, Jaipur, Patna and from several other Indian states in northern India. Meanwhile, connections with Lahore also renewed when the death of Maharaja Ranjit Singh in June 1839 made free intercourse possible. Nao Nihal Singh, the *de-facto* ruler of Lahore,

49. FPC 6 February 1839 No. 53: Hodgson to Torrens, 14 January 1839.

50. FSC 20 May 1839 No. 16: Hodgson to Government.

seemed very much inclined to respond to the Nepalese overtures.⁵¹

The affairs in Ava further excited the deepest interest, and “all eyes are but watching the decision of the Governor General in regard to the treatment of the Resident there”⁵² Hodgson said that “unless the presumption and the duplicity of the Maharaja and the Maharani were checked worse consequences might ensue from their uncontrolled actions”.⁵³ Again in May, when he submitted a list of persons alleged to have crossed over into British territories on secret missions to Indian states, he pointed out that of those who had set from Kathmandu on “secret expeditions”.⁵⁴ As the *Friend of India* expressed that:

emissaries have been deligently employed throughout the length and breadth of Hindustan in sowing the seeds of disaffection among our own subjects, in rousing to hostility the minds of our subordinate allies and in turning the eyes of India to the grand expedition which was represented as coming down from the west to put an end to our empire.⁵⁵

Formerly agents were Nepalese subjects, and they invariably took the well-known routes and therefore, it was easy for the Resident to procure their arrests. But now, the agents were of the plains and their routes were little known. He, therefore, suggested to the Government that either he be allowed to raise a small corps of trackers in Kathmandu to maintain contacts with these agents, or instruct the Magistrates of Tirhut, Gorakhpur, Sarun and Bareilly to be constantly on the look out for all suspicious persons moving

51. FSC 26 December 1839 No. 127: Hodgson to Government, 30 May 1839.

52. FSC 18 December 1839 No. 53: Hodgson to Torrend, 19 January 1839.

53. FSC 6 February 1839 No. 85: Hodgson to Torrens, 29 January 1839.

54. FSC 26 December 1839 No. 119: Hodgson to Government, 17 May 1839.

55. *The Friend of India* (Serampore) 2 May 1839.

about without legitimate purpose or without passports. The Magistrates should also maintain effective patrol on the borders. The second alternative, Hodgson suggested, would prove effective to put a stop to anti-British intrigues.⁵⁶

Towards the Nepal's relations with China, Hodgson reported that embassies were sent to Peking soliciting its aid, financial or military, against the British. Further as the Himalayan kingdoms of Sikkim and Bhutan had relations with China, the strain British relations with China as a result of the opium war were most likely to rouse all of them against the British. Brian Hodgson kept the Government of India informed of the activities of the Darbar warning that "it would be awkward if all these north-east gentry clubbed together against us in certain possible emergencies".⁵⁷

Meanwhile, the Governor General had already approved of the apprehension of all persons of importance against whom there may be sufficient proof, who may have entered into British territories with the object of intrigue or to spread disaffection. More than this, he was disinclined to sanction, or initiate active measures to intercept the correspondence which the darbar was supposed to have been carrying on with Indian states. It was observed to Hodgson that:

the emissaries of the Darbar may not doubt elude the vigilance of our police on some occasion whatever precautions we may

56. FSC 26 December 1839 No. 119: Hodgson to Government, 17 May 1839. These natives agents were: Chaturbhooj to Udaipur; Amar Singh and others to Punjab; Gangadhar to Jaipur; Kusal Singh and Nandaram to Punjab; Gangadhar to Jaipur; Kusal Singh and Nandaram to Gwalior; eight Gossains to Kotah and Deccan; Papu Singh to Gwalior again and Bahadur Singh to Purnea.

57. FPC 26 December 1839 No. 127: Hodgson to Government 30 May 1839.

adopt, and judging from the little result which these intrigues have produced hitherto, his Lordship is of the opinion that the effect of any more several measure of precaution might unnecessarily betray suspicion of individuals, most vexatiously interfere with that freedom of national intercourse which it is the part of general and commercial politic policy to encourage with every neighbouring countries.⁵⁸

Hodgson, however, still felt convinced of the expediency of stringent measures against Nepal. It was strongly rumoured that in the ensuing winter, a war would break out between Nepal and British India. He strongly criticised the continued practical acquiescence and lenience and forgiving language of Lord Auckland's admonition to the Maharaja of Nepal. This view was reinforced by the recent Srinivas Rao episode.⁵⁹ But he was reluctant to pursue the subject of coercing Nepal into good neighbourhood, if only because the Governor General had "been apt, I fancy, to consider me an alarmist". He thus wrote demi-officially to Colvin, Private Secretary to the Governor General on 30 May 1839:

To Lord Bentinck I often foretold the trouble Nepal would give under easily contemplable circumstances and to Lord Auckland I have repeated the something when mischief was remote. At those time I was censured severely: Yet all my anticipation have been proved but prophetic. Had something been done to stay Napalese insolence when our hands were free, we might now have been at ease in respect to her; but

58. FSC 16 December 1839 No. 120: Maddock to Hodgson, 3 June 1839.

59. FSC 7 August 1839, Nos. 17-20,22,25 and 26: Hodgson to Government. In his despatches, Hodgson assessed the secret mission under one Srinivas Rao, who was arrested on his way to the Court of Nepal. On interrogation, it was found that he was sent to Nepal by Bajji Rao II.

now she feels her advantages and is bent on pushing it to the utmost should our troubles increase according to her expectations.⁶⁰

Therefore, he suggested that Colvin should again communicate confidentially with the army authorities on the defence of the frontier; that Dr. Campbell, Political officer in Sikkim should be asked to ascertain the situation in Sikkim and Bhutan and, if necessary, attempt to neutralise intrigues in those states. Because he reported, there was every possibility that the Nepalese army would sweep over Sikkim and Bhutan, join in hand with the Burmese through Assam and expel the Resident. To counteract such steps, Hodgson urged upon the government the adoption of "some special and immediate measures of precaution" such as garrisoning the military posts of Titaliya and Mullaye on the borders. The intrigues, Hodgson observed were:

important parts of a system of general intercommunication between all our evil-wishers, how remote so ever, and hence restrictions of increasing severity upon the Darbar's intercourse with the plains constitute perhaps the true secret . . . for controlling its wanton spirit of alienation and hostility towards the paramount Government of the plains.⁶¹

The Government of India had issued stern warning to those emissaries trying to sneak into Nepal without passports. The Governor General in a firm tone, admonished Rajendra that he would not suffer the Maharaja's matrimonial necessities being pressed into political purposes, prejudicial to British interests.⁶² The measures adopted by the Government had desired effect on the Darbar. Rajendra was much eager to send the bride-seeking mission to India. But Hodgson was instructed to withhold the passports till he

60. FSC 26 December 1839 No. 128: Hodgson to Colvin, 30 May 1839.

61. FSC 18 December 1839 No. 99: Hodgson to Government, 12 March 1839.

62. FSC 18 December 1839 Nos. 97, 150-17: Hodgson to Government.

was convinced that the policy of the Darbar had really changed. To cool down the temper of the Darbar, Hodgson informed Colvin. To cool down the temper of the Darbar, Hodgson informed Colvin that he had a hold over Nepal through her necessity of seeking a bride for Heir-Apparent, Surendra Vikram Shah from India, which could be used to keep her quiet for a while. More important, however, was "another hold on her thro(ugh) discontent of the chiefs, which may and must tell forcibly for us, if we be forced to open rupture".⁶³

OPPOSITION POLITICS - PROPOSED INTERVENTION

It had now become clear to Hodgson that opposition to the Pandes was steadily gaining ground. The provocative foreign policy of Pandes had earned them less support from the *Bharadars*. Moreover, to strengthen their position at home, they had drastically reduced public expenditure and forced the *Bharadars* and chiefs to pay heavier taxes. All Government properties and rent free lands were resumed. The army was used to coerce recalcitrant *Bharadars* and chief. The opposition sought the Resident's intervention. Hodgson in his despatch to the Government remarked that:

all persons of ranks now look to the Company's Government and earnestly hope that the Governor General will ere long be led to address the Raja in such terms as may frighten him into justice at home and abroad, and redeem him from the toils of the Ranee (senior) and Pandes (Ranjung/Pande) whose unjust and irregular ambition threatened equal mischief to the state in its domestic and in its foreign relations.⁶⁴

It seemed certain that in the event of a collision with Nepal the Pandes would "obtain no hearty support from the chiefs and soldiers and will soon betrayed and undone".⁶⁵ Pandes

63. FSC 26 December 1839 No. 128: Hodgson to Colvin, 30 May 1839.

64. FSC 18 December 1839 No. 115: Hodgson to Government, 14 April 1839.

65. FSC 4 September 1839 No. 40: Hodgson to Maddock, 9 June 1839.

policies at home and aboard, were indeed driving many Bharadars and chiefs to oppositions. In their efforts towards military preparation, they had subjected many to extortion. Worse still, in their anxiety to suppress rivals, they had mercilessly persecuted the Thapas.⁶⁶ In June 1839, Hodgson reported that discontent was spreading and that very often, he was being asked by the chiefs, who soon became identified as the pro-British factions:

would the Resident protect us if we sought him? and sometime it is said by them "well let war come, we shall then at least have opportunity to flee to the Company's territory."⁶⁷

Before closing his rather lengthy despatch, Hodgson said that in the event of a war, many chiefs would be at his side to avert the "ruin of event" or flee from it, or avenge in the Company's lands. To Hodgson the obvious reaction to these developments was the active interference in the Nepalese politics to support the pro-British faction.

PROPOSAL NEGATIVED

To the majority of the Calcutta Council, this was a sound policy. They strongly felt that it was now imperative to give up the policy of temporisation and forbearance. They advocated active interference in the internal affairs of Nepal, through the British party's composed of the Junior Maharani, the Thapas, the *Gurus*, the Chautrias and all other hostile to the Pandes. This faction would act as a counterpoise to the Pandes in the event of troubles. The Council-

66. FSC 26 December 1839 No. 82: Hodgson to Maddock, 30 July 1839. Also Basrat, *op.cit.*, p. 305: Landon, *op.cit.*, p. 91: Ramakant, *op.cit.* pp. 156-157. The death of Bhim Sen Thapa was elaborately reported by Hodgson that "thus beset, he courageously defended himself and demanded why if such charge had been . . . produce against him in 1837"? Even Hodgson paid glowing tribute in following words, "the great and able statesman who for more than thirty years had ruled this kingdom with more than regal sway . . . who first extended territories of his country and then tried to save it against the greatest imperialist power".

67. FSC 26 December 1839 No. 131: Hodgson to Maddock, 9 June 1839.

lors strongly held that Nepal should change her policy or else she should be fully prepared for an armed invasion.⁶⁸ Viewing the British troubles in Afghanistan, China and Burma, they cautioned the Government that Nepal should be reduced “to the footing of a faithful and useful ally”.⁶⁹ But Lord Auckland was not so easily persuaded. While fully appreciating the situation in Nepal, and in particular, the attitude of the Maharaja, he felt that time had not come for active interference in the affairs of Himalayan Kingdom. “The quarrel is ours when we chose to enter on it”, said the Governor General and:

in the meantime, I am not one of those who share in the acute apprehensions which have been sometimes expressed of the ability of Nepal to do us under the present circumstances any serious mischief.

Lord Auckland went on to point that Kathamandu's attempt to instigate the Indian states against the British during the past year, had proved futile. Besides, the constitution and methods of warfare of the Gorkhas armies ruled out their successful invasion of India. He agreed with his Council that Nepal was indeed “a thorn in the side of our power”.⁷⁰ According to him, it was not possible for Nepal to risk a rupture with the British, even if she had successfully instigated the Indian states. At the same time, Lord Auckland hoped that the internal strife within the Darbar would certainly keep her aloof from further intrigues.

Against the policy of actively supporting anti-Pande opposition, Lord Auckland was even more emphatic. In an extremely well reasoned passage of his letter to the President of the Council, he pointed out that the Thapas under Bhim Sen were recokoned to be the most hostile towards the British, and their fall from power as considered at the time the

68. Yapo, M.E., *Strategies of British India-Britain, Iran and Afghanistan*, Oxford, 1980, pp. 513-514.

69. Mojumdar, *op.cit.*, p. 43.

70. FSC 18 December 1839, No. 68: Auckland to the President of the Council 18 July 1839.

most fortunate. Yet, it was the ministry of Rangnath Pandit, under whose guidance the first course of anti-British intrigues commence. And, now, the Pandes were following much the same policy. What was the guarantee then that the opposition when once in power, would not turn against their benefactors? "I believe, he wrote:

whatever party wields the power of the state will gratify the pride and ambitions of the Court, and the general and natural love of national independence, by showing itself to be opposed to us and that though all in their turn might try to use for the sake of rising to power we can look no consistent and faithful support from any of them.⁷¹

Utmost caution was therefore, necessary before entering into league with any of the parties, and committing the Government to a cause from which it may be difficult to extricate with either honour or advantages. The prospect of material benefit from such a connection at any rate compared unfavourably with the evils of entangling in responsibilities which might render war inevitable. He, therefore, saw no reason to authorise Hodgson to form any connection with any of the factions and interfere in the internal politics of Nepal. It would "too probably precipitate the fate of those in whose behalf the Government should interest". It might even bring personal danger to the Resident and "we might in various ways dangerously compromise our honour and appear to public as the wrong-doers in a cause, in which, all the right is now indisputable upon our side".⁷² Therefore, Lord Auckland was decidedly opposed to a course of policy which would involve the Government in endless plots and intrigues.

Lord Auckland's colleague in the Council did not fully share his views on Nepal. They felt that soft-peddling the

71. *Ibid.*

72. *Ibid.* Also FSC 12 June 1839 No. 12; Minute by the Governor General, 22 April 1839.

Governor General would only intensify the Darbar's hostile attitude. They would have preferred active intervention and the reduction of Nepal's power by force. The Governor General was thus urged:

we have little hesitation in declaring that there appears to us to be no security for the stability of the British Empire in India, so long as the power of Nepal remain unreduced... operation which in comparison with a war either beyond Indus or in Ava would cost but little and which would contribute more than anything else to place us in a position calculated to secure to England the undisturbed possession of India for ages to come.⁷³

But Lord Auckland, however, remained unmoved. He remarked that "I regard the reduction of the power of Nepal rather as an end to be attained when all circumstances are favourable". Further,

I have no hesitation in recording my decided opinion that we ought not to court the risk of a war with Nepal in the approaching season, (for) I do not share an acute apprehension of immediate danger from the Government of Nepal. I by no means regard that power is likely to venture an assault upon the plains under any circumstances of which we can at this time contemplate the probability.⁷⁴

73. FPC 18 December 1839 No. 73: President in Council to Lord Auckland, 9 October 1839.

74. FSC 18 December 1839 No. 73: Lord Auckland to the President in Council, 9 October 1839: In the same context Lord Auckland remarked that: "I need not on this occasion enlarge on the subject of the specific demands which it is right and fitting that we should make on the Nepal Darbar. . . I would only hint that the question is not of less delicacy than importance. It will hence be difficult so to guide our proceedings as not greatly to alarm and rouse the national spirit. A divided court contending factions, the whole body of Gorkha soldiery may be united in resistance to us".

CHAPTER-VI

TENTATIVE INTERVENTION

In Kathmandu the Resident was still worried about Nepal's intentions. The Darbar seemed to be aware of the British involvement in Afghanistan and throughout the early months of the campaign were extremely restless.¹ Hodgson however, hoped that he would be able to use the necessity of finding a bride for Heir-Apparent Surendra Vikram Shah among the Princess of India to keep Nepal under restraint. Already, he had turned down several requests of the Nepal Government to send bride seeking missions to Indian States. On 9 July 1839, he however agreed to forward a letter to the Maharaja of Rewa seeking the hand of Princes of that State on the condition that all outstanding problems including the question of intrigues with Indian States be amicably settled within ten days.² The senior Maharani Samrajya Lakshmi Devi and the Pandes were opposed to these conditions.³ Maharaja Rajendra vacillated until British victory in Kabul, the news of which reached him in October 1839, brought home to him the futility of confronting the British. Negotiation between the Resident and the Maharaja immediately started, even though the idea of bride seeking in India was dropped, resulting in the engagement of 6 November 1839.

-
1. Ramakant, *op. cit.*, p. 159; Hunter, *op. cit.*, p. 169.
 2. FSC 4 September 1839 No. 43: Hodgson to Government, 9 July 1839.
 3. Resident's Diary - From 15 August to 31 August 1839.

By this engagement Nepal had avowedly pledged herself to hold no secret contacts with Indian states in future without any reference of the Government of India. Apart from these, Rajendra also agreed to redress the grievances of Indian traders and remove custom duties on Indian goods imported into Nepal. Further, the Darbar was to furnish authentic statements on all goods on which custom duties were levied by Nepal.⁴ These were substantial gains. Hodgson saw in them an end to anti-British intrigues with Indian states. The Darbar could always be checked by playing off the friendly faction against the Pandes and other anti-British elements. Hodgson, therefore, remarked with pride that: "If the greatest politics of India go well for some time, I may be able to keep the Darbar to a new course which those points (in the Engagement) will define to her".⁵

BREACH IF THE ENGAGEMENT

Towards the end of the year, the Pandes were gaining control over the administration of the Darbar and with that the relations between the two states worsened.⁶ Even the Engagement of 6 November 1839, did not prevent Nepal from establishing contact with foreign countries. In the beginning of the new year, when rumours of the British difficulties with China due to the Opium War were rife in Kathmandu, correspondence was opened with Lhasa.⁷ Hodgson was not worried for he was sure of his friends in the Darbar, through whom he said, he could "bring the Darbar to our feet" without resorting to war.⁸ But the power of the war party was by no means weakened, nor anti-British feelings allayed. On 10 February 1840, Maharani Samrajya Laxmi Devi prevailed upon

4. Aitchison, *op.cit.*, Vol II, pp. 116-117: Also 26 December 1839 No. 156: Translation of an engagement under Lal Mohur from the Maharaja of Nepal to the Resident, 6 November 1839, See Appendix—

5. Hunter, *op.cit.*, p. 180.

6. 26 December 1839 No. 162: Hodgson to Government, December 1839.

7. FPC 29 January 1840 No. 69: Hodgson to Maddock, 20 January 1840. It appears to Hodgson that "the discontent is most extensive and deep rooted, and disposition to be rid off the present domination in the Darbar by collision with me in some form or other (is) increasing".

8. FSC 29 January 1840 No. 69: Hodgson to Maddock, 20 January 1840.

Maharaja Rajendra to confirm her protege, Ranjung Pande as *Mukhtiar*. This time, Ranjung was not to share power with the Chautariyas. With the Pandes firmly entrenched, the attitude of the Darbar towards the British worsened. Secret contacts with Indian states recommenced. News of Russian advance to Khiva and the rift between the English and the Sikhs provided an opportunity to Nepal, and a mission under Bhopal Singh Thapa was once again despatched to Lahore. The restlessness of the Darbar increased considerably when the likelihood of actual hostility between Chinese and the British seemed likely.⁹ In January and March 1840, two letters were sent to Lhasa with an object to win the support of Chinese. Besides, business with the Resident came to a standstill. Grievances of Indian traders, under the influence of the Chief Justice Misur Guru, were deliberately denied.¹⁰ The engagement stood on a broken reed.

The Government of India was not proposed to take any serious steps against the Darbar on the violation of the Engagement. Hodgson's instructions on the subject were:

the indulgence which has been shown by the British Government to that of Nepalese in allowing its agents free access to our territories is without any reciprocal concession... It must therefore be narrowly restricted if not altogether denied till the conduct of the Darbar shall entitle it to a restoration of the confidence of the British Government in its friendly disposition.¹¹

As regards the mission to Lahore the Governor General-in-Council took a stern view that it was a grave act of unfriendliness towards the British. The Darbar was to be told that the Government of India would be bound to take serious action if such acts were not discontinued.¹²

9. FSC 23 March 1840 No. 110: Hodgson to Maddock, 14 February 1840.
10. Resident's Diary - 4 January 1840 to 18 February 1840.
11. FSC 23 March 1840 No. 120: Maddock to Hodgson, 23 March 1840.
12. *Ibid.*

EVENTS OF APRIL-JUNE 1840

Towards the middle of April 1840, a band of about a hundred Gorkha soldiers under one Rajbir Rana, a Fauzadar, forced themselves into the Ramnagar estate, in the district of Champaran.¹³ The Gorkhas collected the market duties from the 'Shoodia Usthan', a fair then in progress. Thereafter they proceeded to Mongorela, a neighbouring village, where they held a court to which all villagers in the area were summoned, to inform them that their lands had been appropriated by the Nepalese Government and that henceforth all taxes were to be paid to it. In each village, thus forcibly seized, Gorkha soldiers were stationed and the British *Chowkidars* were warned against conveying any information to their superior authorities. As a result of this aggression a strip of land of about one hundred and fifty to two hundred square miles, containing some ninety one villages, was cut off from British territories.¹⁴ The Nepalese, anticipating reaction warned their local authorities to be vigilant. In the capital it seemed that preparations for war were being made and the soldiers even raised slogans:

down with the chiefs, down with the
feringhees, we will be chiefs ourselves, we
will have back our old territories, we will con-
quer to the Ganges, reverberated in the Nepa-
lese capital.¹⁵

Hodgson, even as he wrote to Fort William of this developments, strongly remonstrated against this sudden

-
13. FSC 15 June 1840 No. 1: Reports of G.D. Wilkins, the Magistrate of Champaran, 26 May 1840: O'Malley, *District Gazetteer of Bengal, Champaran*, pp. 32-33.
14. FSC 11 November 1853 Nos. 22-24: *Narrative of Events in Nepal, 1840-1850*, by Lieutenant Nicholetts, Assistant Resident in Nepal. Also FSC 8 June 1840 Nos. 131-133; 22 June 1840 No. 71.
- * FSC 13 July 1840 Nos. 81-88. According to the Nepalese Govt. these villages formerly belonged to Nepal but had been given to the Raja of Ramnagar, Tej Pratap Singh, on the occasion of his marriage of a Nepalese princess. The lands were now being resumed on account of the British Govt. having ordered their escheat on the death of the grantor. Oldfield, *op.cit.*, pp. 318-319.
15. FSC 20 July 1840 No. 59. Oldfield. *op.cit.*, pp. 318-319.

aggression. He demanded an immediate withdrawal of the Gorkha soldiers within the Someshwar ridge and the return to the Government of India of all the lands forcibly seized. He informed the Darbar that the boundary line in Champaran district ran "along the ridge of the hills . . . called Someshwar", and this had been demarcated by Lieutenant Grant in 1817-1818. Therefore, lands beyond the south of the ridge belonged to the British Government.

The Government of India's response was prompt and unequivocal. Hodgson was told to demand an immediate withdrawal of every Nepalese from Ramnagar, south of the Someshwar ridge, the recognised boundary between the two states. Further, the Darbar was to explain the aggression and punish those responsible, provide enough compensation for all damage and return any money collected. These demands were to be backed by a threat of force. If the reply of the Darbar was unsatisfactory Hodgson was to expect,

a movement of troops, so as effectively to remove all the intruders from within our frontiers . . . at the earliest period at which the seasons would admit.¹⁶

In such an eventuality he was to take every precaution for his personal safety and all those connected with the Residency.

As it turned out, the incident dragged on unsatisfactorily for a month, the Darbar evading and procrastinating every demand. One and half months after the incident, Hodgson reported that though the Darbar had informed him of having issued for the immediate withdrawal of all Nepalese subjects from Ramnagar, a large number of armed men were still there upto 25 June. "This is more extra-ordinary", wrote Hodgson,

because the Darbar professed to me to have fully rendered its ward and to have the

16. Political Despatch to the COD, No. 83, 10 August 1840 and also 100 of 13 September 1840; FSC 17 August 1840 No. 71: Government to Hodgson, 17 August 1840.

chief instrument of the encroachment . . . Jusbir Rana actually in confinement at Cathmandoo where he is said to have arrived some days ago.¹⁷

Meanwhile, another incident occurred in Kathmandu. On 21 June, a general parade was ordered in the name of the Maharaja with the intention of announcing to the troops the oft contemplated reduction of their pay.¹⁸ The soldiers, about six thousand in number, got wind of the object of the parade, in all probability information being deliberately leaked out to them. Instead of waiting for the Proclamation reducing their pay to be read out to them, they grounded arms and demanded redressal of their long standing grievances.¹⁹ From the *Tuddi Khel* a large number of them marched towards the Residency. Hodgson, in a private letter described the scene thus:

ere long the report of the mutiny was confirmed by the appearance of a large body of soldiers in arms moving on the Presidency. Arrived at an open space two hundred yards from the Embassy House, the troops called a halt and held a palaver. They objected to perpetrate so cowardly an act as destruction of the Resident, he being a good gentleman long known to them and always kind and courteous to them and their families.²⁰

-
17. FSC 13 July 1840 No. 81: Hodgson to Torrens, 30 June 1840.
18. M.C. Regmi, *op.cit.*, pp. 172-173. Regmi writes that by 1837, the Government of Nepal had undertaken series of measures to retrench non-military expenditure as well as rent-free expenditure and increased revenues from different sources. From 1834-1838, the salaries of non-military employees were retrenched by 25% and various perquisites customarily enjoyed by the Bharadars and chiefs were withdrawn.
19. Nicholetts, *op.cit.* He writes that the grievances of the troops were that for the last two years instead of being reenlisted as paid up and discharged at the end of their year's engagement according to the right and custom, they had been kept hanging on in service for eight to ten months over their annual terms under the perpetual liabilities to be ousted without pay for this broken period by fresh recruitment.
20. Hunter, *op. cit.*, n.40, Ch. I, pp. 185-186.

The mutineers desisted from attacking the Residency, it was said, only because no order had been received from the Maharaja under his *Lal Mohur*. For its part, the Darbar made no efforts to suppress the rising. Ranjung Pande remained confined to his house faking illness.²¹ The senior Maharani left the capital for Thankote that very morning. The affair was serious enough, and even the palace of the *ex-Mukhtiar* and five of his colleagues were sacked.

The Maharaja met the troops and assured them, in an extremely provoking address, the reasons for the reduction for their pay:

The English Government is powerful abounding in wealth and in all other resources for war. I have kept well with the English so long because I am unable to cope with them. Besides, I am abound by the treaty of amity and I have no excuse to break it; nor have I any money to support a war. Troops I have, and arms and ammunitions in plenty, but no money. This is the reason why I have reduced your pay I want treasure to fight the English. Take lower pay for a year or two, and when I have some money in hand, I will throw off the mask and indulge you in war.²²

The immediate effect of this was, it had been said, almost disastrous. The soldiers reacted with extreme hostility towards the Resident. "True, the English Government is great", they retorted,

21. *Ibid.* Also Nicholetts, *op. cit.*, 1840-1850. Lieutenant Nicholetts writes, "throughout that anxious night the Prime Minister Ranjung Pande, although present in the city, never quitted his house, under the pretence of illness, and when the mutineers appeared before him to demand satisfaction, he not only succeeded in a few moments in satisfying the mutineers of his complete innocence, but that he had been and was ever would be their friend, but strange that he did not make any attempt to suppress the mutiny. Indeed it is supposed that, he even pointed out to their ring leaders the most fitting object of their vengeance".

22. Oldfield, *op. cit.*, p. 318.

but care the wild dogs of Nepal (Buansu) how large is the herd they attack? They are sure to get their bellies filled. We want no money for making war; for war shall support itself. We will plunder Lucknow and Patna. But first we must get rid of the Resident who sees and foretells all. We must be able, unseen to watch the moment of attack. It will soon come, it is come give word and we will destroy the Resident and then war will follow of course. You want excuse for war, there is readymade. Let us set without being watched by the Resident and we will soon make the Ganges your boundary.²³

The attack never came. But to Hodgson, treachery was immediately apparent. He had received information that the Maharaja had informed the soldiers in writing that the reduction of their pay was at the insistence of the Resident. To lend colour to this, the night before the parade, Hodgson and his assistant were deliberately detained in the Palace.²⁴

AUCKLAND'S POLICY

The Governor General-in-Council decided against issuing any definite instructions on Hodgson's report of the incident. At any rate, not before the Darbar's attitude to-

-
23. Nicholetts, *op.cit.*, 1840-1850. The soldiers went on to argue: "If the English, as they say, are your friends and want peace; why do they keep possession of half your dominions? Let us restore Kumaon and Sikkim. These are yours, demand them back and if they refuse, drive out the Resident, let us have war".
24. P. Landon, *op.cit.*, p. 93; Hunter *op.cit.* pp. 184-185. Hodgson latter noted "I was called to the Darbar ostensibly for a mere formal visit. I went as usual with the gentleman of the Residency at 7 PM. At 10 O'clock I rose to go, but the Raja begged me to stay a short while and so again at 11 O'clock and again at night . . . (thereafter) to the queen apparent . . . (who) received me with scant civility and presently grew angry and offensive with reference to business . . . It was daylight when I and the gentleman left the palace and shortly after news came to me that troops were in the capital, were in a mutinous state and were threatening mischief to the Residency".

wards the demands over Ramnagar became clear.²⁵ Fort William seemed to have had some doubt about the authenticity of the Maharaja's communication to the Gorkha soldiers regarding the Resident's role in the reduction of their pay. Hodgson was therefore instructed to communicate to the Darbar that the Government of India viewed their continued occupation of the British territories with extreme displeasure and that each day's delay simply multiplied her grievances. Further, if no satisfaction was received, there would be no hesitation to resort to arms and Hodgson was told, for his own information to expect concentration of troops on the borders if reply from the Darbar was unsatisfactory.²⁶

To Hodgson, the mutiny and the treachery of the Darbar was a more urgent matter than the Gorkha occupation of Ramnagar. He had already decided on his own, to suspend all demands upon the Darbar in anticipation of a fresh directive from Calcutta. The Governor General-in-Council, to whom the encroachment upon the Company's territories could never be permitted, viewed the Resident's action with dissatisfaction. Till the middle of July, the Gorkhas had not retired from Ramnagar and it was suspected that Hodgson was not exerting sufficient pressure on the Darbar. He was, therefore firmly told that he had been furnished with repeated and positive orders on the subject for his guidance and that the Government were anxious that these were promptly and fully executed.²⁷

On 29 July 1840, Hodgson forwarded a note to the Darbar demanding the immediate withdrawal of every Nepali subject from Ramnagar, south of the Someswar ridge; explanations on the cause that led to the outrage together with full punishment of those involved; adequate compensations to all those who had suffered in consequence of this aggression and immediate re-

25. Despatch to the Secret Committee of the COD, 18 August 1840, No. 83.

26. Despatch to the Secret Committee of the COD; 10 August 1840, No. 83.

27. *Ibid.* Resident's Diary from 1 July to 10 September 1840.

turn of all money illegally collected and its deposit in the Residency treasury. The Darbar was also told that if these demands were not promptly complied with, force would be applied. But the Nepalese Government continued to procrastinate²⁸ and till as late as the middle of August, complete evacuation had not been effected. What was worse, complaints had been received, the Resident informed Fort William, from the British subjects in Nepal of oppression and violation of the Engagement of 6 November 1839. This led Lord Auckland to warn Maharaja Rajendra in the most explicit terms, the likely consequence of his anti-British stands:

It will require with Your Highness to decide by the conduct which you may adopt whether the friendship which has subsisted between the two states must be broken and it is my fervent desire that your decision may such as will maintain the propriety and honour of Your Highness's family and kingdom.²⁹

More than the Darbar's failure to comply with British demands, it was the renewal of secret intrigues, particularly with Lahore, that forced an angry Lord Auckland to take a strong stand. The issue of the passage of the English troops to Afghanistan through Punjab reinforced mutual bitterness.³⁰ This was further enhanced by the eagerness shown by the Sikh rulers, Nao Nihal Singh and Dhian Singh, who had been interested in forging an alliance with Nepal against the English.³¹ They revived the secret missions. It was also reported that the Lahore Darbar* even wanted to

28. FSC 17 August 1840, Nos. 71-77: Resident's note to the Darbar, 29 July 1840 and also Darbar's note to Resident's 30 July 1840.

29. FSC 31 August 1840 No. 84: Lord Auckland to the Maharaja of Nepal, 31 August 1840.

30. BMAM 33701 PLA Vol, 12, pp. 138, 185, quoted by Mojumdar, K., *op.cit.* p. 36.

31. R.A. Huttenbach; "*Gulab Singh and Creating of Dogra State of Jammu and Kashmire and Ladhak*", *Journal of Asiatic Studies*, 1961, August, pp. 79-82.

* Gorkhas were recruited by Maharaja Ranjit Singh, hence the term '*Lahore*', used by Gorkhas of Nepal for mercenaries. The term is used even to-day but has lost its original meaning.

recruit the Gorkhas in their Khalsa army and the Nepalese Darbar, without any thought regarding the Resident's reaction was willing to supply them. For this purpose Mathbar Singh Thapa was even said to have been granted an annual pension and it was hoped that he would be successful in forging an alliance between the two kingdoms.³²

Though Lord Auckland feared the possibility of such a contingency, yet he felt it would be unwise to press the Lahore Darbar too strongly. Further, he was fully opposed "to attach undue weight" to the intrigues of the two countries, for they were "occurrence which are to be expected in an Asiatic Court."³³ However, Lord Aukland sent a rather mild warning to the ruler of Lahore

that the maintenance of any close intercourse with sovereign of Nepal would ill-accord with the duty and the interest of the Lahore state.³⁴

But intrigues continued. In August 1840, Karbeer Khatree, a high ranking Nepalese army officer, was sent with a secret letter to Benaras to meet an agent. Attar Singh of the Lahore Darbar.³⁵ His arrest soon after led to the discovery of secret letter from the Maharaja of Nepal addressed to the Lahore Darbar. But Lord Auckland was still indifferent to these activities of the Nepalese Darbar. Rather, he was more concerned with the demands of evacuation of Nepalese subject from Ramnagar. In Kathmandu, pressed on by the Governor General, Hodgson issued an ultimatum on 1 September 1840 to the Darbar demanding satisfaction within ten days under penalty of defraying the expenses of such mili-

32. FSC 17 August 1840 Nos. 79-82.

33. K. Mojumdar *op.cit.*, p. 47.

34. BMAM 37700 PLA Vol. 11, 12 Torrens to Clerk, 1 June 1840. Quoted by Mojumdar, *op.cit.*, p. 47.

35. The mission under Karbeer Khatree to Lahore had an interesting story. Before he left Kathmandu with Resident's passport, Karbeer assured Hodgson that the mission was just to fool the Pandes. He was able to convince the Resident that he would help to dispose the Pandes. The Resident accordingly helped his family to escape from Nepal. FSC 31 August 1840, No. 71.

the policy of the Darbar.⁴⁴ Sometimes later, however, Lord Auckland had good reasons to again address the Maharaja.

On 2 November 1840, in consequence of the Karbeer Khatree incident, Lord Auckland wrote to Rajendra that the "British Government must wholly withdraw its confidence" from the Darbar while it was guided by the present "evil councilors". The Governor General said that he would use force rather than resort to any "hollow negotiation" to settle any injury to the British interest in future. Once again, her reiterated:

Your Highness can in no other way show abhorrence of these proceedings . . . then by instantly removing from power and favour the parties who have 50 signally abused the confidence which you have reposed in them.⁴⁵

In conclusion, Rajendra was desired "to listen to the friendly advice and warning of Mr. Hodgson, ere it is too late".⁴⁶

By now, Hodgson's estrangement with the Pandes and his closeness with the other factions was complete. His policy had been to promote anti-pande elements as an effective counterpoise against the ministry. Early in the year, he had suggested to the Government of India that Mathbar Singh Thapa, then in Lahore, could be used against the Pandes. "In the too probable event of war with Nepal", wrote Hodgson:

Mathbar Singh's service would be of extreme value to us . . . for not to mention the energy of his character, he is now looked upon as in some sort the head of his late exiled party, i.e., the Thapas.

44. FSC 26 October 1840 Nos. 134-135: Auckland to Rajendra, 26 October, 1840.

45. FSC 2 November 1840 No. 122: Auckland to Rajendra, 2 November, 1840.

46. *Ibid.*

Further, the presence of such a man with the British not only would "half paralyse" the army of Nepal, but would keep the Pandes in check.⁴⁷ Calcutta was not altogether averse to the suggestion. But was not prepared to sanction it at that time.⁴⁸ In July 1840, Hodgson wrote that the Darbar was completely divided and the chiefs openly dissatisfied.⁴⁹ In September, while reporting the details of the settlement, he pointed out that there was:

a large and distinguished portion of the chieftancy which would be now glad to find honourable safety under the aegis of the predominant influence, though not of the direct dominion, of the British Government.⁵⁰

It was under these circumstances that Rajendra, in spite of the opposition from the Pandes and the senior Maharani, decided to come to terms with the British Government and accept all their demands. On 1 November 1840, before receiving Lord Auckland's Kharita, Rajendra replaced Ranjung Pande by Fateh Jung Chauturia, a pro-British *Bharadar*.⁵¹

ANTI-BRITISH BHARADARS DISMISSED

The change in the ministry following Ranhung's dismissal was however, more nominal than real. The Pandes and the anti-British faction continued to dominate the administration. The power of the senior Maharani was by no means, reduced. The Government of India, therefore, still considered it necessary to strengthen the frontier defences.

-
47. FSC 18 February 1840 No. 67: Hodgson to Government, 27 January 1840.
48. FSC 23 May 1840 No. 120: Torrens to Hodgson, 23 May 1840. The Resident was instructed that "utmost caution that no step be taken by you which may be calculated either to compromise him and his family with the Darbar or to lay you open to the imputation of mutiny to rebellion a subject of the state of Nepal.
49. FSC 20 July 1840 No. 59: Hodgson to Government, 3 July 1840.
50. FSC 5 October 1840 No. 153: Hodgson to Government, 22 September 1840.
51. FSC 23 November 1840 No. 130: Hodgson to Government, 1 November 1840.

tary preparations as may be required to enforce them. The Commander-in-Chief was also requested to formulate plans for the invasion of Nepal.³⁶

RAJENDRA'S SUBMISSION: THE SETTLEMENT

This had the desired effect. On 3 September 1840, an explanation on Ramnagar was made together with five thousand rupees as deposit for the compensation. However, Hodgson rejected it on the ground that the incident of 21 June was not clarified. He explained to the Government of India that he

Foresaw . . . that the Darbar was bent on claiming all the lands below Someswar . . . and it was partly to prevent by calling it at one . . . for debate and pretence for renewed boundary proceeding that I have insisted on the darbar's acceptance of the Governor General's demands.³⁷

The ultimatum was accordingly extended by another ten days. Hodgson continued to adopt an attitude of sullen indifference towards the Darbar, On the occasion of the '*Indra Jatra*', he declined an invitation to the palace stating that he could not reciprocate compliments with the Darbar, until British demands were met.³⁸

Meanwhile, the Maharaja consulted the *Bharadars* who advised him that with the exception of the disputed tracts all demands could be conceded. On 20 September 1840, Hodgson, summoned to the place for a conference, noticed a perceptible change in Rajendra.³⁹ The following day, all demands made upon the Darbar were conceded, except the problems of the disputed tracts. Thereafter, troops were withdrawn from Ramnagar and the officers responsible for the late aggression were reportedly punished. Five hundred

36. FSC 31 August 1840, No. 151: Hodgson to Torrens, 15 August 1840.

37. FSC 31 August 1840, No. 131: Hodgson to Torrens, 15 August 1840.

38. Despatch to the Secret Committee of the COD, 16 October 1840, No. 106; enclosure from the Resident, 14 September 1840.

39. *Ibid.* Enclosure from Resident, 20 September 1840.

rupees more was deposited in the Residency's treasure as compensation. The demands in regards to the four cases of denial of justice to the Indian traders, for which Misur Guru was responsible, was also redressed, though not without some hassle. Orders were issued to the Nepalese Officers posted on the frontier, to surrender fugitive dacoits and thugs, though this was not included in the list of demands.⁴⁰ As regards the incident of 21 June, at the Resident's insistence, it was agreed that troops would be informed that the British were not concerned with their affairs. Hodgson, later reported his attendance in the Darbar for the purpose of witnessing the Maharaja's fulfilment of this engagement where the troops were told that the Resident was in no way, concerned with their pay reduction.⁴¹

RANJUNG PANDE REMOVED

The settlement earned Hodgson approbation from the Government,⁴² but Lord Auckland was not entirely confident that it would be fully implemented by the Darbar or that relations would improve so long as the affairs of the kingdom were in the hands of the Pandes.⁴³ Barely a month after the agreement, he addressed a *Kharita* to the Maharaja expressing his concern over this. He made it vary clear that his feelings of distrust and estrangement had increased rather than diminished by the recent negotiation. And that, these would be removed only by a complete change in the character and

40. Aitchison, *op.cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 116-117.

41. Despatch to the Secret Committee of the COD, 19 October 1840, No. 116. The Govt. of India acknowledged "the able manner in which Mr. Hodgson performed the highly important and delicate duty which had devolved upon him. We shall for the present only observe that we have much reason to be satisfied with Mr. Hodgson's general conduct for this negotiation", also see 16 October 1840, No. 126.

42. FSC 26 October 1840, Nos. 134-135: Torrens to Hodgson, 26 October 1840. The Govt. of India thanked Hodgson "for the marked ability, firmness and judgement with which you have met a long course of adverse and evasive negotiation on the part of Nepalese Darbar and he begs you to accept the expression of his cordial acknowledgement and approbation of your service on the occasion".

43. Resident's Diary 1 October to 30 October 1840.

the policy of the Darbar.⁴⁴ Sometimes later, however, Lord Auckland had good reasons to again address the Maharaja.

On 2 November 1840, in consequence of the Karbeer Khatree incident, Lord Auckland wrote to Rajendra that the "British Government must wholly withdraw its confidence" from the Darbar while it was guided by the present "evil councilors". The Governor General said that he would use force rather than resort to any "hollow negotiation" to settle any injury to the British interest in future. Once again, her reiterated:

Your Highness can in no other way show abhorrence of these proceedings . . . then by instantly removing from power and favour the parties who have so signally abused the confidence which you have reposed in them.⁴⁵

In conclusion, Rajendra was desired "to listen to the friendly advice and warning of Mr. Hodgson, ere it is too late".⁴⁶

By now, Hodgson's estrangement with the Pandes and his closeness with the other factions was complete. His policy had been to promote anti-pande elements as an effective counterpoise against the ministry. Early in the year, he had suggested to the Government of India that Mathbar Singh Thapa, then in Lahore, could be used against the Pandes. "In the too probable event of war with Nepal", wrote Hodgson:

Mathbar Singh's service would be of extreme value to us . . . for not to mention the energy of his character, he is now looked upon as in some sort the head of his late exiled party, i.e., the Thapas.

44. FSC 26 October 1840 Nos. 134-135: Auckland to Rajendra, 26 October, 1840.

45. FSC 2 November 1840 No. 122: Auckland to Rajendra, 2 November, 1840.

46. *Ibid.*

Further, the presence of such a man with the British not only would "half paralyse" the army of Nepal, but would keep the Pandes in check.⁴⁷ Calcutta was not altogether averse to the suggestion. But was not prepared to sanction it at that time.⁴⁸ In July 1840, Hodgson wrote that the Darbar was completely divided and the chiefs openly dissatisfied.⁴⁹ In September, while reporting the details of the settlement, he pointed out that there was:

a large and distinguished portion of the chieftancy which would be now glad to find honourable safety under the aegis of the predominant influence, though not of the direct dominion, of the British Government.⁵⁰

It was under these circumstances that Rajendra, inspite of the opposition from the Pandes and the senior Maharani, decided to come to terms with the British Government and accept all their demands. On 1 November 1840, before receiving Lord Auckland's Kharita, Rajendra replaced Ranjung Pande by Fateh Jung Chauturia, a pro-British *Bharadar*.⁵¹

ANTI-BRITISH BHARADARS DISMISSED

The change in the ministry following Ranhung's dismissal was however, more nominal than real. The Pandes and the anti-British faction continued to dominate the administration. The power of the senior Maharani was by no means, reduced. The Government of India, therefore, still considered it necessary to strengthen the frontier defences.

-
47. FSC 18 February 1840 No. 67: Hodgson to Government, 27 January 1840.
48. FSC 23 May 1840 No. 120: Torrens to Hodgson, 23 May 1840. The Resident was instructed that "utmost caution that no step be taken by you which may be calculated either to compromise him and his family with the Darbar or to lay you open to the imputation of mutiny to rebellion a subject of the state of Nepal.
49. FSC 20 July 1840 No. 59: Hodgson to Government, 3 July 1840.
50. FSC 5 October 1840 No. 153: Hodgson to Government, 22 September 1840.
51. FSC 23 November 1840 No. 130: Hodgson to Government, 1 November 1840.

A corp of observation was stationed at an advanced situation to watch the movements of the Gorkhas and to protect the interests of British subjects. The commander of the force, was directed to keep himself in direct communication with Hodgson.⁵²

In latter part of November, Hodgson reported that the state of affairs in the Darbar, was most unsatisfactory. Despite Ranjung Pande's removal, a change in the policy of the Darbar did not follow as the Maharaja was dominated by the senior Maharani. And he was not prepared to do anything without her consent. On 22 November 1840, the Maharani, with a view to obstructing the change in administration, as Hodgson thought, proceeded to Nayakote, attended by the new *Mukhtiar*.⁵³ Hodgson immediately protested to the Maharaja who explained that the Maharani had gone to perform some religious ceremony and would return within a few days. He assured the Resident that he would instructs the *Mukhtiar* to return immediately. However, no amount of persuasion would induce the Maharani to return. After having waited up to 2 December, the Maharaja proceeded for Nayakote, accompanied by a large number of chief and the Resident, and declared his (Rajendra) intention that "if she agrees (to return) it is well and good, if not he would adjust with the Resident and will not allow her to destroy the kingdom."⁵⁴

The Political Department of the Government of India felt worried at this turn of affairs. The correspondence at that time suggest that Hodgson led the Governor General-in-Council to believe that powerful forces were at work against the Maharaja and the Pandes, and that change in the ministry, would be immediate and complete. In early December 1840, after the return of the Maharaja and Maharani to the Capital, Hodgson wrote privately to the Political Secretary Henry Torrens that there was no reason for

52. Nicholetts, *op.cit.*, p. 1840-1850.

53. Resident's Diary, 11 to 25 November 1840.

54. *Ibid.* 25 November to 9 December 1840.

concern.⁵⁵ "Trust me", he wrote, "and do not needlessly interfere while matters are in progress". Again,

do not despond, things are mending and I might yet achieve the change of new measures - only gradually than you seem to have expected.

He said, he was fully satisfied with Fateh Jung Chautria who had "confidently opened his mind" and "is very grateful for what I have done for him". The Mukhtiar "asked for little beyond continued general countenance and protection such as in wisdom I cannot withhold".⁵⁶ These sentiments, he officially conveyed five days later to the Governor General-in-Council. But at the time, he confessed that the Darbar's resistance to the change had proved more obstinate than he had anticipated. He still hoped of success, if only his hands remained strengthened, and the corps of observation remained on the frontier for some time longer.⁵⁷

The Government of India could not help but regret that the expectation of active assistance from friendly *Bharadars* on whom Hodgson had so heavily relied to bring about some change, had not been realised. It seemed to the Governor General-in-Council that the "whole pressure" on the Maharaja to install a friendly administration, "must proceed directly from yourself as the representative of British Government". Hodgson was accordingly authorised,

to use endeavours to the utmost degree consistent with prudence, the object of procuring the removal (really as well as in name) of the obnoxious ministers of Nepal and the appointment of a trustworthy administration in their place.

The position of estrangement between Nepal and India, which Lord Auckland announced in his *Kharita* of 2

55. *Ibid.*

56. FSC 21 December 1840 No. 108: Hodgson to Maddock, 10 December 1840.

57. FSC 11 January 1841 No. 223: Hodgson to Maddock, 10 December 1840.

November 1840, to Rajendra, was to continue. And Hodgson was given the liberty of expressing this feeling to the Darbar and to show that those sentiments and objects of the Government of India remained unchanged.⁵⁸

Hodgson, who was evidently given a free hand to meddle in the internal affairs of the kingdom, immediately set about negotiation with the friendly *Bharadars*. On 2 January 1841, he got them to enter into a solemn engagement to maintain friendship and good faith with the British Government. The Engagement signed by ninety-five *Bharadars* read:

(It) is most desirable and proper that firm and steady friendship should exist and be daily increased between the British and Nipal Government; that to this and every means should be taken to increase the friendly relations with the Company, and the welfare of the Nipal Government; that the Resident should ever and always be treated in an honourable and friendly manner; that if nevertheless, any unforeseen circumstances or senseless proceeding should at any rate arise to shake the friendly understanding which ought exist between the two Sirkars, or the cause uproar and mischief to Cathmandoo, we shall be responsible for it.⁵⁹

On the same day, Rajendra sent a *Yaddast* to the Governor General informing a complete change of the ministry,

according to your Lordship's advice I have dismissed from the office the several

-
58. FSC 21 December 1840: No. 109: Torrens to Hodgson, 21 December 1840. The Political Secretary to the Government of India advised Hodgson to avoid direct collision with Darbar, "as would be productive of any serious embarrassment to your own position and thus compromise the character of your Government in general estimation at a moment when it might be impossible to render you vigorous protection and support.
59. FSC 25 January 1841, No. 121: Translation of an *Ickarar Namah*, signed by Gooroo, Chautrias, Chiefs, on 2 January 1841.

individuals who tried to make mischief between the two States, and have selected and appointed Chautria Fateh Jung Shah, an individual of high rank and consideration, as my Prime Minister in order that he may clear up all unfriendly feeling between the two Sirkars.

In their place "wise and prudent" counsellors were appointed. The Maharaja further assured that these persons would remain in service unless they committed any crime.⁶⁰

HODGSON'S "MINISTRY"

The *Mukhtiar* and his colleagues, as creatures of the British, maintained close relations with the Resident and identified themselves with British interests. They fully cooperated with the Government of India's effort for the suppression of *Thugi* and dacoits.⁶¹ Again in March 1841, they opposed Rajendra's move to attack Tibet during the trouble in Ladakh and western Tibet at that time.⁶² But their position was extremely precarious. The activities of senior Maharani and the Pandes to regain power and influence continued unabated. Hodgson was fully aware of the *Mukhtiar's* position. In January 1841, shortly after the dismissal of the anti-British *Bharadars*, Hodgson advised against the proposed withdrawal of the brigade from the frontier as "unsafe and expeditious". He wrote that new ministry would require sometime before they consolidated their position. Besides, in view of difficulties with China at that time, it as

60. *Ibid.* Rajendra to Lord Auckland, 2 January 1841.

Individual appointed:

Chautria Fateh Jung Shah
Guru Ranganath Pandit
Guru Krishna Pandit
Chautria Pushkar Shah
Kajee Dal Bhajan Pande
Chautria Guru Prasad Shah
Kajee Kaloo Sahi

Individual discharged:

Guru Krishnaram Missur
Chautria Kool Chandra Shah
Kajee Karbeer Pande
Captain Ranbir Thapa
Kuperdar Kool Raj Pande
Capt. Indrabeer Thapa
Koomedan Umer Shahi

61. Despatch to the Secret Committee to the COD, 21 March 1841, No. 22.

62. FSC 5 April 1841 No. 110: Hodgson to Clerk, 26 March 1841.

possible that the Darbar would receive the utilise encouragement from Lhasa to annoy the British. Under the circumstances to withdraw the troops would be to expose the Residency and all the members of the new administration to "probable danger and dishonour" during the summer when "mischief is always most rife at Kathmandu".⁶³

Towards the close of the month highly inflammatory placards, threatening; the Residency and the new ministry had appeared in the streets of Kathmandu. One poster accused Fateh Jung and the members of having conspired with the British for the division of spoils of Nepal. Another accused the minister of having given the British nine lakh of rupees and the Terai in return for their support to remain in power for five years. These placards also said that the army wanted Ranjung Pande as Mukhtiar and that the new ministry should be removed forthwith.⁶⁴ It was generally believed that this was the work of the Pande faction which was constantly at work to undermine the Chautria ministry.⁶⁵ Shortly after this, the senior Maharani, subsequently followed by the Maharaja and the Heir-Apparent, suddenly left towards Hetauda declaring her intention to proceed to Benaras for pilgrimage. Hodgson objected on the grounds that neither permission nor passports had been obtained. In reporting this event to Fort William, he observed that:

this last device of the Pandey faction seem to prove their stock of paltry manouvers to be nearly exhausted so that a dignified firmness and prudence on our side may be expected at no remote period to place the destinies of this state at our disreational disposal.⁶⁶

63. FSC 15 February 1841 Nos. 72-78: Hodgson to Maddock, 15 January 1841, and Maddock to Hodgson 27 January 1841.

64. M.S. Jain *op.cit.*, pp. 26 and 28.

65. Nicholetts, *op.cit.*, 1840-1850; Also Despatch to the secret committee of the COD, 19 February 1841, No. 15.

66. FSC 8 March 1841 No. 124: Hodgson to Maddock, 28 February 1841.

The royal party returned to the capital within a fortnight. Hodgson felt that her object was to overthrow the ministry and that the Maharaja was allowing himself, without fully realising the implications, to be party to her scheme. She was reported to have summoned to her presence immediately on her arrival at Kathmandu, Ranjung Pande, her favourite. She was also reported to have appealed to the army to reinstate the Pande ministry. In these circumstances, Hodgson felt that the brigade should remain in its advanced situation for a longer period.⁶⁷ It was to be prop to the ministry no less than to the Residency.

AUCKLAND'S CAUTION

The Government of India was, however, more cautious. It was observed to Hodgson on 22 March 1841, that "it will not be wise to raise any nice question on the degree of support, the friendly ministry in Nepal were entitled to form the British Government". He was reminded that Government was only interested in the removal of certain "obnoxious advisers" rather than in their substitution by any particular person. The Governor General-in-Council, therefore, instructed to Hodgson that British objectives should be achieved through guiding the ministry and by preventing the Maharaja from adopting "bad councils".⁶⁸ Lord Auckland, in fact, relied more on his policy of taking up matters directly with the Maharaja Rajendra. A week later, he sent a *Kharita* to the Maharaja on the subject of the Hetauda incidents, and the involvement of the Pande faction. After reminding him that he would be held responsible for the action of his Government by whatever ministry it was directed, Lord Auckland expressed strong displeasure at his late conduct. The *Kharita* concluded with the following warnings:

I have only to repeat my earnest warning to Your Highness against further resort to insincerity and evasion in your dealing

67. FSC 22 March 1841, No. 124: Hodgson to Maddock, 5 March 1841.

68. FSC 22 March 1841, No. 126: Maddock to Hodgson, 22 March 1841.

with a powerful Government which is willing to be at peace with you. A policy of that nature could only have its end the most ruinous consequence to the welfare of Your Highness and your families.⁶⁹

Hodgson was not fully convinced of the efficacy of mere warning. In a long despatch on 7 April, 1841, he argued, how could he expect protections from the ministry, if violence were directed towards the Residency in future, and if the British Government failed to protect them now? And what was he to do in the event of the removal of the ministry from office and its persecution, similar to the fate of Bhim Sen Thapa? The non-interference of the British Government in the persecution of the former *Mukhtiar*, was often remarked in Kathmandu, he added, with surprise and regret.⁷⁰ In such circumstances, the Government of India replied, he should "use the language of earnest expostulation or of firm but temperate remonstrance". He could appeal to the feelings of the Darbar on the injury that Nepal had suffered following Bhim Sen's prosecution. The effect of such a policy, wrote the Governor General, would probably be as great as any threat that could be held out to the Darbar. It would certainly not be expedient to risk a war with Nepal over this issue, "on which we have not a clear right of interference". Hodgson was finally instructed in general terms that he should make it known to the Darbar that:

the want of confidence in the Raja's intention and Councils which has been avowed by the Government of India while the former hostile ministry were in power must be continued and increased by any course of conduct which show a spirit of violent persecution against men who have been supporters of the British alliance and anxious to maintain peace between the two States.⁷¹

69. FSC 29 March 1841, No. 126: Lord Auckland to Maharaja Rajendra, 29 March 1841.

70. FSC 26 April 1841, No. 74: Hodgson to Maddock, 7 April 1841.

71. FSC 26 April 1841, No. 75: Maddock to Hodgson, 26 April 1841.

The *Kharita* had the desired effect on Rajendra and there was a perceptible change in the latter's attitude. He assured the Resident that all remaining anti-British elements would be removed that he would maintain friendly relations with the British. This led Hodgson to hope that at the coming *Panjani*, the tenure of the present pre-British ministry would be extended.

RAJENDRA'S LAST BID

Anti-British feeling was by no means at an end. An opportunity soon provided to Maharaja Rajendra to make one more bid against the British. The Ladakhis, unable to cope with the Dogras under General Zorawar Singh and failing to enlist British support, turned to Lhasa and Kathmandu.⁷² In March 1841, two Ladakhi envoys arrived in Jumla for the purpose. Rajendra did not commit himself to support in the Ladakhis against the Dogras. Instead, it was said, he decided to launch a furtive attack on a nearby goldmine in western Tibet, hoping to see it as a bargain for military assistance from the Sikhs or from the Tibetans. But the fear of the Chinese assistance to the Tibetans served as a deterrent to the Nepalese ambition.⁷³ The Dogras were equally interested in Nepal's assistance against the Ladakhi and the Tibetans. Soon after the Dogra conquest of Ladakh, its ruler appealed to Kathmandu for succour, towards which the Kathmandu Darbar was eager. When Fateh Jung and his colleagues disapproved of Rajendra's plans he went on to establish contact with the Dogras. However, the Chinese *Amban* at Lhasa strongly reprimanded Rajendra's interest in Ladakh's dispute and warned him against "excessive restlessness".⁷⁴ In rejecting Nepal's "silly request", the *Amban* informed Maharaja Rajendra that the Chinese Government had,

no title or purpose to interfere with
Ladakh politics, and that the Darbar (Nepal)

72. K. Mojumdar, "Nepal and the Sikh-Tibetan War", *Bengal Past and Present*, Vol. LXXXII, Pt. I, pp. 13-14.

73. FSC 2 March 1841, No. 110: Hodgson to Government, 14 February, 1841.

74. FSC 26 October 1840, No. 139: Hodgson to Tapp. 9 October 1840.

would do well to confine itself to its established circle of connection, cherishing peace and good faith within that circle, and less heedful of novelties beyond it.⁷⁵

Presumably, the Chinese feared that Nepal's overture to Ladakh might bring in the British, as an ally of the Dogras, the subjects of Lahore, with which the British had friendly relations. Therefore, Hodgson was confident that so long as the Chinese maintained this attitude, the Government of India had little cause for worry. He held that "without China's direct instigation and aid, this Darbar (Nepal) will not certainly under its present ministry, meddle at all in the matter".⁷⁶

However, the constant expansion of the Dogras towards the Tibetan frontiers, worried Hodgson. Further, the occupation of Gartok affected the British Commercial interest in western Himalayas when the Dogra Raja monopolised the local shawl wool trade; and also threatened the economic life of the people of the Punjab hill states.⁷⁷ Hodgson, therefore, felt that unless they (Dogras) were checked "with Chinese, Sikhs and Gurkhas, we shall ere long find ourselves, of necessity, involved in a labyrinth of trans-Himalayas politics, the clue to which may be difficult to find and impracticable to use when found".⁷⁸ The Government of India took serious note of the developments. The Maharaja of Nepal was not only discouraged but also

75. FSC 25 May 1841 No. 154: Hodgson to Government, 20 May 1841.

76. FSC 30 August 1841 No. 32: Hodgson to Lushington, 17 August 1841.

77. C.L. Dutta, *op.cit.* pp. 152-182; Also see A.H. Franke, *A History of Ladakh*, pp. 41-46; Ram Rahul, *The Himalayan Borderland*, pp. 104-5; Alister Lamb, *op.cit.* pp. 66-68. At the initial stage the Government of India encouraged Gulab Singh on his expansionist policies. The British wanted to maintain a strong buffer in the North-West. Besides the disturbances in Ladakh had diverted the shawl wool trade to the British protected hills states of Lahul, Spiti and Kumaon. But the Dogra expansion towards Western Tibet and the fear of a Dogra-Nepal approachment . . . in Tibet, that "all trade still or prohibited". Huttenback, *Gulab Singh and the Creation of Dogra State of Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh*, *JAS*, Vol. 20, pp. 477-488.

78. FSC 11 October 1841 No. 89: Hodgson to Maddock, 2 October 1841.

warned against his "overweening ambition". At the same time, the Political Agent, at Ludhiana George Clerk was instructed to inform the sentiments of the British Government to the Lahore Darbar that "it would not permit any aggressive measure which might obstruct the free transit of commerce through the Bushir state or through any other districts entitled to the British protection".⁷⁹

Towards the end of 1841, it was reported that the Chinese troops advanced to defend the Tibetan frontier. As a precautionary measure, the Government of India despatched two companies of the *Nusseri* battalion to Kotegarh to keep a watch on the affairs of the neighbouring states. Moreover, the Government strongly insisted that the Lahore Darbar should restrain further dogra expansion.⁸⁰ The British reaction to these developments, and the ultimate defeat and death of Zorawar Singh put an end to Rajendra's hopes and cooled his ardour. He quickly made an effort to win the support of the Government of India offering help against the Chinese. Hodgson promptly rejected Rajendra's offer and warned him that the Government of India disapproved of Dogra expansion into Tibet, and

we had no desire to do injury to China in any quarter, and should willingly desist from our compulsory operations in China proper, so soon as justice had been rendered to us.⁸¹

How far Maharaja Rajendra Vikram Shah could have succeeded in forging a Sikh-Gorkha alliance or creating difficulties for the British is difficult to ascertain. But, Hodgson was throughout confident that as long as his pro-British ministry were in power, there was no fear of Nepal joining either the Chinese or the Sikhs against the Company.⁸² With

79. FSC 16 August 1841, No. 39: Government to Clerk, 16 August 1841.

80. Ravuri Dhanalaxi, *op.cit.* pp. 43-47.

81. FSC 3 January 1842 No. 128: Hodgson to Government, 20 October 1841.

82. *Ibid.*

the death of Maharani Samrajya Laxmi Devi on 6 October last,⁸³ the Pandes had become a spent force. The Maharaja too had clearly perceived the altered situation and had no option but to confirm Fateh Jung's Ministry.⁸⁴

83. Nicholetts, *op.cit.* 1840-1850; He writes "the Maharani died of the malarious fever "Owal" which she is supposed to have contracted during her sojourn at Hetouda. Suspicions were at one time entertained that poison had been administered to her, but it subsequently proved that the surmises were groundless".

84. FSC 21 December 1841, No. 77: Hodgson to Maddock 15 November 1841.

CHAPTER-VII

ELLENBOROUGH AND HODGSON'S RECALL

British influence in the Darbar reached its height during the winter of 1841-1842. By then all complaints relating to border disputes and Indian traders, had been favourably adjusted or were in the process of adjustment.¹ During the British disasters in Kabul in the fateful months of that winter, Nepal was quiet and Hodgson ruled out any possibility of trouble on that frontier. In fact, the Maharaja even offered troops for service with the Company's force in Kabul or in Ava as the Governor General thought fit.²

1. FPC 14 February 1842, No. 82: Hodgson to Maddock, 31 January 1842. Also a Translation of Red Seal note from the Maharaja to the Resident, 30 January 1842. The Maharaja informed Hodgson to communicate the *Lal Mohur* wherein the following cases were disposed off: 1. Jumni Naddi case, 2. the matter of Abdul Rasori and Mukhtar Beg, 3. Bhagat Singh's debt to Captain Hollings and 4. Himcha Katwar vrs. Lachmi Narayan. The following were the cases under consideration; 1 Shiv Dayal vrs. Asrani Gri, 2. Waziruddin vrs. Khundes etc.
2. FSC 28 February 1842, No. 72: Hodgson to Maddock, 19 February 1842. In Rajendra's offer of troops, Hodgson saw "many advantages to both the states and which might, by its realisation with a fortunate issue constitute the true enthusiasm of the military mania of this Government whose political restlessness and offensive attitude towards us since the war (1814-16) have been greatly caused by the latent pressure of an excessive and unemployed soldiery". For William acknowledged the offer, although it did not accept it. It was hoped that personal good relations would be cultivated with the Maharaja by the Resident and the ministry. Secret Despatch of the CODs, 22 January 1842, No. 6; FSC 14 February 1842, No. 82: *Kharita* from the Maharaja of Nepal to Lord Auckland, Governor General, 30 January 1842. Also see Secret Despatch to the CODs, 15 February 1842, No. 9.

Hodgson, therefore, urged the Governor General-in-Council in early 1842 that the promises made earlier to the Darbar to remove the brigade from Sagauli, be redeemed.³ The Government of India, too was satisfied with the conduct of Nepal and in February informed the military Department that as differences with her were settled measures should be undertaken for the withdrawal of all troops from the frontier.⁴

FRESH PROBLEMS: HEIR APPARENT

No sooner was this done than an undesirable incident took place when the Maharaja exhibited sentiments quite at variance with his late peaceful professions. A news item had appeared in the Anglo-India press that the death of the late Maharani, Samrajya Lakshmi Devi, was caused by poison. Rajendra sought a clarification on the report from the Resident and proceeded to his bungalow. When confronted, Hodgson assured the Maharaja that his Government would make every exertion to find out the author of the report. The opportunity was taken by Maharaja Rajendra to insult* Hodgson probably to impress the pro-British

3. FSC 14 February 1842, No. 82: Hodgson to Maddock, 31 January 1842; Also see despatch to Secret Committee of the CODs, 19th February 1842, no. 4.

4. FPC 28 February 1842 No. 71: Hodgson to Maddock, 28 February 1842. Maddock wrote to Hodgson that the Governor General-in-Council was satisfied with his conduct and informed that "You have acted throughout these transaction with a thorough knowledge of the native character and with a degree of skill prudence and forbearance that is highly creditable to you and His Lordship-in-Council begs to congratulate you on the termination of your last struggle and to express his strong hope that . . . our relations with the Government of Nepal may not again be interrupted and that between the Maharaja and yourself there may be still maintained those demonstration of personal good feeling and mutual regard which have so strongly marked your recent intercourse with His Highness". Also FSC 14 February 1842 No. 83: Maddock to Hodgson, 9 February 1842.

* Nichollet's Narrative of Events in Nepal. Rajendra was reported to have shouted to Hodgson that "tell the Governor General that he must and shall give hint up. I will have him and flay him alive and rub him with salt and lemon till he die; further tell the Governor General that if this infamous culminator is not delivered up there shall be war between us".

Bharadars and chiefs that the Resident was less powerful to protect them. Later, the Maharaja made full apology for his undignified and highly offensive expression to the British Government.

On 23 April 1842, occurred what was known as the Kashinath episode. It had its origin in a rivalry between Kashinath, a trader from Benaras and another India, Siv Dayal. The latter filed a legal suit against Kashinath in some trumped-up charges and the *Kumari Chok Adalat* after a trial, fined the former a large sum of money. Earlier in 1841, the *Kot-Linga*, the highest court in Nepal dismissed the case on the ground that both plaintiff and respondent being British subjects, the matter was beyond the jurisdiction of Nepal's courts. In late February 1842, the *Kumari Chok Adalat*, however, re-opened the case on an appeal by Siv Dayal. Hodgson, when he heard of this, promptly sent a note to the Maharaja protesting against the re-opening of the case, once dismissed by the highest court.⁵ He demanded immediate clarification on the circumstances on which the *Kumari Chok Adalat* had again sought to meddle in the case and asked the Maharaja to annul the suit.

Despite Hodgson's protest the case was taken up. At this time, Kashinath was residing in the Residency, probably for medical treatment. On the 6 and again on 8 April 1842, the *Darbar Munshi* was ordered to fetch Kashinath for interrogation. Hodgson refused to allow him to be taken. Instead, he asked to see the Maharaja. But the latter, instead of arranging it, marched top the Residency in strength on 23 April to demand the immediate surrender of Kashinath. Hodgson argued that Kashinath, being a British subject, the case could not be decided by the Nepalese Court of Law. He further explained that the said merchant was kept in the Residency for medical treatment. The case, so far as the Resident was concerned, was not of disputed jurisdiction but of strong handed interference with all legal

5. FSC 2 August 1842 No. 51: Hodgson to Maddock, 1 March 1842, and enclosed copy of the Resident's Note to the Maharaja, 26 February 1842. Also see Ramakant, *op. cit.*, pp. 201-204.

proceedings. Besides, the whole matter was once decided by the highest court of the state. He also protested that while Kashinath's bail petition had been rejected and was compelled to deposit a huge amount, his opponent was not required to pay anything and while Kashinath was not even allowed to leave for the plains of India had his documents were confiscated, his rival was set free.⁶ The Resident assured the Maharaja that if the money belonging to Kashinath was given back to him, he would go to Benaras. At this stage, Kashinath himself appeared and declared that he had no wish or intention to oppose the Maharaja, but wanted justice. Māharaja Rajendra, however, did not listen to these explanations and ordered Kashinath's immediate arrest.⁷ Hodgson threatened that "his duties as an ambassador would come to an end" if Kashinath was taken away by force. The Heir Apparent came forward and asked his father to drag Kashinath away. When he attempted to do so, Hodgson intervened and told the Maharaja that if he was going to take Kashinath by force "he had to take both the Resident and the merchant or neither". The Maharaja and the others, thereafter returned to the palace and some chiefs, friendly to the British, were sent to negotiate with the Resident. On their entrusties, Hodgson allowed Kashinath to go to the Darbar on the guarantee from the minister that his life and properties would be protected.

Hodgson instantly realised that the motive behind the incident was to break the alliance between the Resident and the friendly Bharadars. The showdown as probably intended to humiliate the Resident and weaken his position in the eyes of his supporters. This would precisely have been the result if Hodgson had not been able to prevent the Maharaja from dragging Kashinath from the Residency. After all, the issue was too trivial for the Maharaja of a kingdom to intervene personally. Already, the *Bharadars* were being systematically harassed to expose the inability of the Resident to protect them. These developments were the

6. FSC 3 August 1842, No. 65 Hodgson to Maddock, 8 April 1842, and enclosed note of the Resident to the Darbar 6 April, 1842.

7. FSC 3 August 1842 No. 65: Hodgson to Maddock, 8 April 1842.

result of the emergence of the Heir Apparent as a new factor in Darbar politics.⁸ On reporting the incident to Fort William, Hodgson remarked:

I feel assured that the intimidation now being practised towards the chiefs through Heir Apparent have in part the express object of effecting such desertion from me and if the present barbarities be carried a little further and be applied to the ministry without remonstrance from me I fear our honour would hardly escape unquestioned as I am sure that our interests would be sadly wounded by the desertion of all our and powerful friends.⁹

MATHBAR SINGH: INTRIGUES WITH LAHORE

On 7 April 1842, the Mukhtiar informed Hodgson of the Maharaja's wish to send a secret mission to Lahore. Although Fateh Jung, it was said, vehemently objected to the course as "ill timed and calculated to recall the Governor General's attention to the Darbar so recently defeated scheme to open a political intercourse with Punjab". The Maharaja persisted and asked him to communicate his proposal to the Resident. The *Mukhtiar* also stated that,

the Maharaja founded pleasure in nothing but domestic and foreign intrigues to which I rejoined that His Highness was yet young and free from any deep paint of vice or cruelty and that perhaps no sufficient pains had been taken to remove from his character and conduct the bias laid on it. Firstly,

8. *Ibid*: No. 66.

9. FSC 3 August 1842, No. 66: Hodgson to Maddock, 24 April 1842. The *Bharadars* themselves were reported to have been anxious about strong action against the Maharaja and the Heir Apparent. Also see Hunter, *op.cit.*, p. 210, who quoted the as assuring Hodgson after the incident: "be patient and firm, all depends on you. We cannot act now, but we can and we will exact an apology when Maharaja's fit of violence has abated and him, away".

by the undue restraints of the Thapas and second by the pondering encouragement of the Pande's (administration) recurrence to the ancient aggressive and fraudulent external policy of Nepal.¹⁰

Hodgson accordingly warned that such act would be dangerous for Nepal. He suspected that Mathbar Singh who was at this time at Ludhiana, was the man, behind the recent development in the Darbar's politics. It alleged that Mathbar Singh had no other motive than augmenting his own importance and "may even he himself satisfied the projected (of mutual relations between Lahore and Nepal) is vain and futile, at the moment from Sher Singh's fidelity". It seemed that Mathbar Singh was reviving the semblance of reality of the alliance with a view not only of deluding the Maharaja but as well as of creating problems for the new ministry.; It was certain that Mathbar Singh would persevere in his plans.

the more recklessly in proportion as he finds that we cannot and will not fulfil his aspiring aims at power and revenge - his sole chance of deluding his own sovereign is in the character of a successful negotiator with Lahore.¹¹

On 10 April, Hodgson once again communicated his correspondence with the Political Agent in Lahore regarding the activities of Mathbar Singh. It was stated that Mathbar Singh was in a difficult position; and was playing a subtle diplomatic rope trick by wheedling the Pandes into the belief that the Sikh were agreeable to the contemplated league and for which he had been trying. The Political Agent, George Clark observed that,

having new seen a good deal of Mathbar Singh, I am strongly impressed with the belief that his dominant desire is to serve his

10. FSC 3 August 1842 No. 69: Hodgson to Maddock, 7 April 1842.

11. *Ibid.*

own interests and avenge himself on the Pandes by any means; that the means he would prefer as most prompt and affording him the best security for the future would be to precipitate hostilities between the British Government and Nepal, he exerting himself in our side, but that failing his hope of reaching his aim, he would gladly avail himself of those means which a league prompted by himself between Lahore and Kathmandu might be effected by his party afford of lifting him into power.¹²

Meanwhile, Mathbar Singh entreated the Maharaja to use his endeavours to effect his release from the surveillance of the Indian Government. The British promptly removed Mathbar to Simla for security reasons. Hodgson commented:

I apprehend that if Exul's abuse of our confidence and protection is to be prevented, it must be so by our entirely by ourselves. For Exul is clearly gone over to the Maharaja's side for the present and His highness is infatuated with eagerness for the Lahore alliance though possibly without any present or definite purpose offensive (or) inimical to us, but rather partly for vanity's sake and partly as a so called at least defensive and precautionary measures against us.¹³

LORD ELLENBOROUGH'S ATTITUDE

Meanwhile, in early 1842 Lord Ellenborough took over as Governor General in succession to Lord Auckland. After carefully going over all the papers connected with Nepal, he adopted a view entirely different from what his predecessor

-
12. FSC 3 August 1842 No. 70: Enclosed copy of letter from Clark to Hodgson (n.d.).
 13. FSC 3 August 1842 No. 70: Hodgson to Maddock, 10 April 1842 *Ibid.* No. 78: Hodgson to Maddock, 1 May 1842 and also enclosed copies of letter from Sher Singh to Rajendra, 24 April; and Note of Resident to the Darbar.

would probably been taken. He instantly rejected Hodgson's reports on the Kashinath's episode and on Mathbar Singh's Secret overture with Lahore. He bluntly said that he could not believe that he Maharaja would,

forget his personal dignity and the obligation of Public Law and Treaty as to offer international insult to the representation at his court of a sincerely friendly power and to place under persecution a British subject.¹⁴

The Maharaja's action may have been "seemingly" on the mistaken "impression with regard to your conduct in relations to it". Far from accepting his suggestion that the Government of India should take strong note of the incident, the Governor General-in-Council instead, censured Hodgson for discourtesy to an independent sovereign. He expressed surprise that the Resident,

would act in a manner so entirely contrary to the known views or wishes of your Government as to attempt to extend the privileges of British subject or your own authority beyond the just limits which the Law of Nations and a solemn treaty assign to them; still less that you would evince a want of personal consideration for a friendly and independent sovereign.

As if the censure was not enough, Hodgson was ordered to handover to the Darbar a translation of the very letter containing his stricture. The Governor General-in-Council hoped that this measure would clear up the misunderstanding between the two states.¹⁵ As regards Mathbar Singh, Lord Ellenborough felt that the former's positions seemed to be absolutely anomolous. "It was an odd policy", he held, "to maintain a subsidy for a man who made no bones about his hostility towards the British, or at any rate, who was seeking to grind nothing but his own axe". He preferred setting Mathbar free from British surveillance. He even or-

14. *Ibid.* No. 67; Maddock to Hodgson, 8 May 1842.

15. FSC 3 August 1842 No. 67: Maddock to Hodgson, 8 May 1842.

dered the Resident to sound the Darbar if it would give a guarantee of personal safety to Mathbar if he were released to sent back to Nepal.¹⁶

Hodgson immediately protested against the censure. In a Demi Official letter to Maddock, he reminded the Secretary of the realities of situation in Kathmandu. "Remember" he wrote:

whatever has been achieved here with as much as applause of the Governor General-in-Council has been achieved by and through (the) minister and against the Raja and that to show the least distrust of the former so that latter may perceive it may be the death warrant or signal of disgrace of one or more of these whose good faith has been conspicuous as the bad faith of the Raja.

If his version of the incident was not trustworthy, Government could ask the Maharaja for his story. But, if it was seen that Resident was distrusted by his Government a "crash may occur" which could not be averted. He emphasised that his success was entirely due to the Chautria ministry and that he would still succeed in establishing British influence through them "if you be firm". Otherwise he concluded, "the deepest hypocrite alive (the Maharaja) will speedily tho(ugh) softly undo all that I have achieved".¹⁷

Under the circumstances, Hodgson felt convinced that to follow the instruction of the Government of India's despatch of 8 May 1842 in full and forward the translation to the darbar, would weaken Fateh Jung and lead to desertions from his large and influential party, much to the ruin of British interests. He, therefore, decided to substitute the translation by a note of his own, which stated the Governor General wished to give the Maharaja an opportunity of apologizing for his conduct of 23 April - his "unquestioned and unquestional offence" - as Hodgson

16. *Ibid.* No. 73, Maddock to Hodgson.

17. *Ibid.* No. 88: Hodgson to Maddock 16 May 1842.

called it. Further, that the Government was prepared to consider his argument on his right over jurisdiction; and finally that Kharbir Sen's proposed mission to felicitate the new Governor General would not be received, till such apology was made.¹⁸

Lord Ellenborough would brook no insubordination, which was what he considered the action of his Resident in Kathmandu to be. In early June 1842, he very firmly told Hodgson that the original *Kharita* containing the translation should be immediately handed over to the Maharaja.¹⁹ About the Chautria ministry, he could not understand why Hodgson attached so much importance to their continuance in office:

To the British government it is a matter of indifference who are the ministers of Nepal unless so far as the influence of the ministers might affect the question of peace and war in which alone we are interested . . .

But the present ministers of Nepal appears to have no influence whatever of any sort. They seem to be in a state of perpetual terror, always apprehending some danger to their own persons from the violence of the Rajah or the Heir Apparent.²⁰

The Governor General further observed that the ministers were too weak to prevent oppression to the British subjects or insults to the Representative of the British Government. Nor would they be able to prevent war, if the Maharaja chose to start one against the Company, Under the circumstances:

The British Government lose a portion of its power when it departs from its Dignity and places itself in state of subordinate co-operation with the minister of Nepal.²¹

18. FSC 7 September 1842-No. 81: Hodgson to Maddock 9 June 1842.

19. Ramkant, *op.cit.*, p. 207.

20. FPC 5 June 1842 No. 75: Maddock to Hodgson 5 June 1842.

21. FSC 5 June 1842; No. 75: Maddock to Hadgson 5 June 1842.

DEFINITE INSTRUCTIONS

Hodgson replied to the Governor General in a rather lengthy letter on 12 June 1842. He justified his action on the ground that it had prevented the palace faction from being let loose on the ministry. He briefly described circumstances leading to the removal of Pande Ministry and the support extended to Fateh Jung Chautria. "This ministry", Hodgson wrote, "so created and upheld in defiance of place has vindicated the trust reposed in it as are declared 'sole stay' in relations to Nepal".²² The maintenance of this party offered a valuable instrument for the eventual coercion of the state.

Therefore, the Government of India should not desire to risk the undermining of this 'sole pillar' of British hopes at the very moment when it was staggering under the open assaults of the palace faction. The Maharaja had openly assumed the leadership of this faction and the security of the moderate *Bharadars* largely depended upon the Resident's power to protect and sustain them. To weaken his position in their eyes in this situation would be fatal and such would certainly have been the result if he had followed the instruction of 8 May 1842 in full. He only sought a little more time to settle the whole issue. He hoped that the Governor General would overlook his disregard of official orders since "when the game of temporising has been long played, the skill, even of a master, is apt to fail (and) that I have upheld this game for three years".²³

A week later, Hodgson again wrote to Secretary Maddock in reply to several despatched which had in the meantime reached Kathmandu. On the subject of his relations with Maharaja Rajendra and on the instance of latter's disrespect to him in the past three years, he promised to submit a detailed report. But as regards his own conduct towards the Maharaja, he pointed out that there was not a single instance of misbehaviour. Regarding support to the Ministry, he said he was fully aware of the evils of such a

22. FSC 7 September 1842-No. 84: Hodgson to Maddock 12 June 1842.

23. *Ibid.*

connection but pointed out that this should terminate only gradually in the interest of all the chiefs and the princes friendly to the British. This would also give time to the British to tide over the difficulties with Afghanistan and China. Finally, he pointed out that he had nothing to do with the Gorkha army or internal administration of the kingdom.²⁴

Lord Ellenborough had already made up his mind to remove Hodgson, and in fact even issued orders for his recall. He cancelled the order within twenty four hours of his signing it.²⁵ On 8 July, Lord Ellenborough informed Leadel Hall Street that it was not possible to extricate the British from Kathmandu politics so long as Hodgson, with whom the present "erroneous system" was identified, remained as Resident at Kathmandu. But, "I have reason to think, wrote the Governor General:

that the Gentleman's health will make it expedient for him to resign his office as soon as he can return to the plain. I should have otherwise, deemed it my duty to place on record all the grounds upon which I disapprove of his recent conduct and to act according to my view of what the public interest require by relieving him from the charge of his present official duty at Cathmandoo.²⁶

Hodgson's regrets at having deviated from the official instructions, meanwhile, reached Lord Ellenborough who accepted them.²⁷ On 8 August 1842, the Resident was informed that however necessary, it was to maintain temporary connections with the ministry, it was bound to lead to future trouble. Instructions were issued to Hodgson to determine at his discretion "on what manner your conduct should be regulated" so as gradually to withdraw the Brit-

24. *Ibid.* No. 87. Hodgson to Maddock 19 June 1842.

25. Secretary with the Governor General to Hodgson 21 June 1842 in Hunter, *op.cit.* pp. 217. However, no explanation had been offered for the sudden change in Ellenborough's attitude.

26. Despatch to the Secret Committee to the CODs, 8 July 1842, No. 21.

27. FSC 19 October 1842, No. 64: Maddock to Hodgson, 8 August 1842

ish Government from a "false position" without exposing the danger to persons who had relied upon it for support. It was, however, observed that such protection was really ineffective, although its open and abrupt withdrawal could possibly involve them in a new and serious danger.²⁸ As regards relations with Rajendra, no precise or absolute instructions were given. Hodgson was to rely on his own judgement, based on his long and intimate knowledge of the people of Nepal. But it was made clear to him that he was to revert to the only "safe and legitimate" policy of abstaining from interference in the internal affairs of the State. British interests would be best protected, he was told, not by involvement in the politics of the Darbar, but relying for due protection of British interests upon the knowledge entertained of British power.²⁹

NON-INTERFERENCE UNDER TRIAL

The new directions were faithfully carried out by Hodgson. To avoid further entanglements in the Darbar politics he shifted his residence to the hill bangalow.³⁰ The policy, however, coincided with perplexing developments in the kingdom making Hodgson's position extremely difficult. The pretensions of the Heir-Apparent to the sovereignty of the kingdom, urged on by his mother, raised the possibility of the Maharaja's abdication. In such a situation, the re-omergence of the Thapas, as favourites of the Heir-Apparent, made the future of the Chautria ministry extremely bleak. The ministry and the friendly Bharadars, therefore, found it necessary once again to turn to the Resident for support or counsel. On 10 September 1842 Fateh June and three of his colleagues met Hodgson and discussed these developments. The minister had two demands; firstly, a declaration on the part of the Resident pledging support and, secondly, remonstrance to the Maharaja against the reappearance of the Pandes in the Darbar. When Hodgson

28. *Ibid.*

29. *Ibid.* Also see DSC to the CODs, 17 August 1842, No. 30.

30. FSC 7 September 1842, No. 93; Also see *Diary of Events in Nepal* 16 May 1842, J.J. Wheeler, Calcutta, 1878.

politely declined the minister contended that they would resign if not better assured as to their future.³¹ Therefore, the Resident explained his position that he would not object to the ministry's resignation, adding "as a friend", the great advantage he (Fateh Jung) might derive from making "a grace of such a proceeding instead of being driven to it". Hodgson treated the minister with extreme kindness for abrupt termination of his connexion with them was unadvisable, hoping to "let the change in the ministers come, if it must, than to precipitate it". He felt that the presence of the Misur Guru in the ministry would have a sobering effect upon his colleagues and

their united ministry may still perhaps endure a while to the benefit of their own country and of ours but if not and they find it necessary to resign owing to the actual occurrence of the anticipated change in the Gadie or otherwise, we may yet, I trust, to manage that all four shall realise without risk or diminished good work towards the British Government.³²

The bullying tactics of the Heir Apparent, meanwhile continued unabated. The conduct of the Maharaja in encouraging his son in these acts and in the latter's open assumption of authority placed the entire administration of the country in utter confusion. A movement organised by *Bharadars* against the Maharaja and the Heir Apparent was steadily gaining ground and Fateh Jung was approached to inform the Maharaja of the widespread disaffection against the prevailing state of affairs. Fateh Jung again sought Hodgson's advice but the latter again declined stating:

a foreigner in a country full of national prejudices is not in a condition to offer advice upon, and that if I were so foolish as to

31. FSC 5 October 1842, No. 148: Hodgson to Maddock, 11 September 1842.

32. FSC 5 October 1842, No. 148: Hodgson to Maddock, 11 September 1842.

attempt it, my blunders could only embarass the premier and yet more so, the prejudice which may supposed interference would excite.

In reporting this to the Government of India, Hodgson remarked that the movement was widely and thoroughly approved by all sections including the Civil and Military classes, and the ministry have almost been compelled to their adoption by the general indignation of the country. And should the ministry fail to bring about the change, they would resign, an action which followed by "hundreds".³³ A week later, Hodgson again reported on the situation, this time stating that Fateh Jung's hesitation in presenting the complaints to the Maharaja was earning him the displeasure. "It seems to me not likely" wrote Hodgson, "that my continued refusal to have anything to do with the matter may lead to its (the movements) falling thro(ugh) and ending in nothing".³⁴

The Governor General-in-Council fully approved of Hodgson abstaining from any involvement in what was going on at that time. Once again, however, the importance of the policy of non-intervention was driven home to him:

However distressing may be to the people of Nepal, the enormities which are occasionally perpetrated by the Heir Apparent by the sufference of his weak father, those excesses of insane cruelty regard the people of Nipaul with the British Government, and the Governor Gen(era)l in any manner responsible thro(ugh) the advice of its minister at the Court of Nipaul might give, for events of which it would not improbably ultimately involve acts of violence towards the Heir Apparent,

33. FSC 21 December 1842, No. 82: Hodgson to Maddock, 17 November 1842.

34. *Ibid.* No. 84: Hodgson to Bush by 24 November 1842.

and a change in the line of succession to the throne of Nipaul.³⁵

Soon, the widespread disaffection forced the Maharaja to place some restraints upon the Heir Apparent. A *Lal Mohur* to this effect was issued on 1 January 1843.³⁶ Prince Surendra's activities were confined. Hodgson's report on this event stated, "within the narrow limits of mischief, to which he is now circumscribed"; and the report assured the Government of India that "all is quiet throughout the city and country".³⁷

Curiously, the *Lal Mohur* clipping the Heir Apparent's wings, was addressed to the Maharani, Rajya Lakshmi Devi.³⁸ On 8 January 1843, several important *Bharadars* including the redoubtable Jang Bahadur Rana waited upon to Hodgson to inform him that some political power had been given to the Maharani though its exact nature was not specifically mentioned.³⁹ This was a new development and probably was the result of a change in Rajendra's attitude towards the Heir Apparent. Ever since the death of the senior Maharani Samrajya Lakshmi Devi, the mother of the Heir Apparent, more than a year ago, the Maharani Rajya Lakshmi Devi,* had been trying to assert herself. The incarceration of the Pandes and their banishment from Nepal in November 1842 had set the stage for her assumption of power. The position of the Chautria without support from the Resident or from the Maharaja now seemed lost.⁴⁰

35. *Ibid.* No. 84: A Maddock to Hodgson 11 December 1842.

36. FSC 22 February 1843, No. 73: A *Lal Mohur* granted by the Rajah of Nepal to the Maharani, Pochsodi, 1 Sambat 1899.

37. *Ibid.* Hodgson to Maddock 10 January 1843.

38. See Appendix -

39. FSC 22 February 1843 No. 73: Hodgson to Maddock, 10 January 1843.

* It may be recalled that she (Junior Maharani) was supposedly planted in the royal household by Bhimsen Thapa as a counterpoise the senior Maharani and her Pande proteges. It is not unlikely that the excess of Surendra, the Senior Maharani's son drove many to her field with the hope of bolstering her son against the Heir Apparent. However, M.S. Jain did not agree with this statement. pp. 37-38 fn.

40. FSC 1 March 1843 No. 53: Hodgson to Maddock, 25 January 1843.

With the movement against the Heir Apparent having been dwindled, the various contending factions and groups returned to their infighting.⁴¹ Such was the confusion in the country that Hodgson was even tempted to write to the Darbar as who was responsible for the conduct of the Government, but gave up when dissuaded by the Government of India.⁴² Meanwhile, Fateh Jung disheartened by the Resident's continued refusal to help him gradually got involved in intrigues of the Darbar.⁴³ The *Mukhtiar* adopted even populist measures to divert the country to external affairs. He thus demanded of the British that Nepal's boundary with India be adjusted in the former's favour. Again, he demanded a passage for the Gorkha troops through Sikkim to attack Bhutan.⁴⁴

The immediate outcome of these developments was the re-emergence of the Thapas. Mathbar Singh, the sole surviving leader of the Thapas found himself with an invitation from the Maharaja to return to Nepal. But Mathabar Singh did not immediately avail himself of Rajendra's invitation, knowing him too well from past experience. He remained on the frontier for sometime, and cautiously watched the Darbar politics and the attitude of the Maharaja. On 17 April 1843, satisfied with Rajendra, Mathbar Singh reached Kathmandu. Thereafter, he was restored to his family honours and properties, and his innocence was proclaimed

41. *Ibid.*

42. *Ibid.* No. 54: Maddock to Hodgson: 11 February 1843. Hodgson was asked express the view of the Government that "all evincing a disposition to act upon the principle which guide the conduct of civilised state desirous of remaining in terms of friendship with their neighbour".

43. *Ibid.* No. 58: Hodgson to Maddock, 30 January 1843. "Under the influence of the low councillors", wrote Hodgson, "who taught him (Fateh Jung) that in the eyes of the British Government as of his own the patriotism of statesman is a farse, that he must be a goose not to act on that assumption; that if the Resident could not be gained to his party, it must be because the Resident had already been secretly gained by some other party that in his (the Premier) business was to delude both Governments for his own profit".

44. FPC 19 April 1843 No. 50: Hodgson to Maddock, 1 April 1843.

throughout the kingdom.⁴⁵ Nepal was now relatively quiet, but intrigues and rivalries went on. Mathbar Singh was soon able to get rid of the Pande leaders, bringing to an end their political career and by the close of the year managed the appointment of Mukhtiar.⁴⁶

The return of the Thapas and the closeness of the Maharani, Rajya Lakshmi Devi with Maharaja Rajendra completely isolated Heir Apparent Surendra Vikram Shah. During June 1843, he made several attempts to enter into the Residency with the object of appealing to the Resident against the Maharaja who was supposed to have agreed to abdicate in his favour. If such appeal came, what was he to do? Asked Hodgson.⁴⁷ He was instructed to have no concern with him except with the "open approval of the maharaja". He was further warned by the Secretary of the Foreign Department that :

You will not mix yourself up with any intrigues in the ruling family of Nepal or amongst the ministers and chiefs of that state.

It is a matter of extreme surprise to the Governor General-in-Council that you should note for instructions where the course of duty is so clear, and after the reiterated intimation you have received from the Governor General of his resolution not to interfere in the internal affairs of Nepal.⁴⁸

It was plain to Lord Ellenborough that Hodgson was still unable fully to extricate himself from the internal problems of Nepal. His latest report had sealed his fate as the Governor General concluded that Hodgson was "so mixed

45. Nicholetts, *Narrative of Events in Nepal-1843*. Also *Diary of Events in Nepal*, April 1843.

46. Ramakant, *op.cit.*, pp. 217-18.

47. FSC 15 July 1843 No. 60: Hodgson to Thomson, Secretary to the Governor General, 30 June 1843.

48. FSC 15 July 1843 No. 61: Thomson to Hodgson, 14 July 1843.

up with a party in the Darbar that a new policy better be carried by a new man".⁴⁹

HODGSON'S RECALL

On 22 May 1843, Hodgson wrote somewhat light heartedly to Lord Ellenborough that "the improved state of my health, the low state of my purse and the superior opportunities for research here opened by the general and glorious pacification of India under your auspices, afford too much strong reasons for remaining another year in Nepal that I am persuaded your Lordship will not exact my retirement".⁵⁰ He went on to say that his general acquaintance with the institutions, manners and national character of the kingdom was extensive and he now desired an opportunity to complete a report on Nepal which could be of immense value to the Government of India.⁵¹ The Governor General flatly refused to let Hodgson remain another year at Kathmandu.⁵²

Undaunted Hodgson in June 1843, wrote to Lord Ellenborough that three distinguished Nepalese officials paid him a visit and earnestly requested on behalf of the Maharaja to postpone his departure from Kathmandu on the

49. Hunter, *op.cit.*, p. 230.

50. FSC 19 August 1843 No. 2: Hodgson to Lord Ellenborough, 22 May 1843.

51. FSC 19 August 1843 No. 2: Hodgson to Lord Ellenborough, 22 May 1843. Hodgson stated that "each of us in his place and degree cherishes the idea of being remembered by good tableman. And I confess that under the influence of this sentiment abhor the idea of quitting Nepal, after so long a residence without leaving behind me some proof of that disposition and power to be respected . . . otherwise afford the sceptical so much soon to smile at the assertion of in his own case by".

52. FSC 19 August 1843 No. 3: Lord Ellenborough to Hodgson, 2 June 1843. The Governor General's letter is worth quoting: "I have already twice, against my own better judgement acquiesced in your remaining there, first, when I consented that the public letter of an imadversion upon your conduct should not be placed upon the public records, it being then distinctly understood by me that you would retire during the last cold weather; I don't think it (is) desirable that you should remain beyond that period and I shall then appoint you successor. If you desire to remain on service in India, I will endeavour to find some other fit situation for you, but you ought to leave Nepal".

ground of unsettled condition of the state. But he politely turned down their request with silent neglect and promised to follow the Government instructions.⁵³ The Governor General's reply was:

It is my wish that all the Representatives of the Government should make themselves personally acceptable to the sovereign to whom they may be accredited. Whereupon this can be done consistently with their duty to their own country, and with their own characters as honourable and respectable men. But no British minister ought to place himself under any obligation whatever to the sovereign at Whose Court he resides or to the Ministers or chiefs.⁵⁴

"I need hardly inform you", continued Lord Ellenborough, that "I should pay no attention to any wish expressed by the Raja of Nepal that you should remain as the Representative of the British Government at Kathmandu, I must add that I do not think any wish to that effect ought to be expressed by the Rajah". Hodgson was directed to inform Rajendra that if he wished to remain on friendly terms with the British Governments person who would endeavour to perform his duties in a conciliatory manner, would be selected as his successor in the Residency.⁵⁵

Ignoring practical and official form, Hodgson on 17 July 1843 wrote a private letter to Lord Ellenborough in which he pleaded:

let your Lordship consider the extent of official opposition to the whole external police of Nepal made by me and the express instructions of the Governor General-in-Council, between 1837-1841. . . How far can

53 *Ibid.* No. 5: Hodgson to Lord Ellenborough, 20 June 1843.

54. FSC 19 august 1843 No. 5: Lord Ellenborough to Hodgson, 30 June 1843.

55. *Ibid.*

the exact discharge of the stringent diplomatic duties be reconciled with the preservation of the kind feeling on the part of a proud and independent nation? And does it not likewise appear to your Lordship that the Darbar soliciting to let me remain is really offering to Your Lordship sureties for its future good conduct?

He concluded the letter by saying that he would try his best to avoid any sort of entanglement with the Darbar and further claimed that his country's fame would remain in his hands "unimpeachable and unimpeached" till he hold the post.⁵⁶ Three days later, he forwarded a *Kharita* from the Maharaja requesting extension of Hodgson's term to Lord Ellenborough. But realising that the Governor General might suspect him to be behind Rajendra's request added: "Let me beseech Your Lordship", he wrote, "the Darbar is wholly unaware of the peculiar grounds of my wish to remain another year or of the wish itself".⁵⁷

This is Lord Ellenborough was the proverbial last straw. On 19 August 1843, he placed all private letters from Hodgson on official record; and the latter was censured for directly addressing the Governor General.⁵⁸ On the same day, the Calcutta Gazette announced the appointment of Major Henry Lawrence, a Resident in Kathmandu without the customary reference to his predecessor. Hodgson again wrote to Lord Ellenborough on 1 October informing him that he had refused to allow a proposed mission from the Darbar to Fort William regarding extension of his stay. "I , , , had told your Lordship", exposed his sentiments in his long rumbling letter,

56. 19 August 1843 No. 6: Hodgson to Lord Ellenborough, 17 July 1843.

57. FSC 19 August 1843 Nos.: 7 and 8: Hodgson to Lord Ellenborough, 20 July 1843 and a Translation of a *Kharita* from the Rajah of Nepal to the Governor General of India, 7 Savan 1900 Sambat.

58. Sir Henry Montgomery Lawrence (1806-1857), joined Bengal Artillery, February 1823; Fought in Burmese war in 1826; in Afghan War; was Resident in Nepal in 1843-46. C.E. Buckland, n.ch.V. p. 246.

that unless I were expressly reassured of professing the confidence and esteem of Your Lordship, I had no wish nor intention to remain longer at Kathmandu. It was not therefore necessary to drive me out of Nepal and I trust Your Lordship will be pleased to do me the justice to make known in such a way as seems to you fittest that the Calcutta Gazette of the 16 is not meant to cast any obloquy on me.⁵⁹

Shortly afterwards, the Darbar again addressed a Kharita to the Governor General, despatched as a parcel through the Residency Dak to its vakeel at Calcutta. In this Maharaja Rajendra urged the Government of India to allow Hodgson to remain a while longer in Kathmandu. He held that Hodgson by "his long residence . . . at my Darbar has become well acquainted with all the rules and customs of this country... He has averted all the misunderstandings which at the instigation of all ill disposed persons... his exertions to maintain friendship on a firm basis, have been successful".⁶⁰ But Lord Ellenborough was firm. He informed Rajendra that:

Major Lawrence who will now proceed to Your Highness's Court has been on many occasions engaged with field and letterly in the victorious advance of the British armies to Kabul and he will know how to estimate the good qualities of soldiers possessed by none more highly than by the braveman, You Highness subjects. He will assure Your Highness of the sincere friendship with which

59. FSC 14 October 1843 No. 15: Hodgson to Lord Ellenborough, 1 October 1843. Hodgson went on the say "My Lord, it is hard thing at the end of 26 years service to hear it proclaimed not the one has lived in vain, but worse even that to find oneself become a byword and not known why? If I have erred my Lord, I entreat you to protect my character".

60. FSC 4 November 1843: No. 39: Rajendra to Lord Ellenborough, 6 October 1842.

Your Highness is regarded by the British Government and of its earnest desire to improve and to preserve forever the amicable relations now subsisting.⁶¹

As there was no hope for further extension of his tenure Hodgson resigned his office in early December 1843. On 5 December 1843, he left Kathmandu for Calcutta. Hunter remarked the feelings of the Maharaja and *Bharadars* that "the Maharaja burst into tears and referring to the exertion by which Hodgson had often averted a war, called him the "saviour of Nepal".⁶² Major Lawrence, who was present at the time in Kathmandu reported the compliment paid to the out going Resident by the Darbar. And he remarked:

I doubt not in the least that the Maharaja very much regretted Mr. Hodgson's departure more especially as from the Newspapers and other sources, he had been informed that the later Resident was removed from Nepal for saving the country from invasion, with this opinion the whole Darbar strongly impressed and that I found, I had been sent as a sort of punishment to them and to Mr. Hodgson and that my coming was a prelude to a change of measures on the part of the British Government.⁶³

Thus ended Hodgson's diplomatic career. He immediately left Kathmandu for Calcutta and on 6 February 1844, set sail for England. On the eve of his departure a farewell was organised in his honour by the Asiatic Society. The President of the Society said:

The high reputation which Mr. Hodgson has conferred on the Society is not merely a local and an Indian one. His name widely

61. FSC 4 November 1843, No. 40: Lord Ellenborough to the Maharaja of Nepal, 27 October 1843.
62. Hunter, *op.cit.*, p. 234.
63. FSC 27 January 1844, No. 49: Major Lawrence to the secretary in Attendant on Governor General, 13 December 1843.

spread with his discovery among the Scientific Societies of Europe has carried with it corresponding credit to our body as a member of which he has laboured.⁶⁴

He returned to India in the same year setting in Darjeeling in a private capacity and spending the nine years as a scholarly recluse. He again visited England in 1853 and married his first wife whom he brought to Darjeeling. During his stay in Darjeeling, Hodgson took up studies on the "non-Aryan races of the Himalayan region". On the basis of his findings, he held that all these races were from the vast "Turanian races". In 1848, he published his "Aborigines of the Himalaya"⁶⁵ in the *Journal of Asiatic Society*. In the following years, Hodgson published his "On the Physical Geography of the Himalaya",⁶⁶ which attracted the attention of Humboldt in the later years. While pursuing his study on Geography and races, Hodgson also contributed papers on natural history. From 1844 to 1858, he published thirtysix articles in various journals. "No account of natural History of Nepal could be completed", S.H. Prater writes, "which did not mention Brian Houghton Hodgson to whose labour we are indebted for almost all that is known even to the present day of the natural history of that country".⁶⁷

His wife's ill health forced him to return to England in 1858. Since then Hodgson lived the life of a country gentleman in Gloucestershire marrying second time in 1869. There were no children from either marriage. He died in 1894 at the age of ninetyfour.⁶⁸

64. Proceedings of the Society, No. 62. 6 February 1844. Quoted by Hunter *op.cit.*

65. JASB Vol. XVI, 1848.

66. JSAB Vol. XVII (1849), p. 761; vol. XXII (1853), p. 11 and Vol. XVII (1857).

67. Landon, *op.cit.*, pp. 277-279.

68. Hodgson, *op.cit.*, An Introduction by Philips Denwood, p. iii.

EPILOGUE

It has been said of Brian Hodgson that he gradually arrogated to himself the same rights as the residents that the Company had stationed in those princely states in India which had accepted its paramountcy.¹ Whatever may be the charge against Hodgson for interfering in the domestic affairs of an independent kingdom it would be far from the truth to say that he aimed at this from the very beginning with a view to acquiring a dominating influence in the Darbar.² From 1825 to 1833, when he became permanent Resident, Hodgson's primary concern was the development of trade and commerce. His proposals for the recruitment of the surplus Gorkha soldiery of Nepal into the Bengal army was essentially to create a favourable environment for the furtherance of his objective. Besides he had a genuine admiration for the Gorkha soldiers. His assertion of his position as Resident, unlike Sir Edward Gardner, who acquiesced in his isolation was to ensure the safety and security of British traders and merchants. He understood that confidence in the British power to protect the traders against the Darbar's exactions was essential if trade was to develop. It is not surprising, therefore, that proposals regarding trade should dominate the first two years of his Residentsip in Kathmandu. In this respect, Hodgson's ideas were in

-
1. Ct. Rahul, Ram, *Himalaya as a Frontier*, New Delhi (1973), p. 65.
 2. Hunter, *op.cit.*, pp. 226-227.

keeping with the policy laid down as long ago as in Warren Hastings' time. But in advocating the economic penetration of Nepal as a means of binding the kingdom to that of the Company, Hodgson went a step further than the mere search for markets.

In his early years, Hodgson's relations with the *Mukhtiar* Bhim Sen Thapa, if not very close, was not hostile either. In fact, Hodgson admired Bhim Sen's capacity and talents as an administrator. He genuinely regretted Bhim Sen's tragic end and said of him after his death:

The great and able statesman who for more than thirty years had ruled this kingdom with more than regal sway . . . the uniform success of nearly all his remarkable than the energy and sagicity which so much promoted that success. He was indeed a man born to exercise domain over his fellows alike by the means of command and persuasion. Nor I am aware of any native statesman of recent times, except Ranjit Singh, who is, all things considered, worthy to be compared with the late General Bhim Sen Thapa.³

He was quite certain that Bhim Sen's exit would have a destabilising effect upon Nepal. This was one of the reasons why he was apprehensive of the constantly growing military resources of Nepal which without a strong hand to control it could easily get out of hand.⁴ However, his attitude towards the *Mukhtiar* underwent a change when he realised Bhim Sen's antagonism towards the British and to

-
3. Campbell's Sketches; Also see a recent account on Bhim Sen which says, "He was appreciated, teared and admired. Bhim Sen had determination, conviction, courage, administrative ability and ambition. He was ruthless to his internal enemies; he was hungry for power and he knew that his only alternative was utter ruin". Tucker, Sir Francis, *Gorkhas*, London (1957), pp. 101-103.
 4. Ibid. Hodgson further explained that, "it may safely be asserted that if the present unnatural system be left status quo till his death or retirement, a crisis will occur which whether it issues in Civil War or an aggression on us, cannot fail most injuriously effect our interests".

himself was deep seated. It also became clear that so long as Bhim Sen remained in power, British interests in the Himalayan region could not be secured. The question of the implementation of the Commercial Treaty of 1792 and the negotiations for a new one had been a case in point. In this circumstance, the question of direct access to the Maharaja became of great importance. What was in the beginning a subject of form and protocol was to Hodgson soon a matter of practical necessity. In the Maharaja, who himself chafed under Bhim Sen's control, Hodgson found a person sympathetic and considerate to his cause. His reports at this time therefore give a very favourable picture of the youthful Rajendra. The authorities in Fort William did not share Hodgson's views and discouraged any attempt to bypass the *Mukhtiar*.

Yet, despite all this, from 1835 till the downfall of Bhim Sen Thapa in 1837, Hodgson kept aloof from Darbar's politics. The fall of the Thapas from the power led Hodgson to hope that he would be able to establish direct relations with the Maharaja. He was soon disillusioned when he found the Pandes, who had replaced the Thapas, even more hostile to the British. The only way to prevent the new ministry from exercising the same control over the Residency and its relations with the Maharaja was, in Hodgson's opinion, to issue a reprimand to the Darbar backed by a military display. The other alternative of backing the friendly and moderate section to control the Darbar would be to unite all against the British. But Lord Auckland, with the Afghan problem in his hands, could ill afford to take a serious view of the Darbar's attitude. Even when reports of the Darbar's intrigues with Indian States, he was restraining the ardour of his Resident.

Hodgson's attitude towards Darbar politics changed by the middle of 1839 when he perceived that the Pandes had become extremely unpopular and that the opposition had been showing signs of turning to the British. He saw for the first time the advantages of supporting the latter. Lord Auckland, in spite of his colleagues in the Council, was still not prepared for any involvement in the domestic af-

fairs of the kingdom. Besides, he was not quite sure if Nepal would risk a costly adventure with the British in view of her internal problems. But Hodgson's closeness with the pre-British faction, as the moderate came to be so identified, as his enstrangement with the Pandes widened. What he was interested in was an effective counter-balance to the Pandes, even to the extent of using Mathbar Singh Thapa.

It was only after the Afghan problem had been resolved that Lord Auckland took a firm stand against Nepal. Although he was satisfied with Hodgson's settlement of November 1839, he was not convinced of Rajendra's pacific intentions and forced the Maharaja into dismissing Ranjung Pande. When Hodgson informed him that the change was more nominal than real, Lord Auckland authorised him to pressurise the Maharaja into removing all anti-British *Bharadars*. By early 1842, when Lord Ellenborough arrived in India, there was a change in the Alignments in Darbar politics. Maharaja Rajendra, owing probably to domestic compulsions, had joined the Heir Apparent in the camping against the British-supported *Bharadars*. Hodgson in trying to uphold the ministry was not only caught in Darbar rivalries but also found himself against the sovereign. Lord Ellenborough's position was quite clear: Rajendra was the Maharaja of an independent state; secondly, it was a wrong policy to support a ministry unable to stand on its own, and that too in defiance of the legitimate ruler. It should also be remembered that throughout his short tenure, Lord Ellenborough was engaged first against Sind and then against Gwalior, and could not afford to have complication with Nepal even if he chose to support his Resident. Yet, it cannot be denied that in dismissing Hodgson, Lord Ellenborough acted more on impulse rather than in reason.⁵

5. Landon, in his *Nepal* Vol. I, thus writes, "... in a fit of childish irritation Lord Ellenborough dismissed Hodgson on 21st June of that year. The weakness of the man passes belief. Scarcely a fortnight later the Governor General was writing a friendly private letter to the man whom he had thus publicly insulted, practically apologizing for having to remove while a change of policy was carried out. Twenty days later this vacillating officer wrote again to say that after all Hodgson

Sir William Hunter, in defence of Hodgson, says that he followed a policy which had been directed by the Governor General and that charge against the Resident's involvement in Darbar politics is therefore wrong and unfounded,⁶ an examination of the relevant records however suggests that Lord Auckland's policy was basically one of non-intervention. The authority which he granted to Hodgson, reluctantly rather than readily, to exert pressure upon Rajendra was limited both in scope as well as in time. For example, when Hodgson sought permission to extend physical protection to the ministry against the Heir Apparent, the Governor General was not prepared to go that extent. His strongly worded *Kharita*, which he addressed to Rajendra instead, clearly showed that it was the Maharaja and not his *Mukhtiar* or the *Bharadars* that Lord Auckland would call to account when necessary. Further Lord Auckland's policy was largely shaped by Hodgson's assessment of the situation. It is therefore, difficult to fully absolve Hodgson of the charge of interference. But it is doubtful if Hodgson wanted anything more than a temporary counterpoise to the influence of an aggressive and dominant section in the Darbar at a time of great difficulty for the Company elsewhere.⁷

There is no evidence that Hodgson at any stage desired the removal of the Maharaja or proposed taking over

had better stay as Resident. It only need to be added that Lord Ellenborough, whatever his unwisdom in other things, was cautious enough never to place on the files of the Indian Government his despatch of 21st June recalling Hodgson from his work", pp. 102-104.

6. Denwood, Philips, *An Introduction to Hodgson's Essays*, *op. cit.*, p. iii.
7. Brian Hodgson's attitude towards Nepal makes a sharp contrast so that of Henry Burney, Resident in Ava. Like, Hodgson, he too had faced a hostile Darbar. But unlike Hodgson, Burney meekly withdrew the Residency in 1837. Like Hodgson, he faced a hostile Darbar. Lord Auckland disapproved of Burney's withdrawal of the Residency from Ava and it is not unlikely that the lesson learnt in Burma made the Governor General to adopt a strong attitude towards Nepal. Cf. Hall, D.G.E., *Henry-Burney: A Political Biography*, London (1974), Ch. 17, pp. 290-308. Also see, Desai, W.S., *The History of the British Residency in Burma 1826-1840*, Fennham (1972) Reprint.

the direct administration of the Kingdom. His concept of his position as Resident at an independent Court did not change. Unlike the Residents in Indian States, Hodgson functions were limited.⁸ The implications of the system following Lord Wellesley is thus described by Sir Cyril Philips:

It was a suspended threat of British control over internal administration personified in the presence at the Indian princes capital of the British political residents, who was the direct representative on the spot of the Governor General . . . bolstered policy and force, and in practice remote from the control of Calcutta, the British residents had long since grown into petty potentates often pursuing their own private and sometimes corrupts ends.⁹

Hodgson hardly saw himself in this light.

“Without Hodgson”, according to a recent estimate of his achievements, “the British would have found themselves in a serious war with Nepal and its allies when things were going badly in Afghanistan”.¹⁰ Nepal given her limited resources and political instability could not have launched an invasion of sufficient strength to endanger the Company in India. Bhim Sen Thapa and Jang Bahadur Rana later, had a realistic view of the situation in India, and it is unlikely that the *Mukhtiar*s in between or even both Rajendra and Surendra were unaware of the strength and resources of the British. If Hodgson appeals for assistance for his “friends” in the Darbar is any evidence he could hardly have averted a war if Nepal really chose to wage one. Significantly,

-
8. The Resident in Indian States had considerable initiative and independence action. The Resident in Delhi; for example, could call in the army, if circumstances warranted. See Pannikar, K.N., *British Diplomacy in Northern India*, New Delhi (1968), p. 183, n. 6.
 9. Philips, C.H., *The Correspondences of Lord William Bentinck*, Oxford (1984), p.
 10. Denwood, p. An Introduction to Hodgson's Essays etc., *op.cit.*, p. iii.

it was Nepal's perception of the danger from the south, with the history of British conquest of India before then, that was of greater consequence.¹¹ Fear of the loss of further territories, if not her independence, conditioned the Darbar's attitude to the Government of India and its representative in Kathmandu. That this did not happen during Hodgson's time made him, in the end at least, agreeable to the Maharaja and to the Darbar. No wonder that Rajendra called him the "Saviour of Nepal". Yet, the brief involvement was not without impact on Nepal; the lesson of the danger of allowing the British to interfere in its domestic affairs was never forgotten.

During the period under review British influence did not significantly increase nor did the Resident's position improve vis-a-vis the Darbar. Matters practically reverted to the days of Sir Edward Gardner; in fact in the later years, the dominance of Jang Bahadur Rana rather overshadowed the Resident. Trade with Nepal and through her with Central Asia did not develop to the extent Hodgson had anticipated. Recruitment of Gorkhas into the Indian army began in earnest only after 1858 - but it must be recognised that Hodgson was the first advocate of the policy which even today links the British and Indian Governments with Nepal.* On the whole and in the light of these, it is therefore, not unreasonable to assume that Hodgson's real contribution lies not in diplomacy or in practical politics, but in his scholarship;¹² by his own researches, particularly in his retire-

11. Rose, Leo E., *op.cit.*, In his "Nepal: Strategy for Survival", he elaborately explained Nepal's foreign policy over the years.

* In border settlements, particularly in the definition and demarcation of Nepal's southern frontier, Hodgson definitely contributed to frontier stability.

12. Towards Hodgson's overall contributions, Joseph Hooker remarks: "His high position as a man of time requires no mention here. But the difficulties he overcame and sacrifices he made in attaining that position are known to few. He entered the wilds of Nepal, when very young and in different wealth and finding time to spare care about for the best method of employing it . . . By unceasing exertions and a princely liberty Mr. Hodgson has unveiled the mysterious of Buddhist religion. Chronicled the affinities, languages, customs and faith of the Himalayan tribes and complete a natural history of animals and birds

ment, and by his collections of a wealth of manuscripts and source materials, Hodgson may be rightly regarded as having laid the foundations for modern Himalaya Studies.

of the region. Mr. Hodgson's name stands pre-eminent. A seat of Legion of Honour proves the estimation in which his Buddhist studies are held in the continent of Europe". Hooker, Sir Joseph Dalton; "On Notes of a Naturalist" *HJ* Edinburgh (1891) Reprinted, p. xi: Also see, London, *op.cit.*, pp. 273-278.

APPENDIX - A

TREATY OF COMMERCE WITH NEPAL

1 March 1792

“Treaty authenticated under the seal of Maharajah Run Behaudar Shah Behauder Shumshere Jung; being according to the Treaty transmitted by Mr. Jonathan Duncan, the Resident at Benaras, on the part of Right Honourable Charles, Earl Corwallis, K.G., Governor General-in-Council, and empowered by the said authority to conclude a Treaty of commerce with the said Maharajah, and to settle and fix the duties payable by the subjects of the respective states of the Honourable English Company and those of Nepaul, the said gentleman charging himself with whatever relates to the duties thus to the Company; in the like manner as hath the aforesaid Maharajah, with whatever regards the duties thus to be payable by the subjects of the Company's Government to that of Nepaul; and the said Treaty having been delivered to me (the said Maharajah) by Mowlavy Abdul Kadir Khan, the aforesaid gentleman's vakkil, or agent, this counterpart thereof having been by the Nepaul Government, hath been committed to the said Khan, as hereunder detailed:

ARTICLE - I

In as much as an attention to the general to the general welfare, and to ease and satisfaction on the merchants

and traders, tends equally to the reputation of the administrations of both Governments of the Company and of Nepal; it is therefore agreed and stipulated, that 2½ percent shall reciprocally be taken, as duty, on the imports from both countries; such duties to be levied on the amount of the invoices of the goods which the merchants shall have along with them; and to deter the said traders from exhibiting false invoices, the seal of the said customs houses of both countries shall be impressed on the back of the said invoices, and copy thereof being kept, the original shall be restored to the merchants; and in cases where the merchants shall not have along with him his original invoices, the custom house officers shall not in such instance lay down the duty of 2½ percent on a valuation according to the market price.

ARTICLE - II

The opposite stations hereunder specified, within the frontiers of each country, are fixed for the duties to be levied, at which place the traders are to pay the same; and after having once paid duties and receiving a rowannah thereon, on other of further duty shall be payable throughout each country of dominion respectively.

ARTICLE - III

Whoever among the officer on either side shall exceed in his demands for, or exaction of duty, the rate here specified, shall be exemplarily punished by the Government to which he belongs, so as effectually to deter other from like offences.

ARTICLE - IV

In the case of theft or robberies happening on the goods of the merchants, the foudedar, or officer of the police, shall, advising his superiors or Government thereof speedily, cause the zamindars and proprietors of the spot to make the value, which is in all cases, without fail, to be so made good to the merchants.

ARTICLE - V

In cases wherein either country any oppression or violence be committed on any merchants, the officers of country wherein this may happen shall without delay, hear and inquire into the complaints of the persons thus aggrieved, and doing them justice, bring the offenders to punishment.

ARTICLE - VI

When the merchants of either country, having paid the established duty, shall have transported their goods into the dominions of one or other state if such goods be sold within such state, it is well; but if such goods not meeting with sale, and that the said merchants be desirous to transport their said goods to any other country beyond the limits of either of the respective States included in the treaty, the subjects and officers of these latter shall not take thereon any other or further duty than the fixed one levied at the first entry; and are not to exact double duties, but are to allow such goods to depart in all safety without opposition.

ARTICLE - VII

This Treaty shall be of full force and validity in respect of the present and future rulers of both Governments, and, being considered on both sides as a Commercial Treaty and a basis of concord between the two states, is to be, at all times, observed and acted upon in times to come, for the public advantage and the increase of friendship.

APPENDIX - B

THE TREATY OF "COMMERCE AND ALLIANCE" WITH NEPAL

16 October 1801

"Whereas it is evident as the noonday sun to the enlightened understanding of exalted nobles and of powerful Chiefs and Rulers, that Almighty God had entrusted the protection and Government of the universe to the authority of Princes, who make justice their principle, and that by the establishment of a friendly connection between them universal happiness and prosperity is secured, and that the more intimate the relation of amity and union the greater is the general tranquillity; in consideration these circumstances, His Excellency the most Noble the Governor General Marquis Welleslet & c. & c. and the Maharajah have established a system of friendship between the respective Governments of the Company and the Raja of Nepaul, and have agreed to the following Articles:

ARTICLE - I

It is necessary and incumbent upon the principle and officers of that two Governments constantly to exert themselves to improve the friendship subsisting between the two States, and to be zealously and sincerely desirous of the prosperity and success of the Government and subjects of both.

ARTICLE - II

The incendiary and turbulent representations of the disaffected, who are the disturbers of our mutual friendship shall not be attended to without investigation and proof.

ARTICLE - III

The principals and officers of both Governments will cordially consider the friends and enemies of either states to be the friends and enemies of the other; and this consideration must ever remain permanent and in force from generation to generation.

ARTICLE - IV

If any one of the neighbouring powers of either state should commence any altercation or dispute, and design, without provocation, unjustly to possess himself of the territories of either country, and should entertain hostile intentions with the view of taking that country, the vakeels on the part of our respective Governments at either Court will fully report all particulars to the head of the state, who, according to the obligation of friendship subsisting between the two States after having heard the said particulars, will give whatever answer and advice may be proper.

ARTICLE - V

Whenever any dispute of boundary and territory between the two countries may arise, such dispute shall be decided, through our respective vakeels or our officers, according to the principles of justice and right; and a landmark shall be placed upon the said boundary, and which shall constantly remain, that the officers both now and hereafter may consider it as a guide, and not make any encroachment.

ARTICLE - VI

Such places as are upon the Frontiers of the dominions of the Nobab Vizier and of Nepaul, and respecting which any dispute may arise, such dispute shall be settled by the mediation of the vakeels on the part of the Company, in the

presence of one from the Nepal Government, and one from His Excellency the Vizier.

ARTICLE - VII

So many elephants on account of Muchwanpoor, are annually sent to the Company by the Raja Nepaul, and therefore the Governor-General with a view of promoting the satisfaction of the Raja of Nepaul and in consideration of the improved friendly connection, and of this new Treaty, relinquishes and forgoes the tribute above mentioned, and directs that officers of the Company, both now and hereafter from generation to generation, shall never, during the continuance of the engagement contracted by this Treaty (so long as the condition of this Treaty shall be in force), exact the elephants from the Raja.

ARTICLE - VIII

If any of the dependents or inhabitants of either country should fly and take refuge in the other, and a requisition should be made for such persons on the part of the Nepaul Government by its constituted vakeel in attendance on the Governor-General, or on the part of the Company's Government by its representative residing at Nepaul, it is in this case mutually agreed that if such person should have fled after transgressing the laws of his Government, it is incumbent upon the principals of both Governments immediately to deliver him up to the vakeel at their respective courts, that he may be sent in perfect security to the frontier of their respective territories.

ARTICLE - IX

The Maharajah of Nepaul agrees, that a pergunnah with all the lands attached to it, excepting privileged lands and those appropriated to religious purposes, and to jaghirer & c., which are specified separately in the account of collections, shall be given up to Sames Jee are, that if he should remain at Benaras, or at any other places within the Company's provinces, and should spontaneously farm his jagire to the officers of Nepaul, in that event the amount of collections shall be punctually paid to him, agreeably certain kists

which may be hereafter settled; that he may appropriate the same to his necessary expenses, and that he may continue to religious abstraction, according to his agreement, which he may had engraved on brass, at the time of his abdication of the Raj, and of his reigning it in my favour. Again, in the event of his establishing his residence on his jagire, and of his realizing the collections through his own officers, it is proper that he should not keep such a one and other disaffected persons in his service, and besides one hundred men and main servants, & c., he must not entertained any persons as soldiers, with a view to the collections of revenue of the pergunnah; and to protection of his persons he may take two hundred soldiers of the forces of the Nepaul Government, the allowances of whom shall be paid by the Rajah of Nepaul. He must be cautious, also of commencing altercation either by speech or writing; neither must be commit plunder and devatation upon the subjects of Nepaul. In the event of such delinquency being proved to the satisfaction of the two Governments, the aid and protection of the Company shall be withdrawn from him; and in that event also it shall be at the option of the Rajah of Nepaul whether or not he will confiscate his jagire.

The Maharajas also agrees, on his part, that if Sames Jeo should take up his residence within the Company's provinces and should farm out his land to the officers of Nepaul, and that the kists should not be paid according to agreement, or that he should fix his residence on his jagire, and any of the inhabitants of Nepaul should give him or the ryots of his pergunnah any molestation, a requisition shall be made by the Governor-General of the Company, on this subject, to the Rajah. The Governor General is security for the Rajah's performance of this condition, and the Maharajah will immediately as quit himself of the requisition of the Governor General, agreeably to what is above written, If any profits should arise in the collection of the said pergunnah, in consequences of the activity of the officers, or any defalcation occurs from their in attention, in either case, the Rajah of Nepaul will be totally unconcerned.

ARTICLE - X

With the view of carrying into effect the different objects contained in this Treaty, and of promoting other verbal negotiation the Governor General and the Rajah of Nepaul, under the impulse of their will and pleasure, depute a confidential persons to each other as vakeel, that remaining in attendance upon their respective Government, they may effect the objects above specified, and promote whatever may tend to the daily improvement of the friendship subsisting between the two States.

ARTICLE - XI

It is incumbent upon the principals and officers of the two states that they should manifest the regard and respect to the Vakeel of each others Government, which is due to their rank, and is prescribed by the laws of nations; and that they should endeavour, to the utmost of their power, to advance any object which they may propose and to promote their case, comfort, and satisfaction, by extending protection to them, which circumstances are calculated to improve the friendship subsisting between the two Governments, and to illustrate the good name of both states throughout the universe.

ARTICLE - XII

It is incumbent upon the vakeels of both States that they should hold no intercourse whatever with any of the subjects or inhabitants of the country, excepting with the officers of the Government, without the permission of those officers; neither should they carry on any correspondence with any of them and if they should receive any letter or writing from any such people, they should not answer it, without the knowledge of the heads of the State, and acquainting him of the particulars, which will dispel all apprehension or doubt between us, and manifest the sincerety of our friendship.

ARTICLE - XIII

It is incumbent upon the principals and officers mutually to abide by the spirit of this Treaty, which is now

drawn out according to their faith and religion, and deeming it in force from generation to generation that they should not deviate from it; and any person who may transgress against it will be punished by Almighty God, both in this world and in a future state”.

Ratified by the Governor General and Council, 30 October 1801, and by the Nepaul Darbar on 28 October 1801.

APPENDIX - C

THE TREATY OF SAGAULI

TREATY OF PEACE between the HONOURABLE EAST INDIA COMPANY and MAHA RAJAH BIKRAM SAH, Rajah of Nepaul, settled between Lieutenant-Colonel BRADSHAW on the part of the HONOURABLE COMPANY. In virtue of the full powers vested in him by HIS EXCELLENCY the RIGHT HONOURABLE FRANCIS, EARL OF MOIRA, KNIGHT OF THE MOST NOBLE ORDER of the GRANTER, one of HIS MAJESTY'S most honourable PRI-VY COUNCIL, appointed by the Court of Directors of the said Honourable Company to direct and control all the affairs in the East Indies, and by SHREE GOOROO GUJRAT MISSER and CHUNDER SEEKUR OPENEEA on the part of MAHA RAJAH GIRMUKH JODE BIKRAM SAH BAHAUDER SHUMSHEER JUNG, in virtue of the power to that effect vested in them by the said Rajah of Nipal - 2nd December 1815.

Whereas war has arisen between the Honourable East India Company and the Rajah of Nipal, and whereas the parties are mutually disposed to restore the relations of peace and amity, which, previously to the occurrence of the late differences, had long subsisted between the two states, the following terms of peace have been agreed upon.

ARTICLE - I

There shall be perpetual peace and friendships between the Honourable East India Company and the Rajah of Nipal.

ARTICLE - II

The Rajah of Nipal renounces all claims to the lands which were the subject of discussion between the two states before the war; and acknowledges the right of the Honourable Company to the sovereignty to those lands.

ARTICLE - III

The Rajah of Nipal hereby codes to the Honourable East India Company in perpetuity all the undermentioned territories, viz.-First, The whole of the low lands between the River Kali and Rapti. Second, The whole of the low lands (with the exception of Bhootwal Khass) lying between the Rapti and the Gunduck. Thirdly, The whole of the low lands between the Gunduck and Coosah in which the authority of the British Government has been introduced, or is in actual course of introduction.

Fourthly, All the low lands between the Rivers Mitchee and the Teestah. Fifthly, All the territories within the hills eastward of the River Mitchee, including the fort and lands of Nagree and the pass of Nagarocote, leading from Morung into the hills, together with the territory lying between the pass and Nagree, The aforesaid territory shall be evacuated by the Gorkha troops within forty days from this date.

ARTICLE - IV

With a view to indemnify the Chiefs and Barahdars of the State of Nipal, whose interests will suffer by the alienation of the lands ceded by the forgoing Article, the British Government agrees to settle pensions to the aggregate amount of two lakhs of rupees per annum on such chiefs as may be selected by the Rajah of Nipal, and in the proportions which the Rajah may fix. As soon as the selection is made, Sunnuds shall be granted under the seal and signature of the Governor General for pensions respectively.

ARTICLE - V

The Rajah of Nipal renounces for himself, his heirs, and successors, all claim to or connexion with the countries lying to the west of the River Kali and engages never to

have any concern with those countries or the inhabitants thereof.

ARTICLE - VI

The Rajah of Nipal engages never to molest or disturb the Rajah of Sikkim in the possession of his territories; but agrees. If any differences shall arise between the State of Nipal and the Rajah of Sikkim, or the subjects of either, that such differences shall be referred to the arbitration of the British Government, by whose award the Rajah of nipal engages to abide.

ARTICLE - VII

The Rajah of Nipal hereby engages never to take or retain in his service any British Subject, nor the subject of any European and American State, without the consent of the British Government.

ARTICLE - VIII

In order to secure and improve the relations of amity and peace hereby established between the two states, it is agrees that accredited Minister from each shall reside at the Court of the other.

ARTICLE - IX

This Treaty, consisting of nine Article, shall be ratified by the Rajah of Nipal within fifteen days from this date, and the ratification shall be deliver to Lieutenant Colonel Bradshaw, who engages to obtain and deliver to the Rajah the ratification of the Governor General within twenty days, or sooner, if practicable.

APPENDIX - D

MEMORANDUM REGARDING THE RESTORATION OF THE EASTERN TERAI

8th December 1816

Adverting to the amity and confidence subsisting with the Rajah of Nepal, the British Government proposes to suppress, as much as is possible the executing of certain Article in the Treaty of Segowlee, which bear hard upon the Rajah, as follows:

2. With a view of gratify the Rajah in a point which he has much at heart, the British Government is willing to restore the Terai ceded to it by the Rajah in the Treaty to wit, the whole Terai lands lying between the River Coosa and Gunduck, such as appertained to the Rajah before the late disagreement: excepting the disputed lands in the Zillahs of Tirhoot and Sarun, and excepting such portions of territory as may occur on both sides for the purpose of settling a frontier upon investigation by the respective Commissioners; and excepting, such lands as may have been given in possession to any one by the British Government upon ascertainment of his rights subsequent to the cession of Terai to that Government. In case the Rajah is desirous of retaining the lands of such ascertain proprietors, they may be exchanged for others, and let it be clearly understood that, notwithstanding the considerable extent of the lands, in the Zillah of Tirhoot, which have for a long time been a subject of dispute, the settlement made in the year 1812 of Christ, corresponding with the year 1869 of

Bikramjit shall be taken and everything also relinquished, that is to say, that the settlement and negotiations, such as occurred at that period, shall in the present case hold good and be established.

3. The British Government is willing likewise to restore Terai lying between the Rivers Gunduck and Rapti, that is to say from the river Gunduck to the western limits of the Zillah of Goruckpore, together with Pootwal and Seoral, such as appertained to Nipal previous to the disagreements, complete, with the exception of the disputed places in the Terai, and such quantity of ground as may be considered mutually to be requisite for the new boundary.

4. As it is impossible to establish desirable limits between the two States without survey, it will be expedient that commissioner be appointed on both sides for the purpose of arranging in concert as well defined boundary on the basis of the proceeding terms, and of establishing a straight frontier, with a view to the distinct separation of the respective territories of the British Government to the south and of Nipal to the north; and in case any indentations occur to destroy the even tenor of the line, the Commissioners should effect an exchange of lands so interfering on principles of clear reciprocity.

5. And should it occur that the proprietors of lands situated on the mutual frontier, as it may be rectified, whether holding of the British Government or of the Rajah of Nipal, should be placed in the condition of subjects to both Governments, with a view to prevent continual dispute and discussion between the Governments, the respective Commissioners should effect in mutual concurrence and cooperation the exchange of such lands, so as to render them subject to one dominion alone.

6. Whensoever the Terai should be restored, the Rajah of Nipal will cease to require the sum of two lakhs of Rupees per annum, which the British Government agreed to advance for the maintenance of certain Barahdars of his Government.

7. Moreover, the Rajah of Nipal agreed to refrain from prosecuting any inhabitants of the Terai, after its revertance to his rule, on account of having favoured the cause of the British Government during the war, and should any of those persons, excepting the cultivators of the soil, be desirous of quitting their estates, and of retiring within the Company's territories, he shall not be liable to hinderance.

8. In the event of the Rajah's approving the foregoing terms, the proposed arrangement for the survey and establishment of boundary makes shall be carried into execution, and after the determination in concert of the Boundary line, Sunnuds conformable to the foregoing stipulations drawn out and sealed by the two States shall be delivered and accepted on both sides.

Seal

(Signed) Edward Gardner,
Resident

(A True Translation)

(Signed) G. Wellesley

Assistant.

APPENDIX - E

ON THE MILITARY TRIBES OF NEPAL

3 ORIGIN AND CLASSIFICATION OF THE MILITARY TRIBES OF NEPAL

(Read before the Bengal Asiatic Society, 9th January, 1833)

The great aboriginal stock of the inhabitants of these mountains, east of the river *Káli*, or in *Népal*, is Turanian. The fact is inscribed, in characters so plain, upon their faces, forms, and languages, that we may well dispense with the superfluous and vain attempt to trace it historically in the meagre chronicles of barbarians.

But from the twelfth century downwards, the tide of *Mussulmán* conquest and bigotry continued to sweep multitudes of the *Brahmans* of the plains from *Hindústán* into the proximate hills, which now compose the western territories of the kingdom of *Népal*. There the *Brahmans* soon located themselves. They found the natives illiterate, and without faith, but fierce and proud.

Their object was to make them converts to *Hindúism*, and so to confirm the fleeting influence derived from their learning and politeness. They saw that the barbarians had vacant minds, ready to receive their doctrines, but spirits not apt to stoop to degradation, and they acted accordingly. To the earliest and most distinguished of their converts they communicated, in defiance of the creed they taught, the lofty rank and honors of the *Kshatriya* order. But the *Brahmans* had sensual passions to gratify, as well as ambition.

They found the native females—even the most distinguished—nothing loath, but still of a temper, like that of the males, prompt to repel indignities. These females would indeed welcome the polished *Brahmans* to their embraces, but their offspring must not be stigmatised as the infamous progeny of a *Brahman* and a *Mléchha*—must, on the contrary, be raised to eminence in the new order of things proposed to be introduced by their fathers. To this progeny also, then the *Brahmans*, in still greater defiance of their creed, communicated the rank of the second order of *Hindúism*; and from these two roots, mainly, sprung the now numerous, predominant, and extensively ramified, tribe of the *Khas*—originally the name of a small clan of creedless barbarians, now the proud title of the *Kshatriya*, or military order of the kingdom of *Népál*.) The offspring of original *Khas* females and of *Brahmans*, with the honors and rank of the second order of *Hindúism*, got the patronymic titles of the first order; and hence the key to the anomalous nomenclature of so many stirpes of the military tribes of *Népál* is to be sought in the nomenclature of the sacred order. It may be added, as remarkably illustrative of the lofty spirit of the *Parbattias*, that, in spite of the yearly increasing away of *Hindúism* in *Népál*, and of the various attempts of the *Brahmans* in high officer to procure the abolition of a custom so radically opposed to the creed both parties now profess, the *Khas* still insist that the fruit of commerce (marriage is out of the question) between their females and males of the sacred order shall be ranked as *Kshatriyas*, wear the thread, and assume the patronymic title.

The original *Khas*, thus favoured by its, became soon and entirely devoted to the *Brahmanical* system.* The

* That is, they agreed to put away their old gods, and to take the new; to have *Brahmans* for *Gurus*; and not to kill the cow: for the rest they made, and still make, sufficiently light of the ceremonial law in whatever respects food and sexual glorifications. Their active habits and vigorous character could not brook the restraints of the ritual law, and they had the example of licentious *Brahmans* to warrant their neglect of it. The few prejudices of the *Khas* are useful, rather than otherwise, inasmuch as they favour sobriety and cleanliness.

progress of *Islám* below daily poured fresh refugees among them.

They availed themselves of the superior knowledge of the strangers to subdue the neighbouring tribes of aborigines, were successful beyond their hopes, and, in such a career continued for ages, gradually merged the greater part of their own habits, ideas, and language (but not physiognomy) in those of the *Hindús*.

The *Khas* language became a corrupt dialect of Hindi, retaining not many palpable traces (except to curious eyes) of primitive barbarism.

An authentic anecdote told me at *Káthmándú* confirms the origin above assigned to the modern *Khas* tribe of *Népál*. In the reign of *Ram Sáh* of *Górkhá*, an ancestor of the present dynasty of *Népál*. In the reign of *Ram Sáh* of *Górkhá* an ancestor of the present dynasty of *Népál*, an ambassador was sent from the *Durbar* of *Górkhá* to that of *Méwár*, to exhibit the *Górkháli* *Rajah's* pedigree and to claim recognition of alleged kindred. The head of the renowned *Sesodians*, somewhat staggered with the pedigree, seemed inclined to admit the relationship, when it was suggested to him to question the ambassador about his own caste as a sort of test for the orthodoxy or otherwise of the notions of caste entertained in the far distant, and, as had always at *Chitor* or *Udaypur* been supposed, barbarous *Himálaya*. The ambassador, a *Khas*, who had announced himself as belonging to the martial tribe, or *Kashatriya*, thus pressed, was now obliged to admit that he was nevertheless a *Pándé*, which being the indubitable cognomen of a tribe of the sacred order of *Hindúism*, his mission was courteously dismissed without further enquiry.

The *Ekthdriahs* are the descendants more or less pure of *Rájpúts* and other *Kshatriyas* of the plains, who sought refuge in these mountains from the Moslem, or merely military service as adventures. With fewer aims of policy, and readier means in their bright swords of requiting the protection afforded them, of the vile aborigines than the *Brahmans* felt the impulse, of and they did mix it less. Hence, to

this hour, they claim a vague superiority over the *Khas*, notwithstanding that the pressure of the great tide of events around them has, long since, confounded the two races in all essentials. Those among the *Kshatriyas* of the plains, who were more lax, and allied themselves with the *Khas* females in concubinage, were permitted to give to their children, so begotten, the patronymic title only, not the rank. But their children, again, if they married for two generations into the *Khas*, became pure *Khas*, or real *Kshatriyas* in point of privilege and rank, though no longer so in name. They were *Khas*, not and *Kshatriyas*, and yet they bore the proud cognomina of the martial order of the *Hindús*, and were, in the land of their nativity, entitled to every prerogative which *Kshatriya* birth confers in *Hindústán*!

Such is the third and less fruitful root of the *Khas* race.

The *Ektháriahs* speak the *Khas* language, and they speak no other.

The *Thákuris* differ from the *Ektháriahs* only by the accidental circumstance of their lineage being royal. At some former period, and in some little state of other, their progenitors were princes.

The *Sáhi* or *Sáh* are the present royal family.

The remaining military tribes of the *Parbattias* are the *Magar* and *Gúrung*, who now supply the greater number of the soldiers of this state.

From lending themselves less early and heartily to *Brahmanical* influence than the *Khas*, they have retained, in vivid freshness, their original languages, physiognomy, and, in a less degree, habits.

To their own untaught ears their languages differ entirely the one from the other, and no doubt they differ materially, though both belonging to the unpronominialized type of the Turanian tongues. Their physiognomies, too, have peculiarities proper to each, but with the general caste and character fully developed in both. The *Gúrungs* are less gen-

erally and more recently redeemed from *Lamáism* and primitive impurity than the *Magars*.

But though both the *Gúrungs* and *Magars* still maintain their own vernacular tongues, Tartar faces, and careless manners, yet, what with military service for several generations under the predominant *Khas*, and what with the commerce of *Khas* males with their females,* they have acquired the *Khas* language, though not to the oblivion of their own, and the *Khas* habits and sentiments, but with sundry reservations in favour with pristine liberty. As they have, however, with such grace as they could muster, submitted themselves to the ceremonial law of purity and to *Brahman* supremacy, they have been adopted as *Hindús*. But partly owing to the licenses above glanced at, and partly by reason of the necessity of distinctions of caste to Hindúism, they have been denied the thread, and constituted a doubtful order below it, and yet not *Vaisya* nor *Sudra*, but a something superior to both the latter—what I fancy it might puzzle the *Shastris* to explain on *Hindú* principles.

The *Brahmans* of *Népál* are much less generally addicted to arms than those of the plains; and they do not therefore properly belong to our present subject. The enumeration of the *Brahmans* is nevertheless necessary, as serving to elucidate the lineage and connexions of the military tribes, and especially of the *Khas*. The martial classes of *Népál* are, then, the *Khas*, *Magar*, and *Gúrung*, each comprising a very numerous race, variously ramified and subdivided in the manner exhibited in the following tabular statement.

The original seat of the *Khas* is ordinarily said to be *Górkhá*,* because it was thence immediately that they is-

* Here, as in the cases of the *Brahman* and *Khas*, and *Kshatriya* and *Khas*, there can be no marriage. The offspring of a *Khas* with a *Magarmi* or *Gurungni* is a titular *Khas* and real *Magar* or *Gurung*. The descendant fall into the rank of their mothers and retain only the patronymic.

* *Gókhá*, the town, lies about sixty miles W.N.W. of *Káthmándú*. *Górkhá*, the name, is derived from that of the eponymous deity of the royal family, viz. *Górakshanáth* or *Górkhánáth*, who likewise has given his name to our district of *Górakpur*.

sued, some years ago, under the guidance of Prithvi Narayan, to acquire the fame and dominion achieved by him and his successors of the *Górkháli* dynasty.

But the Khas were long previously to the age of Prithi Narayan extensively spread over the whole of the *Chaubisya*, and they are now found in every part of the existing kingdom of *Népál*, as well as in *Kúmáun*, which was part of *Népál* until 1816. The Khas are rather more devoted to the house of *Górkhá*, as well as more liable to *Brahmanical* prejudices than the *Magars* or *Gúrungs*; and, on both accounts, are perhaps somewhat less desirable as soldiers for our service than the latter tribes. I say somewhat, because it is a mere question of degree; the Khas having, certainly, no religious prejudices, nor probably any national partialities, which would prevent their making excellent and faithful servants in arms; and they possess pre-eminently that masculine energy of character and love of enterprise which distinguish so advantageously all the military races of *Nepal*. The original seat of the *Magars* is the *Bára Mangránth*, or *Satahung*, *Páyung*, *Bhírkót*, *Dhor*, *Garahúng*, *Rísing*, *Ghiring*, *Gálmí*, *Argha*, *Kháchi*, *Músikót*, and *Isma*: in other words, most of the central and lower parts of the mountains, between the *Bhéri* and *Marsyándi*† Rivers. The attachment of the *Magars* to the house of *Górkhá* is but recent, and of no extraordinary or intimate nature. Still less so is that of the *Gúrungs*, whose native seats occupy a line of country parallel to that of the *Magars*, to the north of it, and extending to the snows in that direction. Modern events have spread the *Magars* and *Gúrungs* over most part of the present kingdom of *Népál*. The *Gúrungs* and *Magars* are, in the main *Hindús*, only because it is the fashion: and the *Hindúism* of the Khas, in all practical and soldierly respects, is free of disqualifying punctilious.

These highland soldiers, who despatch their meal in half an hour, and satisfy the ceremonial law by merely washing their hands and face, and taking off their turbans before cooking, laugh at the pharisaical rigour of or *Sipáhis*,

† The *Marichangdi* of our maps.

who must bathe from head to foot and make *pújá*, ere they begin to dress their dinner, must eat nearly naked in the coldest weather, and cannot be in marching trim again in less than three hours.

In war, the former readily carry several days' provisions on their backs: the latter would deem such an act intolerably degrading. The former see in foreign service nothing but the prospect of glory and spoil: the latter can discover in it nothing but pollution and peril from unclean men and terrible wizards, goblins, and evil spirits. In masses, the former have all that indomitable confidence, each in all, which grows out of national integrity and success: the latter can have no idea of this sentiment, which yet maintains the union and resolution of multitudes in peril, better than all other human bonds whatever; and, once thoroughly acquired, is by no means inseparable from service under the national standard.

I calculate that there are at this time in *Népál* no less than 30,000 *Dákhreáhs*, of soldiers off the roll by rotation, belonging to the above three tribes. I am not sure that there exists any insuperable obstacle to our obtaining, in one form or other, the services of a large body of these men; and such are their energy of character, love of enterprize, freedom from the shackles of caste, unadulterated military habits and perfect subjectibility to a discipline such as ours, that I am well assured their services, if obtained, would soon come to be most highly prized.*

In my humble opinion they are by far the best soldiers in Asia; and if they were made participators of our

* Since this paper was written the value and the availability to us of the *Górkháli* soldier tribes have been well tested; and it is infinitely to be regretted that the opinions of Sir H. Fane, of Sir C. Napier, and of Sir H. Lawrence, as to the high expediency of recruiting largely from this source, were not acted upon long ago. So long a my voice carried any weight, I often pressed the subject on the attention of those in authority. But the them prejudice in favour of Brahman and Kshatri Sipá his neutralized all my efforts, though the danger of so homogeneous and army of foreign mercenaries was, among other arguments, earnestly dwelt upon. (1857.)

renown in arms, I conceive that their gallant spirit, emphatic contempt of Madhesias (people of the plains,) and unadulterated military habits, might be relied on for fidelity; and that our good and regular pay and noble pension establishment would serve perfectly to counterpoise the influence of nationality, so far as that could injuriously affect us.

The following table exhibits a classified view of the *Brahmanical* and military tribes, with their various subdivisions.

TABULAR VIEW OF THE TRIBES

BRAHMANS,

Arjal,	Dohál	Dhákál	Bikrál
Pondyál	Lamsál	Adhikári	Ukniyál
Khanái	Rimál	Doeja	Bhattwál
Regmi	Dēvakotya	Rukái	Gajniyál
Bhattrái	Parbatya Vash	Sywál	Chavala Gái
Niróla	Parbatya Misr.	Rijál	Vasta Gái.
Achárya	Davári	Dhúnghál	Banjára
Bhatt	Koikyál	Loiyál	Dági
Sápan kotya	Nepálya	Dotiyál	Sóti
Maharáshtra	Barál	Kandyál	Osti.
Kóirála	Pokaryál	Katyál	Utkulli
Pakonyál	Rúpákheta	Dangál	Kandariah
Sattyál	Khativára	Singyál	Ghart mél
Ghartyál	Timil Sina	Panêru	Dulál
Nivapánya	Káphalya	Loityál	Parajuli
Temrákoti	Gaithoula	Sigdhyál	Bajgái
Uphaltopi	Gairaha Pipli	Barál	Satôla
Parijai Kavala	Ghimirya	Gotamya	Ghurchôli
Homya Gái	Simkhára	Ghorasaini	Kéláthoni
Champa gai	Phúnwal	Risyál	Gilal
Gûra Gái	Chamka saini	Chálisya	Lahóni

Subêri	Pura saim	Dhôugána	Muthbari
Pandit	Dhurári	Bharári	
Têva pánya	Bhurtyál	Bágalya	

KHAS*1st Sub-dicision of the Khás, called Thápa.*

Bagyál	Gágliyá	Powár	Khapotari
Takuryál	Súyál	Ghimirya	Parájuli
Palámi	Maharáji	Khulái	Deoja
Gúdar	Lámichanya	Sunyál	

2nd Sub-division of the Khás, called Bishnyát

Khulál	Khaputari	Sripali	Puwar
--------	-----------	---------	-------

3rd Sub-division, called Bhandári

Raghubansi	Láma	Sijapati
------------	------	----------

4th Sub-division, called Kárki

Sutár	Láma	Múndala	Khúlál
-------	------	---------	--------

5th Sub-division, called Khánka

Powár	Maharáji	Partyal	Lakánggi	Lámichanya
Khulái	Kálikotya	Khaputari	Palpáli	

6th Sub-division, or Adhikari,

Thámi	Tharirái	Pokriál	Musiah
Dhámi	Khadhsena	Thákúri	

7th Sub-division, or Bisht

Kálikotya	Puwár	Dahál
-----------	-------	-------

8th Sub-division, or Kunwár

Bagálya	Khulái	Khanka	Arjál
---------	--------	--------	-------

9th Sub-division, or Baniah

Sijapati

10th Sub-division, or Dáni

Sijapati Powár

*11th Sub-division, or Gharti.**

Kalikotya Sijapati

12th Sub-division, or Khattri

Pánde	Khulál	Lámichánya	Tewári	Suveri
Dhakál	Panth	Poryál	Phanyál	Adhikári
Sakhtyál	Burál	Arjál	Sápkotya	Silwal

True Khds not yet classified

Dhongyál	Sijal	Satouya	Bûpakheti
Loyál	Parsái	Khatiwata	Chouvala Gái
Lamsál	Am Gái	Chalatáni	Bhatt Rái
Khukriyál	Baj Gái	Kilathoni	Naopánya
Dangál	Dahál	Satya Gái	Muri Bhus
Sikhmiyál	Deakota	Alpháltopi	Sóti
Bhiryál	Garhtóla	Osti	Parijái Kawala
Pouryál	Séóra	Bhatt Ojha	Bamankotya
Bikrái	Bálya	Tewári	Kadariah
Kanhál	Gilál	Porseni	Kála Khattri
Batyál	Chonial	Homya Gái	Dhúngána
Ganjál	Regmi	Túmtrakot	Pungyál

EKTHARYA, or insulated Tribes ranking with Khás

Búrathoki	Chohan	Bohara	Kutál	Ráya	Boghati
Chiloti	Dikshit	Ravat	Khatit	Dángi	Pandit
Katwái	Bávan	Raimanjhi	Parsái	Kháti	Mahat
Bhukhand	Chokhái	Maghati	Barwál	Bhusál	Chohara Durráh

* Manumitted slaves are called Párgarti, if of Khas lineage. They form a separate and rather numerous class, and so also do the Khawás or manumitted slaves of royalty.

THAKRI, or Royal Lineages, ranking with Khás

Sáhi	Singh	Chand	Jiva	Malla	Maun
Hamál	Rakhsya	Séna	Chohan	Ruchái	

MAGARS*N—Sub-division of the Magars, called Ráná*

Bhusál	Gyángmi	Byángnási	Kyápcháki	Aslámi
Pulámi	Phyúyáli	Durra Lámi	Yahayo	Gácha
Lámi- chanya	Máski	Sárû	Pusái	Gand- harma
Charmi	Arghounlé	Tháda	Dûtt	

II. —Sub-division of magars, called Thápa

Gránjá	Chumi	Keli	Bareya	Namjáli
Lûngeli	Jhángdi	Máski	Darrlámi	Sunári
Yángdi	Phyûyali	Marsyangdi	Chitouriah	Jhári
Arghounli	Gelung	Sinjali	SárûRijái	

III—Sub-division of Magars, called Alaya

Yángmi	Sarángi	Púng	Lamjál	Sûrya Vansi
Gónnda	Sripáli	Súyál	Kháli	Dukhcháki
Sijapati	Panthi	Thokcháki	Méng	Gharti
Rakhál	Sithûng	Maski	Lámichánya	Palámi
Lanapá	Arghounle	Khaptari	Phyûyáli	Kyapcháki
Dúrrá	Khulál	Chermi	Pacháin	

GURUNGS

Gúrúng	Lámichánya	Khaptari	Tangé
Ghalle	Siddh	Chûndáne	Ghonyá
Byápri	Karámati	Dhárén	Paindi
Vumjan	Gósti	Jimel	Méngi
Láma	Bagálva	Lopáte	Dah Láma
Chandú	Tháthúng	Lotháng	Kurángi
Góthi	Chárki	Bûlûng	Khulál

Gonduk	Kháti	Shakya Láma	Surya Vansi Láma
Gohori	Guáburi	Golángya	Madán
Baráhi	Pengi Ghárti	Khangva Dhakaren	Palámi

APPENDIX - F

ON THE COMMERCE OF NEPAL

[The following papers, which are of special interest just now, were addressed to the *Political Secretary at Calcutta in 1831, and were published in a volume of "Selections from the Records of the Government of Bengal, no. XXVII," in 1857.—Ep.]*

No. 1.—A precise practical account of the commercial route of Káthmándú, and thence to the marts on the Bhote or Tibetan frontier, with the manner and expense of conveying goods, the amount and nature of the duties levied thereon by the Népal Government, and the places where they are levied.

No. II—Lists of imports and exports, with remarks.

It is scarcely necessary for me to remark, that a connexion with the country was originally sought by us purely for commercial purposes, which purposes the government, up to the beginning of this century, directly and strenuously exerted itself, by arms and by diplomacy, to promote. Now, though I would by no means advise a recurrence to that mode of fostering the commerce in question, but, on the contrary, entirely adhere to the opinions expressed by me in my public despatch of the 8th of March, 1830, yet I think it is possible we may fall into the opposite error of entire forgetfulness and neglect of the matter. I conceive, therefore, that a few remarks tending to reveal the actual and possible extent and value of the trade in ques-

tion will, at the present moment, be well timed and useful, in which hope I shall now proceed to make some such remarks, and to point out, in the course of them, the specific object for which each of the two accompanying documents was framed. Why that great commerce, which naturally ought to, and formerly did,* subsist between the vast Cis- and Trans-Himálayan regions, should seek the channel of Népal rather than that of Bhútan on the one hand, or of Kumaon on the other, I have already explained at large, in my despatch above alluded to, and to which I beg to refer you, should the subject seem worthy of any present consultation or consideration. But I shall probably be met at the threshold of the discussion with the reasonable questions—what has been the effect of sixteen years' peace and alliance with Népal?—what is now the positive amount of this commerce?—what its extent as compared with any like preceding period. If the mustard-seed be indeed, to attain its promised dimensions, there ought to be now some distinct symptoms of its great power of increase.

To meet in some sort, and prospectively, these reasonable enquiries, I have drawn up the paper. No. II. I have myself searched in vain through my record for any the vaguest—data, by which I might judge of the amount of this commerce at the times of Kirkpatrick's† and Knox's missions to Káthmándú or, at the period of Mr Gardner's arrival here (1816), and the vexation I have experienced at finding none such, has led me thus to place on record the best attainable data for the present time. Fifteen years hence these data will furnish a scale of comparison by which to measure the justness of the views now entertained respecting the power of increase inherent in the trade of Népal. It will readily be anticipated this government neither makes nor

* I recommend a reference to the old records (inaccessible to me) of the commercial Residency of Patna and of its out-post Bettia. In 1842, an official reference was made to me, too immediately before my departure from Népal to be answered, the object of which was to ascertain who the imports from Tibet through Népal, and particularly that of gold, had fallen off so much.

† 1792 and 1801, respectively.

keeps any express record of the annual amount of exports and imports, and that it is no easy thing for one in my situation to get possession of the indirect, yet facile, measure of this amount furnished by the sum-total of the duties annually realized upon it. So far as attainable. I have used this measure. I have also, sought and obtained other measures. I have secretly and carefully applied to some of the oldest and most respectable merchants of Káthmándû, and the other chief towns of the Valley, for conjectural estimates of the total annual amount of imports and exports, and of the number and capital of the chief commercial firms of the Valley. These estimates are given in number II. In the absence of satisfied documents, these are the only accessible data, and when it is considered that I have the means of so applying to the merchants in question as to procure from them sincere statements to the best of their knowledge

It appears then that at this present time there are, in the great towns of the Valley of Népál, fifty-two native and thirty-four Indian merchants engaged in foreign commerce, both with the south and the North, and that the trading capital of the former is considered to be not less than 50,18,000, nor that of the latter less than 23,05,000.* A third of such of these merchants as are natives of the plains have come up subsequently to the establishment of the Residency in 1816, since which period, as is thought by the oldest merchants of Káthmándû, the trade has been tripled.

Turning again to No. II., Part I., we have, for the annual prime cost value of the imports in Sicca rupees 16,11,000, and Part II. of No. II. affords, for the annual value, at Káthmándû, of the exports, 12,77,800 of Népálese rupees, equivalent to Kuldars 10,61,833-5-4, thus making the total of imports and exports 26,75,833-5-4 of Kuldar rupees. But, from particular circumstances, the imports of 1830-31 were above what can be considered an average

* Before I left Népál. I had some reason to suppose these estimates to be too high by a third.

specimen, and should be reduced by one lakh, in the articles of precious stones, English fowling pieces, horses, velvets, and kimkhabs, owing to the extraordinary purchases of the Durbar in that year. After this deduction, there will remain a total of annual imports and exports, according to the lists of No. II, of something short of twenty-six lakhs, which sum agrees sufficiently well with the twenty-five lakhs yielded by the subsequent calculation upon the amounts of duties and of exemptions from duty. I am aware that, after the deduction from the imports adverted to, there will still remain an excess of imports over exports, amounting to four and a half lakhs of rupees,† which may seem to want explanation, if considered as a permanent relation. But I think it will be felt, on reflection, that to attempt to reduce these estimates to rigorous precision, or to raise on them a nice speculation would be to forget that they are necessarily mere approximations. In other respects, I hope and believe both parts of No. II likely to be very useful; but in regard to the precise accuracy of its sum-totals of annual transactions, I have no wish to deceive myself or others.

In respect to the annual amount of duties realized by this government upon this trade, I cannot ascertain it upon the northern branch of the trade, but upon the southern branch, or imports and exports from and to India, (which is farmed and more easily discoverable,) it reached last year (1830) the sum of one lakh and sixty-thousand three hundred and sixty-four Népálese rupees. Now, if we take (as there are good grounds for doing) the duty, upon an average of 6 per cent *ad valorem*, the above amount of duty will give a total annual value of imports and exports, with the plains of India alone, of 26,72,733½ Népálese Paisa rupees, equivalent of Siccas 17,81,821-19-8. But to this sum must

† The deficiency of exports is made up, and more by the agricultural produce of the lowlands, especially grain, six lakhs of which are annually sent to Patna, etc., where it is paid for in money wholly. The means of export afforded to Népál by her Tarai agriculture escaped me in drawing up the tables of commerce.—*B.H.H.*, 1834.

The total of exports and imports must, therefore, be set down at upwards of thirty lakhs—*B.H.H.*, 1857.

be added the whole amount of imports and exports passing duty free, and which cannot be rated at less than seven lakhs of Kuldars per annum. There are exemptions, from principle, of a general nature, such as those affecting the export of gold, piece, and Népalése rupees; and which articles alone amounted for 1830-31, to fully five lakhs of Siccas, as per list of Part II. No. II. There are also exemptions from favouritism, which, by the usage of the Népal government, are largely extended to its more respectable functionaries, civil and military—all of whom, if they have a penny to turn or expense to meet abroad, at once dabble in trade, and procure for themselves freedom of export and import for the nonce. The goods so exported and imported must be rated at a lakh per annum, nor can the Durbar's own purchases or imports be set down at less. We must add, therefore, seven lakhs of exempted goods to the nearly eighteen lakhs pointed out by the duties, and we shall have, in this way, little short of twenty-five lakhs of Kuldars for the total amount value of the exports and imports, to and from the plains, as indicated by the amount of duties and of exemptions. Such, according to data, of some worth at least, is the present extent of the trade of Népal. If we would reasonably conjecture to what a height that trade might easily grow, we may do so by turning to the statistical documents touching the amount and nature of the Russian commerce with China *via* Kiachta; and then, comparing the facilities and difficulties of such a commerce with those which present themselves to a commerce with the same country *via* Káthmándû and Lhása. From St. Petersburg to Peking, by any feasible commercial route, cannot be less than 5,500 miles* and though there is water carriage for a great part of the way, yet such is the savage sterility of the country, and such the rigor of the climate, that the water passage takes three years, and the land route one entire year, to accomplish it. The Russian government levies high duties on this

* Mr. Brun gives 4, 196 miles for what I take to be the direct, or nearly direct, way. Coxe, in one place, gives 5,363, in another place 4,701 miles. Bell's Itinerary yields 6,342. These are obviously the distances by various routes, or, by a more or less straight course, I take nearly the means of them.

trade, not less than 20 to 25 per cent, save on Russian products, which are scant, compared with the foreign. There are some monopolies, and may prohibitions, especially those mischievous ones affecting the export to China paltry, woollen and cotton cloths, glass-ware, hardware, hides, and prepared leather. Of these, not more than half of the first is produced in Siberia, the other half is obtained from North America, either *vid* England, or by way of Kamtschatka and the Aleutian Isles. Of the cotton and woollen cloths, the coarse only are Russian made, the fine come chiefly from England; and the like is true of the glass-ware and hardware. The hides are, mainly of home production. Russia imports from China musk, borax, rhubarb, tea, raw and wrought silk, ditto ditto cotton, porcelain, japan ware, water colours, etc. But the best musk, borax, and rhubarb by far are those of Tibet, and especially of Sifán, the north-eastern province of Tibet; and no tea is better or more abundant than that of Szchuen, which province is only eighty-seven days' journey from Káthmándû; whilst, of course, the musk, borax and rhubarb regions (as above indicated) are yet nearer to us, yet more inaccessible to the Russians, than Szchuen.

What more I have to say on these products will fall more naturally under my remarks on the line of communication with these countries through Népál; and to that topic I now address myself. From Calcutta to Peking is 2,880 miles. Of this, the interval between Calcutta and Káthmándû fills 540 miles, two-thirds of the way being navigable commodiously by means of the Ganges and Gandák. The mountains of Népál and of Tibet are steep and high; but they are, excepting the glaciers of the Himálaya, throughout chequered with cultivation and population, as well as possessed of a temperate climate. It is only necessary to observe the due season for passing the Himálaya, and there is no physical obstacle to apprehend; so that the journey from Káthmándû to Peking may be surely accomplished in five months, allowing for fifteen days of halts. But wherefore speak of Peking? At the eighty-seventh stage only, from Káthmándû, the merchant enters that rich and actively

commercial province of China Proper, called Szchuen,* whence by means of the Yang-tsz-kiang, and of the Hwangho, he may transport his wares, as readily as cheaply, throughout the whole central and northern parts of China, if he can be supposed to have any adequate motive for going beyond the capital of Szchuen, where he may sell his European and Indian products, and purchase tea or silk or other products of China. The mountains of Sífán and of Tibet, which yield the finest borax, musk and rhubarb in the world, lie in his way both to and fro; and in a word, without deviating from his immediate course, or proceeding above ninety days' journey from Káthmándû, he may procure where they grown, or are wrought, all those valuable articles of commerce which Russia must seek indirectly and at a much greater cost. But England and China, and not Calcutta and Chins, it may be argued, must be the sites of the production and consumption of the truly valuable articles of this commerce, of which the Népálese and Indians would have little more than the carrying trade; and England is afar off† It is so, indeed; but, with reference to the cheapness and facility of ship freight, of how little importance to commerce is the distance of England from Calcutta—not to mention that, as I have observed in reference to the Russian commerce, we must not suppose the Russian has no further to seek than St. Petersburg, but remember that England and Canada supply him with half he needs. From Canada Russia seeks through England our paltry, to convey it to the Chinese across the endless savage wastes of Siberia. What should hinder our Indian subjects and the Népálese from procuring these same furs at Calcutta and conveying them through Népál and Tibet to these same Chinese. At less than ninety stages from Káthmándû, they would arrive at the banks of the Hwangho in Sífán, or those of the Yang-taz-kiang in Szchuen; and then the merchants might be said to have reached their goal., What, again, should hinder the same merchants from under-selling the Russian, in the articles of English woollens, hard-ware and

* The route from Lhasa to the central and western provinces of China is far more easy than that from Lhása to Peking.

glass-ware, by conveying them to Szchuen from Calcutta, by the same route? Nothing, it may safely be said, but want of sufficient information upon the general course and prospect of commerce throughout the world; and that information we might easily communicate the practical substance of to them. There are no political bars or hindrances to be removed for the Népalése have used the Chinese commerce *vid* Tibet for ages, and our Indian subjects might deal in concert with Népalése by joint firms at Káthmándū. Nay, by the same means, or now, or shortly, Europeans might essay this line of commercial adventure. But of them it is not my present purpose to speak† Let the nature merchants of Calcutta and of Népál, separately or in concert, take up this commerce, and whilst we, though not the immediate movers, shall yet reap the great advantage of it, as consisting in an exchange of European articles for others chiefly wanted in Europe, we shall have a better chance of its growing to a vigorous maturity than if Europeans were to conduct it through its infancy. I have only further to add, in the way of continued contrast between the Russian commerce and that here sketched, that whilst the former is loaded with duties to the extent of 25 per cent, the latter would, in Népál, be subject only to 8 per cent.* duty; in Tibet, to no duty at all; and in our provinces only, I fancy, to a very

† Lord Elgin is now proceeding to China, in order to determine the footing upon which the civilized world, and especially England, shall hereafter have commercial intercourse with the Celestial Empire.

It may be worth while to remind. His excellency of the vast extent of conterminous frontier and trading necessity in this quarter, between Gilgit and Brahmakund. We might stipulate for a Commercial Agent or Consul to be located at Lhása, or for a trading frontier post, like Kiachta; and, at all events, it would add to the weight and prestige of our Ambassador, to show himself familiar with his whole case, or with the landward, as well as the sea-board relations of Britain and China.—*Note of 1857.*

* That is, the 6 per cent before spoken of and 2 per cent, more levied between Káthmándū and the Bhoté Frontier; but the latter duty can hardly be rated so high; at all events, 8 per cent, will amply cover all Custom House charges within the Népalése dominions. In our territories, the duties appear to reach 7 per cent. See general remarks to Part 1.

moderate one, which might perhaps be advantageously abolished. Having thus, in the best manner I was able, without numerous books to refer to, none of which are to be had here, given a rapid view of the grounds upon which I conceive a very flourishing commerce might be driven in European and Indian articles, between the great Cis and Trans-Himálayan plains, by means (at least in the first instance) of our Indian subjects and those of Népál, I need only add, that the document No. 1, is designed to arouse and direct the attention of the native merchants of Calcutta; that I have given it a popular form with an eye to its publication for general information in the *Gleanings in Science*; that No. 2. might be similarly published with advantage, and lastly, that nothing further is necessary, in order to give this publication all the effect which could be wisdom than simply to enjoin the Editor of that work to refer any native making enquiries on the subject to the Resident at Káthmándû, who, without openly aiding or interfering, might smooth the merchant's way to Káthmándû, and assist him with counsel and information. To prove that I have laid no undue stress on this matter. I only desire that a reference be had to the circumstances and extent of the Russian commerce at Kiachta, as lately (*i.e.*, in 1829) laid before Parliament; and even if this parallel between the two trades be objected to in its present extent, (and I have run it the whole length of China on one side, partly from a persuasion of the soundness of the notion, partly to provoke enquiry,) let us limit our own views to Tibet and maintain the parallel so modified. It may instruct, as well as stimulate us. Tibet, in the large sense, is an immense country, tolerably well peopled, possessed of a temperate climate, rich in natural productions, and inhabited by no rude nomades, but by a settled, peaceful, lettered, and commercially disposed race, to whom our broad cloths are the one thing needful; since, whilst all ranks and ages, and both sexes, wear woollen cloths, the native manufactures are most wretched, and China has none of a superior sort and moderate price wherewith to supply the Tibetans. With her musk, her rhubarb, her borax, her splendid wools, her mineral and animal wealth, her univer-

sal need of good woollens, and her incapacity to provide herself, or to obtain supplies from any of her neighbours, Tibet may well be believed capable of maintaining a large and valuable exchange of commodities with Great Britain, through the medium of our Indian subjects and the people of Népál, to which latter the *aditus*, closed to all others by China, is freely open. Now is it now needful to use another argument, in proof of the extension of which this commerce is capable, than simply to point to the recorded extent of the existing Russian commerce with China across Siberia.

P.S., 1857.—A costly road has been constructed recently over the Western Himálaya; but, adverting to proximity and accessibility to the various centres of supply and demand, I apprehend that a brisk trade between the Cis- and Trans-Himálayan countries would inevitably seek the route of the central or eastern part of the chain. To Delhi, Benáres Patna, Dacca and Calcutta, on the one hands, to all the rich and populous parts of Tibet, extending from Digarchee to Sífán, on the other hand, either of the latter routes is far nearer and much more accessible. By the unanimous testimony of all natives and of written native authorities Western Tibet is very much the poorest, most rugged, and least populous part of that country. Utsáng, Khám, Sífán, and the proximate parts of China furnish* all the materials, save shawl-wool, for a trade with us, as well as all the effective demand for our commodities. All this point to Káthmándû Darjeeling or Takyeul (above Gowhati in Assam) as the most expedient line of transit of the Himálaya.‡

By the terms of the Treaty of 1792, the duties leviabie on both sides are limited to 2½ per cent. *ad valorem* of the invoice. The actual charges to which the trader is put far exceed the customs duties *co nomine*, since tolls are levied by every Jageerdar on the transit of goods through the lowland.

* See Cooper, Bengal *As see Journal* for May 1869.

‡ Since this was writer the successful growth and manufacture of tea in the British Himalaya are accomplished facts adding greatly to the means of establishing without doubt or difficulty a flourishing commerce with Tibet and the countries immediately north establishments.

I

The Trade of Nepal

When we consider how much intelligent activity the native inhabitants of Calcutta have, of late years, been manifesting, we cannot help wondering that none of the mercantile class among them should have yet turned their attention to the commerce of Népal. Do they not know that the Népárs, or aborigines of the great Valley of Népal, have from the earliest times, maintained an extensive commercial intercourse between the plains of India on the one hand and those of Tibet on the other; The Népal is now subject to a wise and orderly Native Government; that owing to the firm peace and alliance between that Government and the Honourable Company's, the Indian merchant has full and free access to Népal; that the confidence inspired by the high character of the native administration, and by the presence of a British Resident at the Court, has led the native merchants of Benárcé to establish several flourishing kothees at Káthmándú, that the Cashmerians of Patna have had kothees there for ages past; that so entirely is the mind of the inhabitants of our territories now disabused of the old idle dread of a journey to Népal, the lakhs of the natives of Oude, Behar, and North East Bengal, of all ranks and conditions, annually resort to Káthmándú, to keep the great vernal festival at Pasupati Kshétra. Are the shrewd native merchants of Calcutta incapable of imitating the example of their brethren of Benáres, who have now no less than ten kothees at Káthmándú; and will it not shame them to hear, that whilst not one of them has essayed a visit to Káthmándú, to make enquiry and observation on the spot,

Nothing is more craved for or less procurable, in Tibet and up to the Russian frontier, than good tea; and if we cannot open up the Takyaul route from Assam we can and have that through Sikim by the Chola pass. The recent treaty has given us a right of way and of road construction, and this pass is not liable to be closed by the snow nor is the access to Sikim from the south rendered dangerous by malaria. The southern half of Sikim is our own: the northern half belongs to our dependant ally to whom we restored it in 816, and for whom we have preserved it ever sine, from the grasp of Népal.

very many Népálese have found their way to Calcutta, and realized, on their return, cent per cent. On their speculations in European articles? The native merchants of Calcutta have, whilst there, a hard struggle to maintain with their European rivals in trade, but at Káthmándu, they would have no such formidable rivalry to contend with, because Europeans not attached to the Residency, have no access to the country and without such access, they probably could not, and certainly have not, attempted to conduct any branch of the trade in question. But every native of the plains of India is free to enter Népál at his pleasure, nor would he find any difficulty in procuring from the Government of the country permission to sojourn by himself or his agent at Káthmándu, for purposes of trade. With a view to arouse, as well as to direct, the attention of our native brethren of the City of Palaces, in regard to the trade of Népál we subjoin some of the principle details respecting the route, the manner and the cost of carriage, and the nature and amount of the duties levied by the Népál Government. It cannot be necessary to dwell upon that portion of the way which lies within the heart of our own provinces—suffice it to say that, by the Ganges and Gandák, there is commodious water carriage a all seasons, from Calcutta to Govindgunge or Kesriah, situated on the Gandák river, in the Zillah of Sarun, and no great way from the boundary of the Népálese territories. Kesriah or Govindgunge, then, must be the merchant's place of debarkation for himself and his goods, and there he must provide himself with bullocks for the conveyance of his wares, as far as the base of the greater mountains of Népál, where again, he will have to send back the bullocks and hire men to complete the transfer of his merchandise to Káthmándú and here we may notice a precaution of some importance, which is, that the merchant's wares should be made up at Calcutta into secure package adapted for carriage on a man's back of the full weight of two Calcutta bazar maunds each; because, if the wares be so made up, a single mountaineer will carry that surprising weight over the huge mountains of Népál, whereas two men not being able to unite their strength with effect in the conveyance of goods, packages heavier than two maunds are,

of necessity, taken to pieces on the road at great hazard and inconvenience, or the merchant must submit to have very light weights carried for him, in consideration of his awkwardness or inexperience in regard to the mode of adjusting loads. Besides the system of duties proceeds in some sort upon a presumption of such loads as those prescribed; and lastly, two such loads form exactly a bullock freight; and upon bullocks it is necessary, or at least highly expedient to convey wares from Kesriah to the foot of the mountains. Let every merchant, therefore, make up his goods into parcels of two full bazar maunds each, and let him have with him apparatus for fixing two of such parcels across a bullock's saddle. He will thus save much money and trouble. Kesriah and Govindgunge are both flourishing villages at which plenty of good bullocks can be had by the merchant, for the carriage of his wares, as well as a good tattoo for his own riding to the foot of the hills, whence he himself must either walk, or provide himself (as he easily can at Hitounda) with a dooly, for the journey through the mountains to Kathmandu, the hire of a bullock from Kesriah to Hitounda, at the foot of the mountains, is three Sicca rupees: besides which sum, there is an expense of six annas per bullock to tokdars or watch-men on this route, *viz.*, two annas at Moorliah, two at Bichiako, and two at Hitounda. The total expenses, therefore per bullock, from Kesriah to Hitounda, are Sicca rupees 3-6-0. The load of each bullock is four pukka maunds. The stages are nine, as follows:—Kesriah to Bhopatpoor, 5 cos; to Lohiá, 7 cos; to Segoulee, 5 cos; to Amodahi, 5 cos; to Pursoi, 6 cos; to Bisouliah or Simrabasa, 4 cos; to Amodahi, 5 cos; to Pursoni, 6 cos; to Bisouliah or Simrabasa, 4 cos; to Bichiako, 5 cos; to Chooriah Ghauti, 3 cos; and to Hitounda, 4 cos; being 44 cos in all. Hitounda, as already frequently observed, is at the foot of the great mountains, which, for want of roads, no beast of burden can traverse laden. Men, therefore, are employed, but so athletic and careful and trustworthy are the hill porters, that this sort of carriage is far less expensive or inconvenient than might be imagined. The precautions in respect to packages before prescribed having been attended to by the trader he will find the four maunds of

goods, which constituted the one bullock's load as far as Hitounda readily taken up by two hill-porters, who will convey them most carefully in six days to Káthmándú. It is an established rule, that four maunds, properly packed, make two bakkooos, or men's loads, which are conveyed to Káthmándú at the fixed rate of two rupees of the country per bakkoo or load. The stages and distances are as follows:—Hitounda to Bhainsa Dobháng, 3½ cos; to Bhjimpbédy, 4 cos; to Tambakháni, 3 cos; to Chitlong, 3 cos; to Thankot, 3 cos; to Káthmándú, 3 cos—Total, 10½ cos. At Hitounda, there is a Custom House Chokey, where packages are counted merely, not opened, nor is any duty levied there. At Chisapáni Fort, which is half way between Bhimpbédy and Tambakháni, is another Custom Chokey, and there the merchandise is weighed and a Government duty is levied of one anna per dhárni of three seers, being two Paisa rupees per bakkoo: also, Zemindary duty at Chitlong of two annas per bakkoo or load of 32 Dhárni, in other words of 96 ordinary seers. At Thankot, the last stage but one, a further Zemindary duty is levied of four annas per bakkoo.

**SUMMARY RECAPITULATION OF THE EXPENSES FOR
CARRIAGE AND DUTY BETWEEN HITOUNDA AND
KATHMANDU**

	<i>Nepalese Rs</i>	<i>Siccas</i>
Hire of Porters	4 0 0	3 4 0½
Duties Paisa rupees 4 12 0	3 12 8	3 0 9¼
Per bullock load ..	7 12 8	6 4 9¾

To which, if we add the 3-6-0 Sicca for bullock hire and watch-men, between Kesriah and Hitounda, we shall have a total of Sicca rupees 9-10-9¾ for the expense, for duty and carriage, of conveying four pukka bazar maunds and upwards, (64 dhârni or 192 ordinary seers exactly,) from the Ghaut of the Gandák to Káthmándú, where finally the goods are subject to an *ad volorem* duty of rupees 8-8-0 of the country or 2-13-6 Sicca, and where the merchant may get cent. per cent upon Calcutta prices for his European articles, if they have been well selected:

		Duty in Nepal Rupees * Siccas				
European broad cloths and other woolens of all sorts	per cent	3	8	0	2	13 6
European chiatzes and other cotton of all sorts..		3	8	0	2	13 6
European silks of all sorts	"	3	8	0	2	13 6
European lines of all sorts	"	3	8	0	2	13 6
Amritsur and Cashmere shwals, good	"	3	8	0	2	13 6
Dacca muslims and Jamdanees, sahanas, & c. ..	"	3	8	0	2	13 6
Malda and bhaugulpoor silk and mixed silk and cotton stuffs	"	3	8	0	2	13 6
Benáres kimkhabs, toftas, mushroo, shmlas, do- pattajas, & c.	"	3	8	0	2	13 6
Mirzapoor and Calkpes kharwas and garhas ..	"	3	8	0	2	13 6
Mowsahans, andarsahs, & c.	"	3	8	0	2	13 6
Behar, pagress, khasas, & c.	"	3	8	0	2	13 6
Bareilly, Lucknow and Tanha chintzes	"	3	8	0	2	13 6
Eruopean cutlery, as knives, scissors, & c.	"	3	8	0	2	13 6
European mirrors, window glass, & c	"	3	8	0	2	13 6
Indian karanas, or groceries, drugs, dues, and spicery of all sorts	"	5	0	0	4	1 0
Peltry of Europe and India, as Dacca, other skins, goat ditto, & c.	"	5	0	0	4	1 0
Quicksilver, vermilion, red and white lead, brim- stone, jasta, ranga, camphor	"	5	0	0	4	1 0
Indigo pays in kind	"	10	0	0	8	2 0
Precious stones, as diamond emerald, pearl, corel	"	1	8	0	1	3
Indian laces, as Kalabuttu, Totah, & c.	"	5	0	0	4	1 0

The duties upon imports from the plains, leviabie at Káthemándú, are farmed by the Government, instead of being collected directly. The farm is called Bhansár—the farmer, Bhansári. On the arrival of a merchant with goods from the plains, the Bhansári, or his deputy, waits upon the merchant and seals up his bales, if it be not convenient to him to have them at once examined. When the bales are opened and the goods inspected, an *ad valorem* duty (for

the most part) of 3½ per cent is levied on them by the Bhansári, thus:—

	<i>Nepalese Rs.</i>	<i>Siccas</i>
For Kinára or Kinára, per cent	2 0 0	1 10 0
For Nirikhi, per cent 1 8 0	1 3 6
	3 8 0	2 13 6

The value of the goods, upon which depends the amount of duty, is settled by inspection of the merchant's invoice and by appraisement of a regular officer, thence called the Nirikhman. If the merchant continue to dispute the appraiser's valuation, and the consequent amount, of duty, and will not listen to reason, it is usual for the Government, in the last resort, to require the merchant to dispose of his wares to it at his own alleged valuation. Let no one therefore think to abate the duty by under-valuing his goods, for if he do, he may find himself taken at his word, when he least expected it. For the rest, if he be fair and reasonable and exhibit his invoice, he has nothing to fear from the Bhansári, who is not a man of eminent place or power, and if he were, would not be suffered, under the present able administration, to press the merchant. In respect to the duties levied on the way up, (at Chisapâni and Thankot,) as already explained, they are called Sayer and Bakwaoon. If the merchant please, he may avoid paying them on the road, and settle for them at Káthmándú, in which case the Collector of Chisapâni takes a memorandum of the weight of the goods and forwards it to the Bhansári and to the Government Collector at Káthmandú, giving the merchant, at the same time, a note of hand to pass him one.

We have stated that the duty on Imports from the plains is, in general, an ad valorem one of 3-8-0 of the country currency: but as, there is a different rate in respect to some of the articles, and, as the enumeration of the chief Imports will serve as sort of guide to the Calcutta trader, who may be disposed to adventure a speculation to

Káthmándú, we shall give a list of these Imports with the duty assigned to each.

Whoever has sold his wares at Káthmándú will next look to purchasing a "Return Cargo" with the proceeds of such sale. We therefore now proceed to notice the manner and amount of the Export duties levied by the Népál Government upon goods exported to the plains. There is no difference between goods the produce of Népál and such as are the produce of Bhote (Tibet) or China, all paying on exportation to India at the same rate.

The Exports, like the Imports, are farmed, and it is therefore with the Bhansari that the merchant will have again to treat with.

The Export duty is an *ad valorem* one, and amounts, for the most part, to 4-11-1 per cent, which is levied thus:—

	Ostensibly			Beally		
As Bakkooána	1	0	0	1	2	2
As Nirikhi	1	4	0	1	4	0
As Kinars	2	0	0	2	4	3
	4	4	0	4	11	1

These sums are Népálese currency. Their equivalents in Sicca rupees are 3--3 and 3-13-0. There are no further duties levied on the road, and the merchant, upon payment of the above *ad valorem* duty at Káthmándú, receives from the Bhansári a *pasa*, or Dhoka Nikási, which will carry him, free beyond the limits of Népál.

The merchant's goods, on his return, should be made up, as on his approach, into bakkoos or men's loads of thrity-two dhárnis of three seers per dhárni, and he should have bullocks waiting his arrival at Hitounda, by previous arrangement. The following is a list of some of the principal exports, with their respective duties:—

Articles	Duties in Nepal Rupees & Siccas
Chours	per cent 4 11 1 3 13 9
Tibetan, Himalayan and Chinese woollens as	
Maleeda, Toos, Namda, Chourpat, Rahry, Bhot etc "	4 11 1 3 13 9
Chinese damasked and brocaded satins & silks "	4 11 1 3 13 9
Sohága or borax.. .. .	4 11 1 3 13 9
Népálese, Bhotea and Chinese drugs —rhubarb, mihargiyah, zaharmohars, momira, jatamangsee, hurtal, & c... .. .	" 4 11 1 3 13 9
Bhotea and Népálese paper.. .. .	" 4 11 1 3 13 9
Musk pods, per seer of 32 Sa. Wat	" 1 4 0 1 0 3
Gold.. .. .	" Duty free
Silver	" Prohibited
Rupees of the plains.. .. .	" Ditto
Rupees of Népál and copper pice of ditto	" Free
Bhote poneys or tanghans, each	" 7 0 0 5 11 0
Hard-ware, as iron phowrahs & c.	" 4 11 1 3 13 9

Though we would not advise the native merchant of Calcutta to meddle, in the *first* instance, directly himself, with the trade of bhote, whether in exports or imports, yet as that country causes the great demand for European woollens in particular, and is, on many accounts, or more consideration in a commercial point of view than Népál, we shall give some details relative to the trade with it, through Népál, analogous to those we have already, furnished respecting the trade with Népál itself.

The duties upon the Bhote trade are levied by government through its own officers, not farmed, like the duties on the trade with helpings. Goods of the plains (whether the produce of Europe or India,) exported through Népál to Bhote, are made up into packages or *bakkoos*, of sixteen *dhârnis*, or forty-eight *seers* only, owing to the extreme difficulties of the road, which will not permit a man to carry more than that weight upon his back; and there are no other means whatever of conveyance, until the Himálaya has been passed. Upon these *bakkoos* or loads the duty is levied, and amounts to Paisa rupees 1-0-1 per *bakkoo*, for all articles

alike. The duty is levied at the Taksár or Mint, and the collector is familiarly called Taksári in consequence. The details of duty of the 1-0-1 are these:—

Taksár	0	6	0	
Nikási	0	10	0	
Bahidár	0	0	1	
Paisa Rupees		1	0	1	= Siccas 0 10 10

Upon payment of this sum to the Taksári, that officer furnishes the merchant with a passport, which will pass his goods, free, to the frontier of Bhot or Tibet.

The chief exports to Bhote are:—European broad cloths (crimson, green, orange, liver, and brown-coloured), cutlery, pearls, coral, diamonds, emeralds, indigo and opium. goods imported into Népal from Bhote (no duty levied there) pay to the Taksár at Káthmándú as follows:—

- Musk pods, per seer (in kind) .. 1½ tolahs.
- Gold, per tolah 1 anna.

Silver is all necessarily sold to the Taksár and is received at the Sicca weight, paid for at the Népalése or Mohári weight, difference three annas.

Articles	Duty
Chours, white	per dhárni 4 annas.
Ditto, black	per dhárni 3 annas
Chinese and Bhotea velvets, woollens, satins, silk thread, and raw silk	per cent 4 rupees
Peltry of Mongolia and Bhote, samoor, kakoon, chuah-khal, garbsooth, & C.	" 4 "
Borax	" 4 "
Chinese and Bhotea tea	" 4 "
Druga	" 4 "

From Kathmándú to Bhote frontier, or rather, to the frontier *marts* of Kooti and of Keroong, there are two roads,

one of which is called the Keroong and the other the Kooti way, after the marts in question, which are respectable Botea towns.

The following are the stages and expenses:— Káthmándú to Kooti, eight stages, sixteen *dhárnis*, or forty-eight seers, a man's load. His hire, 2 rupees of Népál—or Siccas 1-10-0 for the trip.

The stages are Sankhoo, 3½ cos; to Sipa, 7½ cos; to Choutra, 5 cos; to Maggar gaon or Dharapani, 3 or 4 cos; to Listi, 5 cos; to Khasa, 4 cos; to Chê-sang, 5 cos; to Kooti, 3¾ cos.

From Káthmándú to Keroong, the eight stages are:— To Jaiphal-kepowah, 4 cos; to Nayakot, 5 cos; to Taptap, 4 cos; to Preboo, 4 cos; to Dhom-chap, 5 cos; to Maidan Pootah, 3 cos; to Risoo (frontier), 4 cos; to Maima, 4 cos; to Keroong, 4 cos.

The load is the same as on the Kooti road and the hire of the carrier the same.

The Himálaya once passed, you come to a tolerably plain country, along which beasts of burden can travel laden. The usual carriage is on ponies and mules, which carry two *bakkoos* of sixteen *dhárnis* each, and can be hired for the trip, from Lhása to the Népál frontier, for twenty rupees of Bhote currency. They perform the journey in about a month, allowing for three or four days' halts.

P.S.—The Népálese *dhárni* is equal to three seers. The Népálese rupee is worth thirteen annas. It is called, after an ancient dynasty, Mahêndra Mally, or shortly and commonly Môhars. The Bhote rupee is called Kala Môhari. It ought to be equal to the Népálese, but is rendered five gundas less valuable by undue adulteration.

No. II.
TRADE OF NEPAL
Import of Goods from the Plains in 1830-31

Articles	At what price purchased in Calcutta, or where manufactured or grown	Estimated prime cost amount of Imports in Co.'s Rupees.	At what price sold in Nepal, in Nepalese Rupees	Amount of goods transported to Bhote	Amount of goods consumed in all Nepal	REMARKS
European crimson velvet ^a	From 5 to 15 Rs. per yard	13,000	26,000	2,000	24,000	* The Tibetans care not for our velvets, but they are much admired by the Népālese, both males and females. Ladies wear velvet bodies; gentlemen velvet caps and jackets. Scabbards and saddles and cushions are covered with velvets.
" blue and greeo ditto	" 8 " 12 " "	8,000	16,000	4,000	12,000	
" black ditto	" 5 " 9 " "	4,000	8,000	None	8,000	
" brown, liver, and abitee ditto	" 5 " 10 " "	5,000	10,000	2,000	8,000	
Broad cloth of scarlet colour ^b	" 2½ " 10 " "	30,000	60,000	10,000	50,000	
" green ditto	" 2 " 12 " "	20,000	40,000	25,000	15,000	^b Our broad cloth is equally prized in Népāl and Tibet, but the Tibetans are superstitions about its colour. The colours set down are the only ones which the Tibetans will wear, and even of these the blue and black, though agreeable to the Népālese, are not so to the Tibetans. The quality most saleable is that which fetches
" brown ditto	" 2½ " 6 " "	25,000	50,000	20,000	30,000	
" black ditto	" 3 " 9 " "	8,000	16,000	None	16,000	
" blue ditto	" 2 " 11 " "	21,000	42,000	2,000	40,000	
" liver, yellow, and abiree ditto	" 2½ " 4 " "	16,000	32,000	3,000	29,000	
Europe shawls ^c	" 6 " 25 " per piece	2,000	4,000	None	4,000	
" rumal	" ½ " 2 " "	1,000	2,000	"	2,000	
" satin	" 1½ " 2 " "	2,500	5,000	"	5,000	
" chintzes, ^d 1¼ by 28 yds. "	4 " 14 " "	22,000	44,000	2,000	42,000	

Articles	At what price purchased in Calcutta, or where manufactured or grown	Estimated prime cost amount of Imports in Co.'s Rupees.	At what price sold in Nepal, in Nepalese Rupees	Amount of goods transported to Bhote	Amount of goods consumed in all Nepal	REMARKS
French ditto, 1 by 14 to 21 yds. Country ditto, from Tanda, Bareilly furruckabad, & c., 1½ to 2 by 6 to 9 yards	" 14 " 30 " "	8,000	16,000	1,000	15,000	8 to 10 rupees per yard at Calcutta.
Europe cambries, 1 by 12 yds " long cloth, 1 by 24 yds. " leno cloth, 1 by 10 yds.	" 1-6 " 4 " " " 5 " 12 " " 6 " 10 " " 2½ " 9 " "	2,00,000 17,000 6,000 16,000	3,00,000 34,000 12,000 32,000	5,000 1,200 2,000 2,000	2,95,000 32,800 10,000 30,000	In Tibet all ranks and both sexes wear woollens throughout the year, and almost exclusively of other apparel; yet the only native manufactures of woollen cloths are of the most inferior quality and insufferable weight.
Dacca jamdane, 1 by 10 yards	" 10 " 20 " "	5,000	10,000	None	10,000	Nor is the total deficiency of good broad cloths capable of being supplied by the Chinese, who use not, nor make, woollens.
Tanda jamdane	From 5 to 10 Rs per piece	5,000	7,500	500	7,000	
Dacca muslin, 1 by 18 yards .. Muslin of Behar, Santipoor, Chandrakona, and Kopamow, 1 by 16 yards	" 10 " 15 " " " 2 " 10 " "	8,000 40,000	16,000 60,000	None 500	16,000 59,500	
Dacca Sahan, 1 by 18 yard . . Sahan cloth of Santipoor, Chandrakona, Jahana, Kopamow, and Tanda, etc., 1½ & 2 cubits by 12 and 18 yards . .	" 8 " 13 " " " 1½ " 8 " "	40,000 100,000	80,000 150,000	None 5,000	80,000 145,000	Tibet only receives a small quantity of Toos and Maleeda from China; and those cloths, though made of fine wool, are of poor, loose-textured, flannel-like manufacture.
Kora Gora cloth of Dhurbanga, Lands, Jahana, and Majhdawa, etc., 1½ & 2 cubits by 14 and 20 yards	" 1½ " 6 " "	33,000	50,000	500	49,000	How large, then, ought to be the demand for our broad cloths in Tibet, if sufficiently
Dacca Turban, 1½ span by 12						

Articles	At what price purchased in Calcutta, or where manufactured or grown	Estimated prime cost amount of Imports in Co.'s Rupees.	At what price sold in Nepal, in Nepalese Rupees	Amount of goods transported to Bhote	Amount of goods consumed in all Nepal	REMARKS
and 30 yards "	5 " 15 " "	10,000	20,000		19,000	intelligent and active industry was employed in putting them within the reach of the Tibetans.
Turban of Kopamow and Jahana 1½ span by 20 and 40 yards "	1½ " 10 " "	30,000	45,000	300		
Gimtee of bykantpore and Jahana, etc., 1 cubit by 6 & 8 yds. "	1½ " 4 " "	10,000	15,000	None	15,000	Our imitations of Indian hand-kerchiefs and Cashmere shawls are becoming very popular among the middle and lower orders in Népal.
Indian and English Doriah cloth 1 by 16 yards "	2 " 8 " "	7,000	10,500			English and Indian Chintzes are not worn at all in Tibet.
Maldahee cloth, 1 by 9 or 10 yds "	2½ " 5 " "	7,000	14,000	"	10,500	
Moorshedabad cloth stuffs of sorts, 1 by 6 or 0 yards "	3 " 10 " "	12,000	24,000			Both are much worn in Népal by the middle and lower orders.
Boolbool Chasma Kummerbund of Malda, 1 cubit by 6 yards "	3 " 6 " "	1,000	2,000			Women make gowns of them, the men jackets and linings to jackets—to the latter use they are occasionally applied in Bhote.
Radhanagaree and Bhaugulporee, Soosy and Loonga cloth, 1 by 6 yards "	1-12 " 3 " "	1,600	3,200			No kind of cotton stuffs, fine or coarse, are used as apparel in Tibet, and the little the Tibetans purchase, is wanted merely for covering
Benâres Mushroo and Goolbadan 1¾ cubits by 5 yards "	3 " 12 " "	7,000	14,000			
Benares Dhooties, of sorts, 2½ cubits by 5 yards, with brocaded edges "	2 " 4 " p.ea.pr.	3,000	6,000	None	6,000	
Gya Dhooties, ditto ditto "	1½ " 3 " "	2,000	4,000	"	4,000	
Benâres Kinkhabs, 1 by 5 or 6						

Articles	At what price purchased in Calcutta, or where manufactured or grown		Estimated prime cost amount of Imports in Co.'s Rupees.	At what price sold in Nepal, in Nepalese Rupees	Amount of goods transported to Bhothe	Amount of goods consumed in all Nepal	REMARKS
yards	"	50 " 400 " per piece.	28,000	56,000	11,000	45,000	the pictures with which the walls of scared edifices are literally covered in Tibet. On the contrary., all classes in Népal wear cotton wholly or partially throughout the year: and as Népal has no native manufacture of any but very coarse sorts, there is a large demand for the finer fabrics, both of Europe and India. Chintzes and Sahans are the kinds most used. The whole of the middle and upper classes are clad in foreign cottons. The poor manufacture, each family, their own supply of coarse goods. The manufacture is purely and entirely domestic and peculiar to the females. English lace, the beautiful silk and muslin fabrics of Benâres embroidered all round with gold or silver, and the
Benâres Kinkhabs, 1 by 5 or 6 yards	"	20 " 500 " "	4,000	8,000	5,000	3,000	
Benâres Dopattahs, with brocaded edges, 1½ or 2 by 3 or 4½ yards	"	5 " 40 " each	1,200	2,400	None	2,400	
Tash of Benâres, Lucknow, and Patna, 1¼ by 6 yards	"	75 " 300 " per piece	8,000	16,000	4,000	12,000	
Golden Kallabuttu	"	2 " " per tolah	12,000	24,000	None	24,000	
Silver ditto	"	½ " 1-2 " "	5,000	10,000	"	10,000	
English lace and Indian Gotah and Kinara of gold	"	2 " 2¼ " "	22,000	44,000	"	44,000	
Ditto ditto of silver	"	12 as " 1 " "	6,000	12,000	"	12,000	
Gold and Silver Salmasitara	"	2½ " 3½ " "	9,000	18,000	"	18,000	
Cashmeer and Amritsar Shawls, ^a 2 by 3½ or 4½ yards	"	80 " 1000 " per piece	45,000	90,000	"	90,000	
Ditto ditto Rumals, 1½ & 2½ yds "	"	20 " 150 " "	6,000	12,000	"	12,000	
Kalpi and Mirzapoor Kharwa cloth, 1¾ cubits by 6 or 7 yds. "	"	14 as " 1-12 " "	6,000	12,000	4,500	7,500	
Mirzapoor and Patna Carpets, of sorts	"	2½ " 50 " "	4,000	8,000	None	8,000	
Patna and Govindgunge Settringhees	"	1 " 8 " "	1,200	2,400	"	2,400	
English and Bengal silk thread per seer of 80 sa. Wt. . . .		From 4 to 16 Rs. per seer	12,000	21,000	None	24,000	

Articles	At what price purchased in Calcutta, or where manufactured or grown	Estimated prime cost amount of Imports in Co's Rupees.	At what price sold in Nepal, in Nepalese Rupees	Amount of goods transported to Bhote	Amount of goods consumed in all Nepal	REMARKS
Cotton thread Indian mostly	" 22 " 30 " per md.	4,000	8,000	1,200	6,800	splendid brocades of the latter place are not much known
Cotton, raw, from Mirzapore	" 12 " 16 " "	32,000	64,000	None	64,000	or esteemed in Bhote. They
Pearls (large)	" 25 " 500 " "	40,000	80,000	30,000	50,000	are all well-known and much
Ditto (middle-sized)	" 10 " 20 " per corge	22,000	44,000	30,000	14,000	esteemed in Népal, but only
Ditto (small)	" 1 " 10 " "	13,000	26,000	20,000	6,000	to a very moderate extent
Coral (large) 1½ to 2½ tolahs per bead	" 8 " 12 " per tolah	25,000	50,000	15,000	35,000	within the means of the people. Every man, however, who
Ditto (middle) 5 to 10 beads per tolah	" 3 " 7 " "	40,000	88,000	50,000	38,000	can afford it will have his cap
Ditto (small) 12 to 20 do, do	" 1½ " 2½ " "	26,000	52,000	15,000	37,000	banded with lace of silver or gold, and the Court annually
Diamonds, Emeralds, Rubies, and Sapphires	" 12as " 1½ per corge	50,000	100,000	None	100,000	consumes a considerable supply of brocaded goods of the finest qualities.
Neshapoori Feroza stone	" 1 " 10 " "	16,000	32,000	15,000	17,000	
Cornelian	" 1 " 10 " "	1,000	2,000	500	1,500	
Kahrobah or red amber	" 2 " 8 per tolah	6,000	12,000	7,000	5,000	^a Bhote receives its supply of Shawls by way of Ladakh,
Ditto yellow	" 2 " 8 per tolah	3,000	4,000	None	4,000	to Népal they come <i>via</i> the plains. All who can afford it
Ditto Kupperi Poosah	" 4as " 1 " "	600	1,200	1,000	200	wear them.
Poth or glass beads, of different colours	" 50 " 100 " "	2,000	4,000	None	4,000	^b Kharwas are used for lining the dresses of the
Chank	" 2 " 4 as each	2,500	5,000	3,500	1,500	commonalty of Népal and for their bed furniture. The
Large Cowries	" 18 Rs. 2 as each	100	200	None	200	Népalése manufacture cotton
Kuldar gold Mohur	" 30 Rs per seer	20,000	25,000	3,000	25,000	stuffs as fine as Kharwa, but
Golochan	" 8 as each	3,000	6,000	2,500	3,000	
Indigo ^k	" 8 as each	2,000	4,000	2,500	1,500	

Articles	At what price purchased in Calcutta, or where manufactured or grown	Estimated prime cost amount of Imports in Co. s Rupees.	At what price sold in Nepal, in Nepalese Rupees	Amount of goods transported to Bhothe	Amount of goods consumed in all Nepal	REMARKS
Otter skins	" 3 to 6 as each	1,000	2,000	600	1,400	they cannot give them a permanent colour, such as Kharwa receives in the plains.
Green skins, of prepared leather for native shoes, etc.	From 4 to 5½ Rs. per maund	40,000	80,000	1,200	78,800	¹ Bhothe has long been a capital market for pearls and coral. All the women of rank wear the former and all the priests of rank carry rosaries of coral beads. The market, however, is now glutted.
Brimatone	" 13 "	6,000	12,000	500	11,500	² Gold Mohurs fetch at Káthmándú 25 rupees of Népal each, the rupee in question being worth 13 annas and 4 pie.
Quickalver	" 80 "	3,000	6,000	1,600	4,400	³ Népal and Tibet are all ways very inadequately supplied with good indigo.
Singraf or vermillion cinnabar	" 80 "	3,000	6,000	None	6,000	There is a very great demand for it just now in the latter country.
China red lead	" 60 "	2,500	5,000	"	5,000	⁴ Saltetre is produced in the Népalése Tarai, and brimstone in the hills, but neither
Country ditto	" 8 "	1,000	2,000	"	2,000	
Ruskapoor	" 8 " 12 " per seer.	800	1,600	"	1,600	
Camphire	" " 32 " per maund	7,000	14,000	"	14,000	
White sandal	" 9 " 11 "	4,000	8,000	1,000	7,000	
Red ditto	" 4½ " 6 "	2,600	5,200	600	4,600	
Zangar or verdigris	" 5 "	5,000	10,000	1,200	8,800	
White lead	" " 2 "	3,000	6,000	1,500	4,500	
Sankhia, Hartal, & Tabkiah do.	" " 4 per seer	1,400	2,800	None	2,800	
Opium ^m	" 3½ " 4 "	4,000	8,000	2,000	6,000	
Sajikhar and Jowakhar		500	1,000	None	1,000	

Articles	At what price purchased in Calcutta, or where manufactured or grown	Estimated prime cost amount of Imports in Co.'s Rupees.	At what price sold in Nepal, in Nepalese Rupees	Amount of goods transported to Bhoote	Amount of goods consumed in all Nepal	REMARKS
Ranga, Tin ⁿ	" " 12 " per maund	16,000	32,000	1,500	30,500	in quantity equal to the demand of the government, who therefore prohibit all export to Tibet of that which comes from the plains. The transports or exports to Tibet are therefore clandestine.
Jasta, Pewter	" " 4 " "	19,000	38,000	None	38,000	
Lead	" " 4 " "	10,000	20,000	"	20,000	
Steel	" 12 " 16 " "	4,000	8,000	"	8,000	
Gun flints,° European	" 1 " 1½ " per 100	6,000	12,000	None	12,000	The Népálese want skill to work their Sulphur mines profitably.
Europe-made guns, of sorts	" 250 " 600 " each	11,000	22,000	"	22,000	
Monghyr-made ditto	" 10 " 35 " "	2,000	4,000	"	4,000	"Opium is in great demand in Tibet just now. A very insufficient quantity gets there <i>via</i> Népál at present. It is procured by the Népálese furtively, in the Tarai, from our ryots between the Narayani and Bagmatti.
English knivas and scissors	" 4 as " 2 " "	1,200	2,400	300	2,100	
English needles, etc.	From 11 as to 1½	1,500	3,000	None	3,000	
Ditto iron and brass-ware	Rs. per 100	600	1,200	"	1,200	
Atter of Ghazeepore, Jaunpore,	" 1 " 15 " per tolah.	6,000	12,000	None	12,000	"Népál is full of copper and iron and the people have great skill in working them.
Choha oil ditto	" 12 as " 1 " per seer.	1,200	2,400	"	2,400	
Keorah Water	" 8 as " 1½ " "	1,000	2,000	"	2,000	Tin, lead and zinc they get from below, and a variety of mixed metals. Népál pro-
Abir	" 4 " 7 " per maund	5,000	10,000	"	10,000	
Saffron of Cashmeer	" 6 " 8 as per tolah	1,500	3,000	"	3,000	
Lobhan	" 20 " 24 Rs. per maund	3,500	7,000	"	7,000	
Paun of Behar and Bengal	" 1 " 4 as per dholi	2,500	7,000	"	7,000	
Cocoonut Hookah bottoms	" 3 " 10 Rs. per 100	600	1,200	"	1,200	

Articles	At what price purchased in Calcutta, or where manufactured or grown	Estimated prime cost amount of Imports in Co.'s Rupees.	At what price sold in Nepal, in Nepalese Rupees	Amount of goods transported to Bhote	Amount of goods consumed in all Nepal	REMARKS
Almonds ^a	" " 6 " per maund	3,000	6,000	"	6,000	duces plenty of zinc, but no
Dates.....	" " 5 " "	1,800	3,600	"	3,600	skill to work the mines.
Cocoanuts.....	" " 12 " "	3,000	6,000	"	6,000	^a The whole Goorkha
Dakh raisins.....	" " 16 " "	500	1,000	"	1,000	army, which is armed with
Makhanah.....	" " 7 " "	400	800	"	800	muskets, is supplied with
Desee betel nut.....	" 4 " 5½ " "	5,000	10,000	500	9,500	flints from below, chiefly from
Ditto ditto Dakheni pepper, (Black).....	" 9 " 11 " "	10,000	20,000	2,000	18,000	Calcutta.
Cloves.....	" " 25 " "	14,000	28,000	2,000	26,000	For English fowling-
Nutmegs.....	" " 1½ " per 100	4,000	8,000	1,000	7,000	pieces and hard-ware, there
Pepal.....	" 8 " 10 " per maun	800	1,600	200	1,400	is a always a considerable
Assafoeida.....	" 16 " 30 " "	5,500	11,000	1,000	10,000	demand in Népal; guns priced
Mace.....	" " 155 " "	6,000	12,000	None	12,000	between 250 to 500 rupees
Cinnamon.....	" 13 " 14 " "	2,500	5,000	"	5,000	sell very well, and so do good
Zaera.....	" 6 " 9 " "	2,000	4,000	"	4,000	plain scissors and needles.
Small Cardamums.....	" 3 " 6½ " per seer	4,000	8,000	"	8,000	Our scissors are also in de-
Jetmudh or Moolhati.....	" " " "	500	1,000	"	1,000	mand in Bhote, and if we
Gugal.....	" 6 " 7 Rs. per maund	600	1,200	"	1,200	would condescend to work
Nasadar.....	" 7 " 9 " "	1,200	2,400	"	2,400	upon the models prescribed
Dry ginger.....	" 3 " 4 " "	1,000	2,000	"	2,000	by the usage of these coun-
Mangrela or Kalonjee.....	" 2½ " 3 " "	300	600	"	600	tries, we might obtain a large
Akarkora.....	" 18 " 22 " "	300	600	"	600	vent in them for our hard-
Bakkam wood.....	" 9 " 11 " "	2,500	5,000	"	5,000	ware, of most sorts.
Kusum flower.....	" 8 " 13 " "	6,000	12,000	"	12,000	^a Both Népal and Tibet
						constantly require and con-

Articles	At what price purchased in Calcutta, or where manufactured or grown	Estimated prime cost amount of Imports in Co.'s Rupees.	At what price sold in Nepal, in Nepalese Rupees	Amount of goods transported to Bhoté	Amount of goods consumed in all Nepal	REMARKS
Tund ditto		500	1,000	None	1,000	sume a large quantity of tropical spicery, drugs and dried fruits, and both countries repay India with large returns of drugs and samples peculiar to either region. Of the number and value of the medicinal substances furnished to commerce by these countries, European medical men are strangely uninformed. ¶Within the last fifteen years the gentry of Népál have become universally horsemen. The Court makes large and regular purchases, and pays usually, not in money, but in elephants, the produce of its Tarai territories. This sort of barter answers equally well to both parties in the transaction.
Tutea		900	1,800	"	1,800	
Surma	" ½ " 1 a. per tolah.	300	600	"	600	
Moordasankh	" 5 " 6 Rs. per maund	200	400	"	400	
Mahawur		250	500	"	500	
Golali	" " 15 " "	150	3,000	"	3,000	
Tokhumbalanga and Ispoghol.	600	600	1,200	"	1,200	
Sendhu salt	" 8 " 10 " "	500	1,000	"	1,000	
Kattah	" " 3 " "	400	800	"	800	
Soap, soft, Indian	" " 8 " "	1,200	2,400	"	2,400	
Dry leaf, tobacco	" 5 " 7 " "	10,000	8,000	"	12,000	
Chooree and Tikooleem, from Benáres and Ghazeepore	" 4 as " 2 " per pair.	1,500	3,000	None	3,000	

Articles	At what price purchased in Calcutta, or where manufactured or grown	Estimated prime cost amount of imports in Co.'s Rupees.	At what price sold in Nepal, in Nepalese Rupees	Amount of goods transported to Bhote	Amount of goods consumed in all Nepal	REMARKS
Peacocks' feathers		400	800	"	800	"Small mirrors are in equal demand for Népal and for Tibet.
Chapra Lakh	" 11 " 18 " per mannd	500	1,000	"	1,000	"Not merely wall-shades and chandeliers, but tumblers, wine-glasses, and lanterns sell well at Káthmándú. The people are beginning to use our crockery and glass-ware at their tables.
Hookah snakes	From 1 a to 1 Re. each	250	500	None	500	The Tibetans never had any scruples about using our plates, dishes, and glasses. China however supplies them with crockery. For fine glass-ware they cause some de-
Tazez horses	" 300 " 1200 "	30,000	60,000	"	60,000	
Indian horse apparatus	"	1,000	2,000	"	2,000	
Buffaloes	" 3 " 12 "	41,000	1,23,000	"	1,23,000	
Goats, etc.	" 6 as " 1½ "	11,500	34,500	"	34,500	
Arhur doll	" 1 " per maund	500	1,000	"	1,000	
Sugar	" 5 " 7 "	5,600	11,200	1,000	10,200	mand.
Sugar candy	" 15 " 18 "	3,000	6,000	None	6,000	
English looking-glasses'	" 1 a. " 15 " each	3,000	6,000	400	5,600	
English glass-ware'		5,000	10,000	2,000	8,000	
Grand Total Rs		16,11,000	30,60,500	3,56,900	27,03,600	

GENERAL OBSERVATION.

Of the seven headings under which the information continued in this paper is arranged, the first and last speak for themselves, the others may be helped by illustration. The purpose of the second heading is, chiefly, to afford a useful hint as to the usual *quality* of the goods required for this market. A comparison of headings 3 and 4 will give the average profits upon the trade realized at Káthmándú, at

100 to 135

this time, after allowance has been made for the difference of Kuldar and Népálese rupees

(13½ to 16)

and for the expenses of duties and carriage on account of both, which latter may be seen in No. I., *so far as the Népálese Territories are concerned*; and for the rest of the way, through our own territories, the means of accurate information are in everybody's hands. I may as well, however, observe, that according to the statements of Népálese merchants of credit, the costs on account of Custom House charges, in our territories,* reach 7 percent of the value of the goods, half of the sum being paid at Calcutta and the other half to various of the Customs on the way up. Every Custom House examiner on the river, they affirm, must be propitiated, and no doubt there is some truth in this assertion. The more's the pity! These two headings (3 and 4) may likewise, by showing the *proportionate* amounts of the several sorts of goods required, and by indicating, though less accurately of course, the total amounts of annual transactions, serve to regulate commercial adventure in the first instance, and afterwards to point out to the merchant and to the government, by collation with the known wants and means of their regions, the enlargement of which this commerce is probably capable. And by a reference to the same circumstances, in conjunction with the matter of headings 5 and 6, which show how much of the imports is consumed in Népál, and how much transported to the North, the intelligent merchant may gather further hints for the guidance of his conduct both present and prospective, and Government further indications relative to the probable future importance of the

*By Treaty they ought to be 2½ only.

commerce in question. Where there is no such thing as statistical records, or, at least none accessible to the stranger, we must be contented with the best opinions and estimate within our reach; and these which I have given have been gathered with care from native merchants of high respectability. So much for the form of the paper. In regard to its substance, I know not that much can be added to the marginal remarks. It appears (columns 3 and 4), that whilst traffic is languishing all over the world, almost for want of compensating profits, the merchants of Népál are procuring from 50 to 100 per cent, advance upon Calcutta prices at Káthmándú upon their speculations in European woollens, chintzes, hardware and glassware, as well as upon those in Indian cotton stuffs of all sorts, spicery, drugs, dyes and pelagic produce, such as pearls and coral, and, in a word, upon the great mass of their commercial transactions. This fact, when taken in connection with the rapidity of the returns upon these speculations, is demonstrative of itself, that the trade in question is capable of an easy, immediate, and considerable extension. It must be remembered, however, that the 100 per cent of profit in question is not actually such, but only 200 Népálese for 100 Sicca rupees, which proportion of 2 to 1, when reduced to one denomination of coin, is only* 27 to 16. It must be further remembered that this profit, or rather advance on Calcutta prices, is exclusive of the costs in duties and carriage. When, however, due allowance has been made on both these scores, there will still remain a net or real profit of 30 per cent., which is quite sufficient to support the inference based on it. There is one general remark in reference to the trade of Bhote that I cannot forbear making. It is this, that whereas, at present, of the whole goods imported from the plains, the greater portion is consumed in Népál, and a small portion only transported to the North, the reverse of this ought naturally to be the case with reference to the relative means and wants of the two countries. But Népál has already sensibly felt the benign influence of a pacific intercourse with us; Tibet has yet to receive it. Its indirect extension beyond the snows, however, though slower, must be equally certain with its prevalence on this side of them. Népál being within the reach of those whom it concerns to note *particulars* relative to this commerce, I shall pass on to such as belong

*Popular standard—Calcutta assay gives the value of Siccas to Moháris thus—100 of former to 135¼ of latter.

to the Tibetan branch of it, and observe that the great staples exported through Népal to that country have heretofore been English broad cloth, pearls, and coral. Of the two latter, there is said to be just now a superfluity in Tibet, but the former is in good demand. The best *qualities* are those from 8 to 15 rupees per yard; the best *colours* liver, imperial purple, scarlet, yellow, lively green, and clean brown. Three or four times the quantity now sent there might at once be profitably transmitted by one who knew well the markets of Calcutta and Káthmándú, and had an establishment at the latter place, and such an one might also realise a large profit upon the transmission of select hardware, glassware, and peltry.

Opium and indigo are now in great demand in Tibet, and there is good reason to believe that a large quantity of both articles might be annually sent there with great advantage to the transmitter. Not merely the Tibetans, but the neighbouring Mongolians and Chinese, would eagerly purchase opium if they could get it at Lhása or Digarchee. How far the Company's regulations interfere with the export of this drug in this direction, I cannot say; but those whom it concerns can easily ascertain. The present Calcutta prices are four times as great as those at which the Népalése merchants now purchase, the small quantity they can procure clandestinely, and which is all that is transmitted to Tibet.

TRADE OF NEPAL No. II—EXPORTS

Export (of Tibetan and Nepálese Goods) to the Plains in 1830-31)

Articles	Prices at Káthmándú Népálese Rupees	Estimated amount of Imports from the North in Népálese Ru- pees.	Estimated total amount of Exports of Tíbetan, Kachar, and Népálese Goods in Népálese Rupees.	Estimated amount of Goods consumed in Népál in Népálese Ru- pees.	Produce of place	REMARKS
Gold						
1st sort or Kundun	24 Rupees per tolah	20,000	20,000	None	Tíbet	<p style="text-align: center;">Bringing Gold from Bhot to Népál answers well as a commercial speculation, chiefly owing to the intervention of the adulterated coin of Bhot. Transporting to the plains is not profitable, but Silver and Indian Rupees being prohibited, the merchants of Népál, who have now more to buy than to sell below, carry down Gold to meet the difference, since they can dispose of it without loss, and look to gain from the returns. The Gold brought from Bhot is usually very impure. The Népálese refine it and gain by the craft. Much is used for ornaments in Népál, little for coin.</p>
2d sort	22 do do	90,000	80,000	10,000		
3d sort	20 do do	60,000	40,000	20,000		
4th sort or Bukee	13 do do	45,000	30,000	15,000		
5th sort (white or bad)	From 13 to 17 Rs. per tolah	15,000	5,000	10,000		
Silver	Paid by Government Mono- poly 15 and 1/100 per old Kuldar weight	10,000	None	10,000	Ditto	<p style="text-align: center;">The chief coinage of Népál is of Silver, and much less than is required</p>

Articles	Prices at Káthmándú Népálese Rupees	Estimated amount of Imports from the North in Népálese Ru- pees.	Estimated total amount of Exports of Tibetan, Kachar, and Népálese Goods in Népálese Rupees.	Estimated amount of Goods consumed in Népál in Népálese Ru- pees.	Produce of place	REMARKS
Musk Pods—						comes from the North, hence its transport to the Plains is prohibited, and all that is brought her is necessarily made over to the Government, which, with a shortsighted policy, perpetuating the short supply, pays the importer less than a just price. The Silver is weighed against old Kuldars, and paid for in Népál Rupees at 113 per 100 Kuldars. The Bazar rate is 120, the Calcutta assay 135¾ nearly.
1st sort or Kagazee	From 64 to 70 Rs. per seer of 32 Sa. Wt.....		35,000			
2d ditto or Ga nouta.....	60 Rs. per seer.....		8,000			
3d ditto or Kacha ree.....	From 45 to 50 Rs. per seer.	75,000	12,000	5,000	Ditto	
4th ditto or Nekha na, or 2½ Musk free of the Pod..	Do. 4½ to 5½ Rs. per tolah.		15,000			
Revand Chinese ... Borax.....	8 Rupees per seer From 4 to 5 as. per seer	Caret 16,000	Caret 13,000	Caret 3,000	Ditto and Sifán Tibet and Digar- chee	Bhot or Tibet produces the finest Musk, Rhubarb, and Borax in the world. Borax is, I think, an exclusive product of Tibet. A deal of Rhubarb is exported from Bhot for Europe <i>via</i> Siberia and Russia, and also <i>via</i> China and the Occan. It would answer well to get it <i>via</i> Népál, but Europeans have never sought it hence, and the natives know not its use. The European demand for Musk is very slack now—has it lost its repute as a medicine.
Hurtal (Mejensoor)..	Do. 12 as to 1 Re. do.....	13,000	12,000	1,000	Ditto 1 Re. per Shoenee	
Charas	Do. 1 to 2 Rs. do.....	6,500	3,500	3,000	Népálese Kachar.	
Wax.....	Do. 12 as to 1 Re. do.....	13,000	7,000	6,000	Ditto	
Honey.....	5 annas per seer.....	1,400	400	1,000	Ditto	
Paper.....	Do. 5 to 6 as. do.....	8,500	5,000	3,500	Ditto	
Zahr Mohara.....	Do. 1½ to 4 Rs. do.....	1,200	1,000	200	Kathai or North- ern China proper	The Paper of Népál is an admirable article, which ought to

Articles	Prices at Káthmándú Népálese Rupees	Estimated amount of Imports from the North in Népálese Ru- pees.	Estimated total amount of Exports of Tibetan, Kachar, and Népálese Goods in Népálese Rupees.	Estimated amount of Goods consumed in Népál in Népálese Ru- pees.	Produce of place	REMARKS
Silajeet, white and black.....	Do. 5 to 8 as, do	4,000	2,500	1,500	Kachar	be substituted for the flimay paper of the Plains, for the records of every Office in Ben- gal.
Bikhma.....	From 6 to 8 as per seer	2,500	2,000	500	Kachar	In the Pharmacy of India, Mahomedan as well as Hindoo, the drugs of the Kachar and of Tibet enjoy the highest re- pute, many selling far above their weight in gold, and in great quantities. European medical men seem almost ut- terly ignorant of them, though they are to be found in most of the druggists' shops of the great cities of India. Comes through Lhása, and sells chiefly in Lucknow, Nagpore, and Hydrabad. It is, I believe, the famous Ginseng. Its price seems absurdly high. Be it what it will, it comes through Lhása. The Tea is chiefly pro- duced in Setchuen, and is commonly compacted into cakes, like Chocolate, or Co- coa. The Bhotéas universally consume the substance of the Tea triturated and made up for
Nirbisi.....	1 Re. do. do.	800	500	300	Kathai	
Padmchal	From 3 to 4 as do. do.	1,000	700	300	Kachar	
Jatamangsi.....	Do. 8 to 12 do. do. do.	10,000	8,000	2,000	Ditto and Kooti	
Kutki.....	3 annas do. do	2,500	1,800	700	Helma, Listy, Ka- char, and Lekh	
Mehr Gya.....	From 130 to 150 Rs. p. tolah	5,000	5,000	None	China	
Tanzoo.....	Caret	Caret	Caret	Kathai	
Chiraitah.....	6 as, per seer	2,500	2,000	500	Kachar	
Mamira.....	From 2 to 4 as per tolah	700	300	400	Kathai	
Tea.....	Do. 2 to 3 Rs. per seer	4,500	2,500	2,000	Tibet	
Walnut.....	1 Ré. per hundred	1,400	400	1,000	Ditto and Kachar	
Halva Bedud.....	From 1½ to 2 Rs. per seer	1,600	600	1,000	Tibet	
Dakh Raiins.....	2 Rs. do. do.	1,000	None	1,000	Ditto	
Bhotea Bair.....	Do. 1 to ½ Rs. do. do	400	200	200	Ditto	

Articles	Prices at Kathmandu Népalése Rupees	Estimated amount of Imports from the North in Népalése Ru- pees.	Estimated total amount of Exports of Tibetan, Kachar, and Népalése Goods in Népalése Rupees.	Estimated amount of Goods consumed in Népal in Népalése Ru- pees.	Produce of place	REMARKS
Salt (Rock).....	3 annas do. do.	1,50,000	None	1,50,000	Ditto	convenience of carriage as above
Cow-tail (white).....	From 1½ to 2 Rs. do. do.	27,000	26,000	1,000	Ditto	noted and not like us and the Chi- nese; the mere infusion. Tea,
Ditto (black).....	Do. 1 to 1¼ do. do. do.	25,000	24,000	1,000	Ditto	however, such as we purchase in China, may be had at Lhása in
Shawls.....	Do. 60 to 100 Rs. pr. pair	2,000	None	2,000	Ladak	any quantity that is called for, and some of it is annually brought to Népal.
Toos, ½ by 30 yards.	Do. 24 to 45 Ra pr. piece	5,000	2,500	2,500	Pechin	All Népal proper and its adjacencies is supplied with Salt from Tibet. It is Rock Salt, and
Ditto, ditto.....	Do. 15 to 21 do. do.....	3,500	1,500	2,000	Siling	very good. The Government lev- ies no duty on it. As there cannot
Malidah, ½ by 12 yards.....	Do. 14 to 24 do. do.....	4,000	2,500	1,500	Lhása	be less than 100,000 families in the limits contemplated, nor the families consume, on an average,
Namdah 1½ by 2 yards.....	Do. 8 to 12 do. do.....	2,000	1,500	500	Ditto	less than half a pice worth per day, I should take the import to
Pankhi, 1 cubit by 6 to 9 yards.....	Do. 1½ to 3 do. do.....	2,500	1,000	1,500	Kachar	reach 2¼ lakhs; my informants, however, say not.
Bhot Blanket, 1 by 15 cubits.....	Do. 2 to 3 do. do.....	5,000	2,000	3,000	Kooti, Keroong and Kachar	Toos and Malidah are loosely woven, flannel-like, very narrow cloths, made of excellent wool-
Rarhi Blanket.....	Do. 2 to 4½ do. do.....	7,000	3,000	4,000	Ditto ditto	wretched substitutes for good Broad Cloth, but the best within
Chourput.....	Do. 1 to 1½ do. do.....	800	200	600	Ditto ditto	the ordinary reach of the Bhotéas, who, though they all wear wool-
Namboo, 1 span by 22 yards.....	Do. 4½ to 16 do. do.....	8,000	None	8,000	Ditto ditto	lens throughout the year, have not a single good manufacture of
Tur or Sambur.....	Do. 60 to 80 do. do.....	4,500	1,500	3,000	Lhása	their own, nor can China furnish

Articles	Prices at Káthmándú Népálese Rupees	Estimated amount of Imports from the North in Népálese Ru- pees.	Estimated total amount of Exports of Tibetan, Kachar, and Népálese Goods in Népálese Rupees.	Estimated amount of Goods consumed in Népál in Népálese Ru- pees.	Produce of place	REMARKS
Cakum (a kind of fur).....	Do. 80 to 150 Rs. each.....	2,800	1,300	1,500	Ditto	them with anything better than Toos and Malidah. Half the nation would be clothed by Britain if such com- mercial relations as time and pru- dent activity may establish pre- vailed. The Toos and Malidah sell at a good profit in the Plains, Sircars, and upper servants liking them for chudders. Namdah and the rest to Namboo are blankets of good wool but very coarse and heavy save the Chourput, which is light and finer. It is made of the inner coat of the chowree ox or yák: the others of sheeps wool. The Kachar blankets sell well in the plains to the poor, being warmer and more durable than Indian blankets. Some of the former are felted, not woven.
Choowa Khal.....	From 40 to 80 Rs. each.....	2,500	1,200	1,300	Ditto	Bhoolea and Sansu are much used by the Népálese women, but the Satins, Silks, and Velvets of China are in Népál generally giving way before our Broad Cloths and Velvets.
Garbsoot (Peltry).....	Do 12 to 23 do. do.	700	200	500	Ditto	Comes through Lhása.
Cochin or Satin.....	Do 2½ to 6 do. pr. yard	15,000	9,000	6,000	China	Vases, Sword-handles, Snuff Boxes, & c., come ready made of Yú. The unwrought stone is not brought. It is called oriental jade by its ana- lyser.
Bhooleea and Sansu (Silka), 1½ by 2½ yards.....	Do 4½ to 6 do. pr. piece	2,000	None	2,000	Ditto	
Velvet of Pechin.....	Do 8 to 16 do. do.	3,000	do.	3,000	Ditto	
Kummerbund (Silk), 1½ by 9 cubits.....	Do. 9 to 13 do. do.	500	do.	500	Lhása	
China Sewing Silk	8 annas per tolah.....	1,200	do.	1,200	China	
Sphatic or Crystal	From 1-5 to 2 Rs. pr. seer	2,500	1,500	1,000	Helmoo and Kachar	
Yú or Oriental jade.....	700	200	500	Lhása	
Sang-yesham.....	1,200	200	1,000	Ditto	
Hawk (female).....	From 25 to 40 Rs. each	12,000	10,000	2,000	Lhása an Keroong	

Articles	Prices at Káthmándú Népálese Rupees	Estimated amount of Imports from the North in Népálese Ru- pees.	Estimated total amount of Exports of Tibetan, Kachar, and Népálese Goods in Népálese Rupees.	Estimated amount of Goods consumed in Népál in Népálese Ru- pees.	Produce of place	REMARKS
Hawk (male).....	Do. 15 to 26 do. do.....	6,000	5,000	1,000	Ditto ditto	The bird in question, known by the name of Baaz below, and by the Tibetans called Sáyl, is a large tractable species of the short-winged kind of true Hawk. It is by far the best known to Indian Falconry, and is set all over the Deccan, as well as Hindostan. It is the Goshawk of Europeans. Female called Báz; male, Jürra.
Tangan (Pony).....	Do. 40 to 120 do. do.	10,000	7,000	3,000	Ladakh, Mosting, Pūmi, and Junla	
Sheep and Goat, & c. (Changra)	Sheep 1½ to 3 Rs. do..... Changra 1 to 1½ do..... Khasee 2½ to 5 do.....	8,500	None	8,500	Népálese Kachar	
Copper Pots, & c.....	From 1 Rd 10 as. to Rs. p. sr.	4,5000	Népál	These mountains are not favourable to Sheep or goats, and as the people consume a deal of their flesh, large numbers are annually brought to Népál proper, both from the juxta Himálayan tracts where they flourish and from the Plains. None are exported.
Copper Pice	20 gundas per Rupee	250,000	Ditto	
Mahindramalee Ru- pees.....	13 as. 4 p. Sicca each.....	2,20,000	Ditto	Mahindramalee Rupees are the Rupees of Népál. They are exported only, because the exportation of Siccas or of silver is prohibited. At Káthmándú the exchange in the bazar against Siccas is fixed by authority at 120 to 100. It ought to be by Calcutta assay 135 to 100, and in the Tarai the Népál merchants are glad to get 100 Siccas for 130
Iron Phowrahs, Koo- dalties, & c.....	From 4 to 5 seers pr. Rupee	5,000	Ditto	
Khookree or Népálese short Sword.....	Do. 8 as to 10 Rs. each	1,000	Ditto	

Articles	Prices at Káthmándú Népálese Rupees	Estimated amount of Imports from the North in Népálese Ru- pees.	Estimated total amount of Exports of Tibetan, Kacher, and Népálese Goods in Népálese Rupees.	Estimated amount of Goods consumed in Népál in Népálese Ru- pees.	Produce of place	REMARKS	
Brasa Pots, & c.....	1 Re. 10 as. per seer.....	1,000	Ditto	Mahindramalees. Népál is full of fine copper, and supplies copper currency to the whole tract of the plains between the Ganges and the Hills, Monghyr and Pillibheet. Iron too abounds in Népál, and much coarse Hardware is exported to the same tract of the plains. There are Lead, Sulphur, and Zinc mines in Népál, but no skill to work them profitably. A deal of each is imported from the plains, and also of Tin, with which last, and with the Zinc got from us, the Népálese mix their own Copper, and make a great variety of mixed metals in a superior style. From the article Copper Pots to the end, the whole are the produce of Népál, except the silver of the Népál rupees. Of course, therefore, the column indicating the quantities imported from Tibet is blank, and as the entire almost of the articles produced in the Népálese Tarai is exported to the plains, and no part of them consumed in Népál, the column indicating local consumption is likewise a blank. It was not thought worth while to alter the form of the paper	
Elephants.....	From 100 to 700 Rupees per elephant.....	67,200	Népálese Tarai in common parlance, but really Forest and lesser Hills		
Ivory.....	Do. 1 Re. 4 as. to 2 Rs. p. seer	400			
Bootwal, Horses.....	Do. 40 to 150 Rs. each.....	45,000			
Wax.....	Do. 12 as to 1 do. pr. seer	7,000			
Honey.....	Do. 5 to 8 as. do.	3,000			
Ganja.....	Caret.....	3,500			
Bháng.....	From 5 to 7 as. per maund	2,000			Népálese Tarai in common parlance, but really Forest and lesser Hills
Harra, bahera, Aonla	Do. 8 to 12 as, do.....	3,000			
Small Harra.....	Do. 3 to 4½ Rs. do.....	5,000			
Bootwal Chasas.....	Do. 3 to 3½ do. do.....	4,500			
Large Cardamoms.....	Do. 5 to 6½ do do.....	6,000	Hills		
Charaitah	Caret.....	2,000			
Resin of the Saul- tree.....	4 Rupees per maund.....	12,000			

Articles	Prices at Káthmándú Népálese Rupees	Estimated amount of Imports from the North in Népálese Ru- pees.	Estimated total amount of Exports of Tibetan, Kachar, and Népálese Goods in Népálese Rupees.	Estimated amount of Goods consumed in Népál in Népálese Ru- pees.	Produce of place	REMARKS
Taj.....	From 1 to 2 Rs. do.....	2,500	Népál Tarai	for the sake of these articles, which have no interest for the great foreign merchant. The Népálese Saul Forest is an inexhaustible mine of timber. Saul and Sissoo are the most valuable kinds of produce. The open low lands of Népál have been wonderfully resuscitated by the continued peace and alliance with our Government, and the energy of the Népálese administration since 1816. No regular troops are maintained there by the Government, and the Civil establishment is one a very moderate scale, nor do any of the mountaineers holding lands reside there. The whole net produce of the land, consequently, is exported to Patna, & c., and chiefly on Government account. It is paid for in money therefore, and these low lands not only supply the Government of Népál with bullion for its currency, but enable it to furnish itself with the luxuries of the plains, and to maintain the balance of a trade which, so far as the hill produce is concerned, is always apt to be against Népál.
Tezpaut.....	Do. do.....	4,000		
Pipala.....	From 5 to 6 Rs. do.....	3,000		
Kuth (Terrajapon).....	Caret.....	4,500		
Moosli, Chiriakand, & c.....	1 Rupee per bullock-load	1,200		
Stag Horn.....	From 1 to 2 as per horn	1,200	Népál Tarai	
Deer Skins.....	Caret.....	1,000		
Timber.....	Caret.....	3,00,000		
Grain.....	Caret.....	6,60,000		
Ox and Buffalo Skins Do Horns	Caret..... Caret.....	1,00,000		
	Népál.....	7,27,400	19,77,800	3,12,700		
	Sicca Rupees.....	6,06,16,610	10,64,835,	42,60,583	54	

GENERAL OBSERVATION

I regard to the trade of Népál, or rather to the trade through Népál, the principal objects of interest for the foreign merchant of every country, and especially for the European merchant, must be the production and consumption of the great *trans-Himalayan* countries. On this account I have arranged the information. I possess relative to the exports under heads calculated to show where the articles exported through Népál are produced; what quantity of them is, at present, consumed in Népál; and what quantity is transmitted to the plains. But I have adhered to the Káthmándú prices, because I know not the prices of Tibet, and because for the immediate benefit of those for whom I write, the Káthmándú price will suffice. It appear by Part I., that the prime cost value of imports from, the South per annum is 16,11,000 Sicca Rupees; by part II, that the value of the Annual Exports to the South at Káthmándú is 12,77,800 of Népálese Rupees, which last sum is equivalent to 10,64,833-5-4 of Sicca Rupees. And as this disparity, if not supposed to be counterpoised, as I pretend not to say it is, by a "favourable balance" upon the Northern branch of the Trade, may excite sceptical remark, I must observe first, that the Imports of 1830-31 from the South were raised one and a half lakhs above the ordinary standard, with reference to the Trade in general, by an extraordinary amount of purchases on the part of the Government. With reference to these unusual purchases. I would suggest the following reductions to those who wish to form as exact an idea as possible of the present average imports:—

Velveta	5,000
Kimkhabs	12,000
Pearls	15,000
Coral	25,000
Diamonds and Rubies	25,000
Saltpetre	20,000
Horses	20,000
								1,22,000 Sicca Rupees

Let us say, then, that the Imports are reduced from 16,11,000 to fifteen lakhs of siccas, and that the Exports remain at 10,64,833 Siccas as before, the difference is about four and a half lakhs; and upon its I confess I have no accurate information to supply. Statistical documents alone could supply, with precise accuracy, the amount of Imports and Exports; none such have I the means of referring to. Let, then, the *rest* of the Information contained in both parts of No. II be taken as trustworthy, and let no further reliance be placed upon the *totality of the transactions* than its conjectural character may seem to warrant. It should be observed, however, that though the total amounts of Imports and Exports may err materially, the proportional amount of the several articles of them may still be nearly accurate, and such I verily believe they are; and being such, it is imagined they must be of material practical utility. For the rest, the marginal notes contain all the detailed information. I have to supply upon the Exports of Népál.

(Signed)

B.H. HODGSON
Officiating Resident

NÉPÁL RESIDENCY,
The 1st December 1831

(True Copies)
B.H. HODGSON

APPENDIX - G

PROPOSED DRAFT TREATY 1852

1. The Resident engages that in every case of offence by a subject of Nepal against a follower of the Residency, the trial and sentence of the offender shall rest entirely with the Darbar.
2. The Resident undertakes that in every each case, wherein the offender may be apprehended within the presincts of the Residency, or may otherwise, fall into the Resident's hand instantly to make him over to the Darbar.
3. The Maharaja engages that in every case of offence by a follower of the Residency against the subject of Nepal, the accused shall in the first instance, and, immediately after his apprehension by the Nepalese authorities, be surrendered to the Residency.
4. The Maharaja engages that the trial so far the ascertainment of guilty of innocence, is carried of every offending follower of the Residency shall rest entirely with the Resident.
5. The Resident engages that upon the close of every trial terminating in the conviction of the accused, and, in which the genuinness of offences proved consists in a violation of the policy of a Hindu State or any other particular national customs of the Nepalese, he will not pass sentence according to the Company's Regulations, but, as far as possible, according to the law of Nepal.
6. In consideration for differences manifested by the Resident in Articles 5 towards the peculiar jurisprudence

of the kingdom of Nepal, the Maharaja engages in every case of the sort contemplated by the law of Nepal, to be satisfied with such communication of the sentence into transportation of imprisonment for life or for years as may deem adequate by the Resident in friendly conference with Darbar.

7. Should the Resident in any such case as those referred to Article 5 and 6 fails to satisfy the Darbar in friendly conference as to the adequacy of the proposed committed sentence, and, the penalty by the Nepalese Law be death or mutilation, the Maharaja agrees that proceedings shall be stayed and the offender remain in the Resident's custody pending a reference to the Governor General-in-Council.

8. In all cases wherein the circumstances proved a follower of the Residency be wilful murder, heinous robbery, rape or offence universally acknowledged to be served death, the Resident engages that the offender shall suffer capitally.¹

1. FPC 4 February 1833, No. 58.

APPENDIX - H

DRAFT TREATY OF COMMERCE - 1835

Preamble

Whereas the protection of Commerce tends to promote friendship between States by calling forth the advantages of international intercourse, it has therefore pleased the Honourable Sir C.J. Metcalf Baronet, Governor General of India, on the part of the Honourable Company, and His highness Maharajadhiraja Rajendra Birvikram Sag on the part of Nepal, to conclude the following treaty of commerce, consisting of 9 article.

ARTICLE - I

The produces and manufactures of Nepal and Tibet shall pay an import duty of 4 percent Khuldar, advalorem of the selling prices, according to the market rates, in the Company's dominions and the produces and manufactures of British India and Europe shall pay an import duty of 5 percent Mahendra Mulli advalorem of the selling price and according to the market rates in the dominions of Nepal.

ARTICLE - II

No other or further duty or import of any kind shall be levied on the goods of either state in the territories of the other whether the merchants, from inability to sell, take his goods back whence he came or forward beyond the dominions of the respective States.

ARTICLE - III

The fixed advalorem duty of 4 per cent Kuldar and 5 percent Mahendra Mulli; currency should be levied at one time and place and the merchants shall at the time and place, be furnished with a full discharge.

ARTICLE - IV

The following places in the dominions of either states are fixed on as the sole stations where at custom duty can or shall be levied, viz., in the Company's provinces: Dhaca, Cuttack, Murshidabad, Chhtagong, Mirzapur, Cawnpur, Agra, Bareilly, Gazipur, Hoogly, Patna, Benaras, Allahabad, Furrackabad, Meerut, Delhi, Calcutta and in the dominion of Nepal as follows:

District	Custom House	District	Custom House
Morung	Rangeli	Saptari	Rampur, Aurachi
Mahatari	Bhawanipur		Mashisoth
Bara	Laleshwar	Sarlahi	Begi, Bishnupur
Chitwan	Jhowani	Parsa	A low Cathery
Beloan		Pali	Pali
Butwal	Kotwali Choutara	Khajaini	Aurchya
Sheuraj	Ganeshpur	Salyans	Dang
Piuthana	Sheugarhy	Doti	Brahmadeo
Dullu Dailekh	Dully Ranighat		Souryara Machheli
Nepal proper	Kathmandu		Bidpani Kalapani

ARTICLE - V

Officer of the Custom Department or other taking or attempting to take, under any name or excuse, any thing from the merchant beyond the fixed advelorem duty; or

taking or attempting to take the given sum otherwise than is provided for by articles III and IV shall be exceptarily punished by their own Government.

ARTICLE - VI

To the unoffending merchant of either state, the Court of Justice of the other state shall be accessible in like manner as they are so to its subjects, and justice shall neither be denied nor delayed to them, but their causes heard and decided according to the law.

ARTICLE - VII

Plaints of Nepalese merchants against the British custom house officer and their dependent and which plaints the said merchants have failed to procure due explanation from the collectors, shall be referred by the Darbar to the Resident who shall be bound to procure such explanation from the Collectors. And, in like manner plaints of British merchants against the Bhansari of Nepal and which the Bhansari has failed equitably to attend to, shall be referred by the Resident to the Darbar, when the Darbar shall be bound to procure and give to Resident full explanation of the circumstances of the case.

ARTICLE - VIII

Lists of the produce and manufacture of both sides shall be prepared and authenticated by the signature of the Governor General and of the Maharaja, for the guidance of the Customs Department; and articles heretofore free of duty on both sides shall be shown and so specified in these lists.

ARTICLE - IX

The Treaty of 1792 and of 1801 are hereby wholly rescinded and the present treaty substituted for them.

P.S.: Articles of the above treaty translated from the Parbattiah transcript delivered by the Darbar to Resident, March, 24th 1835.

APPENDIX - I

HEAD OF A LETTER FROM THE GOVERNOR GENERAL TO THE DARBAR 1837

Governor General expectation of improvements from the recent change founded upon the report excellent character of the Raja and the signal and recent proof given him of the superiority of the British Government to all artifices of the late minister opposed to His Highness's rights.

Disappointment of those hopes; two months having elapsed without least provision for conduct of current business or for maintenance of current courtesy more objection to policy and conduct of Darbar for twenty years past. Its inequality shameless manner in which Darbar has availed itself of every advantages whilst it has refused to reciprocate one, as far as refusal was possible-Chiefs of Nepal all grades travelling everywhere with favour and honour whilst gentlemen of the Residency refused to permission to excuse a few miles for recreation-meanwhile and other subject of Nepal treated in equal footing with our own below, whilst British subjects trading with the Hills harrassed with all kind of wanton impediment; Neither can come nor go, nor deal with special permission not allowed to expect the Company's coins tho(ugh) it alone will circulate below and subject, in the Court of justice too refusal and delay of decisions, often with open reproaches. British Government retaliates and do in future, in each particular Darbar does. By Treaty of Sugauly all is our that we held at the close of the war, in other words all to Makawanpor and Hamarpur Terai held by tenure of grace and avowed as a check may be

resumed. (See despatch of Secretary to Resident at Lucknow 3 June 1819 and Acting Resident at Nipal 19 June 1819) Darbar awares that in all discussions on Treaty, the Residency made by us the capital article and that it was with express to quiet Darbar on that head, that the Terai was given back. If then Darbar attempts to neutralise the Residency condition of gift of Terai token and Treaty violated in its chief article.

APPENDIX - J

TRANSLATION OF AN ENGAGEMENT UNDER THE RED SEAL, IN THE FORM OF A LETTER FROM THE MAHARAJA OF NIPAL TO THE GOVERNOR GENERAL OF INDIA, Dated 6 November 1839.

“According to your (Resident's) request and for the purpose of perpetuating the friendship of the two States as well as to promote the effectual discharge of current business the following items are fixed”.

- I All secret intrigues whatever, by messengers or letter, shall totally cease.
- II. The Nipal Government engages to have no further intercourse with the dependent allies of the Companies beyond the Ganges, who are by the Treaty precluded from such intercourse, except with the Resident's sanction and under his passports.
- III. With the Zamindars and Baboos on this side on the Ganges who are connected by marriage with the royal family of Nipal, intercourse of letters and persons shall remain open to Nipal Government as heretofore.
- IV. It is agreed to as a rule for the guidance of both Sircars that in judicial matters where civil causes arise there, they shall be heard and decided; and the Nipal Government engages that for the future British subjects shall not be compelled to plead in the Court of Nipal to Civil actions, having exclusive reference to their dealing in the plains.

- V. The Nipal Government engages that British Subjects shall hereafter be regarded as her own subjects in regards to access to the Court of Law, and that the causes of the former shall be heard and decided without denial or delay, according to the usages of Nipal.
- VI. The Nipal Government engaged that an authentic statement of all duties leviabie in Nipal shall be delivered to the Resident and that hereafter unauthorised imports not entered in this list shall be levied on British subjects.

APPENDIX - K

LAL MUHAR GRANTED BY THE RAJAH OF NEPAL TO THE MAHARANEE DATED NEPAL POCHSODI, I SAMBAT 1899 OR 1 JANUARY 1843

The Maha Ranee is aware that formerly the Heir-Apparent and myself had equal power and that the heir Apparent without provocation gave great troubles and punished and disgraced people without cause and that I did not interfere with him everything in this way became disorder. In consequence, the Gooroos and Priests, my relatives, my minister, all the chiefs, the army, the regiments, each company, the palace nurses and wardens and the other confidential menials and the on and off the role servants of the State, the ryots, both of the plains and hills of all castes petitioned saying that if such things were allowed the kingdom could not last and that justice must be done to all as was formerly customary in Nepal or else that they (petitioners) demanded their dismissal from office and leave to quit the country.

Therefore, to put a stop to such irregularities and to save the kingdom, I in the month of Marg Sodi Sambat 1899, agreed to the above petition and for the Heir Apparent and myself put my seal to it.

To all my people and subjects in Nepal, Let it be known to all that from today Maharanee Rajya Laxmi Devi should be considered the sovereign in Nepal, all should carry out her orders. I have willingly consented to this proposal and I am giving full powers in the administration to my wife voluntarily and agreeably. In these affairs I will be nothing against the consent and the order of my wife. I pledge my-

self to this. I am also order you that you will never carry out the orders of the Yuvaraj Surendra, and whoever shall carry out his order will be liable to punishment by the order of my wife from today. The following will be under the charge of my wife:

1. Power to inflict imprisonment, cuttings of limbs, transportation, death and loss of office over all subjects except members of royal family,
2. power to appoint officers of State, dismissing them, transferring, promotion and degrading them;
3. power to deal with foreign State like China, Tibet and British.
4. power to enter into treaty relations or war, with the above named foreign States as times dictate.

This order for the future Government of the kingdom according to its ancient laws, my Gooroos, minister, chiefs and soldier will strictly attend to, should any one disobey it according to his caste and by your orders shall be punished.

This is my ORDER.

Maha Raja Rajendra Vikram
Shah Deva-

APPENDIX - L

FAUNA OF NEPAL

By **S.H. Prater C.M.Z.S.**

Curator Bombay Natural History Society

INTRODUCTION

No account of the natural history of Nepal would be complete which did not mention Brian Houghton Hodgson, to whose labours we are indebted for almost all that is known, even to the present day, of the natural history of this wonderful country.

Hodgson was appointed Assistant Resident in Nepal in 1822; in 1833 he succeeded Sir Herbert Maddock as Resident and continued as such till 1843. After a year of retirement he returned to India in 1845. It was his intention to return to Nepal, but as the necessary permission for his residence in the State in a private capacity was not forthcoming, he lived at Darjiling in the neighbouring province of Sikkim, a country closely resembling Nepal in its climate, physical character, and its animal and plant life. After fifteen years residence in Darjiling. Hodgson left India for good in 1858 and passed away on the 23rd May 1894 in his ninety-fifth year.

Hodgson's vast collections of specimens, his drawings and manuscripts have been distributed among the great libraries and museums of England and the Continent. In addition to the specimens which he presented to the Asiatic Society of Bengal, the Museum of the East India Com-

pany and other public institutions between the years 1827 and 1843, he made two magnificent donations to the British Museum. The two collections placed at the disposal of the Museum, from which it made its selections included 9,512 specimens of birds, 993 of mammals, and 84 reptiles.

The available literature on the mammalia of Nepal is indeed comprised mainly of Hodgson's writings. His observations on the mammals of this country and of the neighbouring province of Sikkim laid the foundation of Himalayan mammology. Between the years 1830 and 1843 Hodgson contributed no less than eighty papers on mammals to scientific bodies mainly to the Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal; these observations include descriptions of thirty-nine new genera and species discovered by him. But though Hodgson's researches and collections are described as having "laid the foundations of Himalayan Mammology," the proper study of this material has been handicapped from the imperfect labelling of his specimens, so that a modern collection from the State of Nepal remained for many years a great desideratum.

The Bombay Natural history Society had between the years 1912 and 1924 conducted a survey of the mammals of India, Burma, and Ceylon, and although collections had been obtained from the neighbouring provinces of Kumaon and Sikkim, the much desired opportunity of making a collection within the State of Nepal was not forthcoming until, in 1921, thanks to the kindness of the Prime Minister of Nepal, permission was accorded to the Society to send Mr. N.A. Baptista, a trained Indian collector, into Nepal for the purpose of making a systematic collection of mammals from within the borders of the State. Baptista collected in Nepal during 1921-22 and again between 1922 and 1923. The entire material thus obtained was forwarded to the British Museum, and as a result a complete list of the mammals of Nepal, which includes species recorded by Hodgson, was published by Messrs. M.A.C. Hinton and T.B. Fry in the Journal of the Bombay Natural history Society (vol. xxix p.

399), while a supplementary report by Mr. Fry appeared in a subsequent issue (vol. xxx, no. 3).

Hodgson's greatest contribution to zoology is to be found, however, not in the department of mammals, but rather in the domain of bird life. During his residence at Kathmandu he was able to record the occurrence of no less than 563 different species of birds in the State of Nepal; of these quite 150 species of birds in the State of Nepal; of these quite 150 species were new to the avifauna of the India Empire.

Hodgson at one time contemplated published a work on the vertebrate fauna of Nepal, but this did not materialize, and the drawings, prepared by native artists under his supervision, were presented to the British Museum and the Zoological Society of London. The originals consisting 1,241 illustrations of birds and 567 of mammals, went to the Zoological Society, while 2,000 folio sheets, mostly copies, he handed over to the British Museum.

Subsequent to Hodgson further contributions to the State were made by John Scully, whose writings on the fauna of Nepal include a list of birds observed by him in Nepal during his two years of residence in the State (*Stray Feathers*, vol. viii, 1879). His notes have been a great assistance in compiling the present list of Nepalese birds. Mr. Herbert Stevens' Notes on the Birds of the Sikkim Himalayas, published in the Journal of the Bombay Natural History Society (Vols. xxix and xxx), were also instrumental in supplying information on the occurrence and altitudinal distribution of species which occur in the eastern limits of Nepal. Finally the collection of birds made in Nepal by Col. R.L. Kennion, C.I.E., F.Z.S., and the Society's collector, Baptista, in Nepal, during the years 1920 and 1921, which were examined and identified at the British Museum, were of value in confirming the status and distribution of a large number of species.

The Catalogue of the Hodgson collection published by the British Museum in 1863 (second edition) mentions

thirty-three species of reptiles. The species recorded as occurring within the State must form a very small proportion of the reptiles which actually occur, and in the present list we have indicated the species which, from their general geographical distribution, are likely to inhabit the country.

It should be noted, however, that, at the time when the catalogues of Hodgson's Nepal collections were compiled, insufficient attention was paid to the recording of the locality from which a specimen was obtained, and, as a result, a certain number of mammals, birds, and reptiles, obtained by Hodgson in Bihar and Sikkim, were included in the catalogues of his collections from Nepal.

Further it should be noted that these lists of specimens collected in Nepal and also subsequent collections refer mainly to the Valley of Kathmandu, Eastern Nepal and the Tarai, and practically nothing is known of the zoology of Central and Western Nepal.

To the naturalist Nepal, with its wonderful variety of climate and vegetation, is one of the most interesting countries in the world, for not only does its fauna vary with the wide range of altitude of its mountains, but it also varies strikingly as one proceeds from east to West.

The central position of Nepal in the Great Himalayan Chain makes it the meeting-ground of East and West Himalayan races, so that, without actual examination and comparison, it is impossible to assign correctly the race to which a given species belongs; in the accompanying list the racial status of the various species has been omitted except in instances where these have been verified.

In treating of its natural productions Hodgson found it convenient to divide the country into three zones or regions:

1. The Lower region includes the plains, the Tarai, and the forest-clad slopes of the lower hills up to an altitude of 4,000 feet.

2. The Central region comprises the high-lying valleys and central ranges of mountains from 4,000 to 10,000 feet.
3. The Northern or Alpine region contains the main Himalayan Chain towering from 10,000 to 29,000 feet.

These three zones support in general a fauna which is characteristic of three distinct zoo-geographical regions—the lowest is Cis-gangetic or Indian, the central is Trans-Gangetic or Himalayan, while the northern is mainly Palaeartic.

Hodgson's "lower region" consists of a strip of land some twenty to thirty miles wide forming the southern boundary of the State. It is composed partly of open flat country and partly of forest-covered hills and valleys. The richly cultivated plains of Nepal, which extend from the southern frontier of the State for about ten miles inland, are succeeded by a strip of low-lying land, which borders the forest and the foothills. This strip of low-lying land, which borders the forest and the foothills. This strip is the true Tarai, which, particularly in the Eastern portions of the State, is composed of swampy tracts, overrun with tall grass and rank vegetation. Beyond the Tarai the forest—the "*Jhari*" or "*Bhavar*" of the Nepalese—rises abruptly and stretches from east to west. It is composed mainly of Saletrees (*Shorea robusta*) intermingled with *Simal* (*Silk Cotton, Bombax malabaricum*) with a comparatively slight undergrowth of grass and scrub. This forest covers the slopes of the Siwaliks—the sand-stone range bordering the northern margin of the Tarai—and clothes the great sub-Himalayan valleys—the "duns", which lie beyond. Its climate is similar to that of the Indian plains with some increase of heat and a great excess of moisture. The fauna and flora it supports is similar in character to that which is to be found in the main Indian region. The Mammals which inhabit it are practically the same as those found in Bengal. Among the larger animals Elephant, Rhinoceros, and Sambhar are characteristic. With these occur Buffalo, Chital, Hog Deer and

Swamp Deer; in the hills the Indian Bison or Gaur replaces the Buffalo, and the characteristic swamp-living animals of the Tarai are of course absent.

The Bird life of this region is much the same as that found in the more humid forests of the Malabar Coast and Assam. It is rich in characteristic forms such as Hornbills, Barbets, Fruit Pigeons, Bulbuls, and Woodpeckers. In the cultivated area and on the edge of the forest some of the more common birds of the Indian plains are to be found, whilst many wading birds and water fowl spend the winter amongst its streams and marshes. A favourite haunt of these birds is a small but deep lake within the forest two or three miles west of Bichako, which Scully found tenanted during winter by great numbers of swimming birds. The cold season also occasions the migration to the lower region of many species which breed in the mountains and descend to the lower hills and plains for the winter.

The Reptiles include several species of lizards and snakes which are common in the main peninsula.

The central region is described as a "clusterous succession of mountains varying in elevation from 4,000-10,000 feet with a temperature from 10-20 degrees lower than the plains." It includes the Mahabharat range which rises to 8,000 feet to form a continuous barrier stretching across the country from east to west. At intervals this mountain wall is pierced by the gorges of transverse rivers. Between the Mahabharat range and the main Himalayan chain lies the great populous valley in which Kathmandu, the capital of Nepal, is situated. The valley is the best known part of the State. The fauna of the central zone is characteristically Himalayan. Many of the species occurring in this region, if not peculiar to Nepal, are at least peculiar to the State and neighbouring Himalayan provinces. The fauna is marked by the absence of characteristically Indian animals and by the presence of such forms as Ferrets, Badgers, Racoons, Crestless Porcupines, etc., which do not occur in the Indian peninsula, while whole genera of birds, such as *Yuhina*, *Siva*, *Minla*, *Ixulus*, etc., are nearly, if not quite, restricted to

this region. During migration many of the wading and swimming birds remain in the central Valley for short periods during their passage to and from the Indian plains. The majority of reptiles occurring in this zone are of purely Himalayan species.

Hodgson's northern region commences on the inner hills at about 11,000 feet and has nothing tropical about it except perhaps the succession of seasons. Within the zone the forest is principally composed of Coniferae. Scrubby Rhododendrons, etc., and it is not until we get above the tree level—about 12,000-13,000 feet—that any open country is found. In this region the fauna gradually changes, the oriental forms disappearing and being replaced by Palaeartic types. Among the characteristic larger animals are the Yak, Bharal, Ibex, and Tahr. The pine forests contain many species of Warblers, Tits, and Finches which breed here, but the various species of Laughing Thrushes which form so marked a feature of the bird life of the lower regions are conspicuous by their absence. In Eastern Nepal, however, the Black-faced Laughing Thrush (*T. affinis*) is found right up to the snow line. Above the tree limit birds become scarce. The kinds more commonly met with are Accentors, Ravens, Dippers, Wall-creepers and, that most beautiful of Alpine birds, Hodgson's Grandala (*G. Coelicolor*). The little Nepalese Wren (*T. nepalensis*) is found among the rocky cracks above 12,000 feet and flocks of Snow Pigeon (*C. leuconota*) are not uncommon. Monals, Tragopans, Blood and Cheer Pheasants, and Snow Cock occur within the zone.

GLOSSARY

<i>Adalat</i>	:	A Court of Law.
<i>Amban</i>	:	Chinese Viceroy
<i>Baisakh</i>	:	Beginning of Nepalese New Year.
<i>Baisi</i>	:	Twenty-two
<i>Bhansar</i>	:	Custom house
<i>Bharadar</i>	:	A high ranking official, a member of nobility.
<i>Bichari</i>	:	A Judge.
<i>Birta</i>	:	Lands grant by the State of individual, general on a tax-free basis.
<i>Brahmins</i>	:	Priestly class.
<i>Chaubisi</i>	:	Twenty-four
<i>Chowkidar</i>	:	Watchman
<i>Dasera</i>	:	Twenty-four
<i>Chowkidar</i>	:	Watchman
<i>Dasera</i>	:	A festival in honour to Goddess Durga, celebrates during October-November.
<i>Dhakareah</i>	:	Off-the-roll soldier.

<i>Dittha</i>	:	A high ranking officer in the judicial heirarchy.
<i>Duars</i>	:	Passes.
<i>Fauzdar</i>	:	A local functionary in the charge of revenue collection and other functions.
<i>Feringhees</i>	:	Foreigners.
<i>Gaddie</i>	:	Royal throne.
<i>Gossains</i>	:	Religious mendicants.
<i>Guru</i>	:	Religious preceptors.
<i>Harakaras</i>	:	A spy
<i>Holi</i>	:	A Spring festival.
<i>Indra-Jatra</i>	:	A religious procession in honour of Lord Indra.
<i>Jagirs</i>	:	A land assign to a Government employees or functionary as emoluments.
<i>Kazi</i>	:	A civil officer of ministerial rank.
<i>Kapardar</i>	:	The chief of the royal household.
<i>Kharidar</i>	:	A Civil Officer.
<i>Kharita</i>	:	A Civil Officer.
<i>Kharita</i>	:	It is a document similar to "latter patent" of English Constitutional Law.
<i>Khazanchi</i>	:	Treasurer.
<i>Kipat</i>	:	A form of customary communal land tenure system prevalent among the eastern hill regions including Kathmandu Valley.
<i>Kot-Linga</i>	:	The highest Court of Law in Nepal.
<i>Lal-Mohur</i>	:	Royal proclamation.

<i>Madhesis</i>	:	People of plain.
<i>Mukhtiar</i>	:	It is a Persian word which means "Competent to do", or the Commander-in-Chief.
<i>Munshi</i>	:	An official in-charge of correspondence in English or Persian.
<i>Pandit</i>	:	A religious priest.
<i>Panjani</i>	:	Annual renewal of tenure.
<i>Parbattiah</i>	:	Hillman.
<i>Puja</i>	:	Religious worship.
<i>Rani</i>	:	Queen
<i>Rajdhani</i>	:	State Capital.
<i>Sadar</i>	:	The Chief Station of District.
<i>Saddhu</i>	:	Hindu mendicants.
<i>Sayar</i>	:	To cover a variety of items of taxation and impost, other than land revenue.
<i>Sipahis</i>	:	Soldiers.
<i>Subba</i>	:	Headman of the Limbu community in the far eastern hill religion.
<i>Sunnad</i>	:	Deed of grant by the Government of Office, privilege or right.
<i>Taksal</i>	:	Mint.
<i>Tokadari</i>	:	Contract
<i>Tuddikhel</i>	:	A parade ground.
<i>Yaddast</i>	:	A Memorandum
<i>Zamindary</i>	:	A land-lord; and estate holder; a hereditary collector of revenue.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

A. Primary Sources

I. UNPUBLISHED

Government Records and Documents: English.

A. In the National Archives of India, New Delhi.

Foreign Political Consultations and Proceedings:
1816-1853.

Foreign Secret Consultations and Proceedings:
1816-1844.

Foreign Miscellaneous Political Records.

Political Letters to and from the Court of Directors: 1816-1844.

Secret Letters to and from the Court of Directors: 1816-1844.

The Governor General's Despatches to and from
and the Court of Directors, 1833-1844.

The Governor General's Confidential despatches
to and from the Court of Directors: 1833-1844.

Nepal Residency Records.

Resident's Diary from 1837-1840. Hodgson
manuscripts, Cleaveland Microfilm, No. 77, Roll-
8.

- B. In the National Archives of Nepal, Kathmandu: Nepali.

Government Records and Documents (selected documents only).

- C. In the West Bengal State Archives, Calcutta: English. (Selected documents only).

Indian Office Copies of Political Proceedings.

Government of Bengal Political Consultations.

Government of Bengal Judicial (Criminal) Proceedings.

II. PUBLISHED

Documents, Memoirs, Accounts, etc.

A. English

Aitchison, C.U., A Collection of Treaties, Engagement and Sunnads relating to Indian and Neighbouring Countries, Vol. II, Calcutta (1906) and Vol. XII, Calcutta (1931).

Campbell, A., Campbell's Sketches (vide Bikramjit Hasrat, History of Nepal, Punjab, 1971).

Cox, J.L., Papers Respecting the Nepaul War, London, 1824. (Reprint as Military History of Nepal, New Delhi, 1983).

Eden, A., Political Mission to Bhootan, Calcutta, 1865.

Ganguly, D.C., Select Documents of the British Period of Indian History, Calcutta, 1958.

Hodgson, B.H., Essay on the Language, Literature and Religion of Nepal and Tibet, London, 1874 (Reprint, New Delhi, 1972).

———, "On Administration of Justice" and Some Account of the system of Law and Police as Recognised in the State of Nepal", Asiatic Researches, Vol. XXII, 1836.

- Markham, Clements, *Narratives of the Mission of George Bogle to Tibet and of the Journey of Thomas Manning to Lhasa*, London, 1876.
- Nicollets, C.H., *Narratives of Events in Nepal from 1840 to 1850* (vide Bikramjit Hasrat, *History of Nepal, Punjab*, 1971).
- Pemberton, R.B., *Reports on Bootan*, Calcutta, 1839.
- Princep, H.T., *History of the Political and Military Transactions in India during the administration of the Marquis of Hastings, 1813-1823*, Vol. 2, London, 1825.
- Sinha, N.R., and Dasgupta, A.K. (ed.), *Selections from Ochterlony Papers (18181-1825)*, Calcutta, 1964.
- Tickell, J.R., *Excerpts from the Letters of the Resident at Kathmandu to Government, from 1830-1840* (vide Bikramjit Hasrat, *History of Nepal, Punjab*, 1971).
- Wheeler, J.T., *Diary of Events in Nepal, 1841-1846*, Calcutta, 1878.

B. Nepali

- Bajracharya, D., *Aitihāsik Patra Sangraha, Part I*, Kathmandu 2014, B.S.
- Bir Pustakalaya, *Aitihāsik Chittipatra Sangraha, Vols. 2*, Kathmandu, 2022, B.S.
- Narhari Nath Yogi, *Itihas Prakashna Sandi-Patra Sangraha*, Benaras, 2022, B.S.
- Nepal, J.B., *Aitihāsik Patrasangraha*, Kathmandu, 2014, B.S.
- Regmi, M.C., *Regmi Research Series. A Translation of Nepali Documents*, Issued monthly, Mimeograph.
- Tewari, R., *Aitihāsik Patra Sangraha, Part 2*, Kathmandu, 2016, B.S.
- (ed.), *Abhilekha Sangraha, Vol. I*. Kathmandu, 2018, B.S.

SECONDARY SOURCES**A. ENGLISH**

- Agarwal, Hemnarayan, *The Administrative System of Nepal-From Tradition to modernity*, New Delhi, 1976.
- Bahadur, Purna, *The Strategic Importance of Nepal, Nepal To-day*, April 1953.
- Bajpai, G.S., *Nepal and Indo-Nepalese Relations*, Indian Year Book of International Affairs, Madras, 1954.
- Ballantine, Henry, *Our India's Frontier: On Nepal: the Gurkhas Mysterious Land*, New York, 1895.
- , *The Land of the Gurkhas*, Harper's New Monthly Magazine, No. 78, 1889.
- Bell, Charles, *Tibet, Past and Present*, Oxford, 1924.
- Bendall, C., *A Journey of Literary and Archeological Research in Nepal and Northern India*, Oxford, 1886.
- Barat, Amitya, *The Bengal Native Infantry, Its Organisation and Discipline, 1796-1852*, Calcutta, 1962.
- Bayley, S.F., *Kathmandu, the Capital of Nepal*, Calcutta, 1918.
- Banerjee, N.N., *Nepal - The Hindu Kingdom: The Himalayas in and Across*, Calcutta, 1937.
- Benadach, W., *An Inquiry into the State of the Indian Army*, London, 1826.
- Bishop, R.N.W., *Unknown Nepal*, London, 1952.
- Bista, D.B., *People of Nepal*, Kathmandu, 1967.
- Bolt, David, *Gurkhas*, London, 1967.
- Bredin, A.E.C., *The Happy Warriors*, Dorset, 1961.
- Brown, Percy, *Pictureque Nepal*, London, 1912.
- Bruce, C.G., *Nepal and Sikkim, Twenty Years in the Himalayas*, London, 1910.

- Buchanan (Hamilton) Dr. Francis, *An Account of the Kingdom of Nepal*, New Delhi (reprint), 1971.
- Buckland, C.E., *Dictionary of Indian Biography*, London, 1906.
- Bose, S.C., *Geography of Himalaya*, New Delhi, 1983.
- Camman, Schuyler, *Trade Through the Himalayas*, Princeton, 1951.
- Candler, E., *Bengal Native Army*, Calcutta, 1903.
- Cavenagh, Orfeur, *Rough Notes on the state of Nepal: Its Government, Army and Resources*, Calcutta, 1851.
- , *Reminiscences of an Indian Official*, London 1884.
- Chauduri, K.C., *Anglo-Nepalese Relations*, Calcutta, 1960.
- Choudhury, Roy, P.C., "Early Indo-Nepal Relations", *Bengal Past and Present*, 74 (July-December) 1955.
- Cobbet, Pitt, *Leading Cases on International law*, London, 1922.
- Colchester, Lord (ed.), *History of the Indian administration of Lord Ellenborough in his Correspondences with the Duke of Wellington*, London, 1874.
- Cooper, T.T., *Travels of a pioneer of Commerce*, London, 1871.
- Cunningham, A., *Ladhak: Physical, Statistical and historical*, London, 1854.
- Das, Sarat Chandra, *The Commerce of Tibet*, Calcutta, 1883.
- Davis, Hass
- Datta, K.K., "Some unpublished letters relating to Anglo-Nepalese Relations in the beginning of the 19th Century", *the Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society*, September-December, 1939.
- Davis, Hassoldt, *Nepal, Land of Mystery: Adventures in Burman, China, India and the Kingdom of Nepal*, London, 1942.

- Desai, W.S., *History of the British Residency in Burma: 1826-1840*, Fernham, 1972 (Reprint).
- Dhanalaxmi, R., *British Attitude to Nepal's Relations with Tibet and China, 1814-1914*, New Delhi, 1981.
- Diskalkar, K.K., "Tibeto-Nepalese War, 1788-1793". the journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society, December 1933.
- Driver, Maud, Honoria Lawrence - *A Fragment of Indian history*, London, 1936.
- Duncan, Forbes, *Jhoney Gorkhas*, New Delhi, 1972.
- Dutta, C.L., *Ladhak and Western Himalaya Politics*, New Delhi, 1973.
- Edgar, J.W., *Report on a visit to Sikkim and the Tibetan Frontier*, Calcutta, 1874.
- Edwards, H.B., and Merivale, H., *Life of Sir Henry Lawrence*, London, 1873.
- Farwell, Byron, *The Gurkhas*, London, 1985.
- Fisher, Margarent and Rose, Leo E., *England, India, Nepal, Tibet, China, 1765-1958*, Berkeley, 1963.
- Fortesque, J.W., *History of the British Army*, Vol. IX, London, 1930.
- Franke, A.H., *A History of Ladhak*, New Delhi, 1977.
- Gaige Frederick, H., *Regionalism and National Unity in Nepal*, California, 1975.
- Gibbs, H.R.K., *the Gurkha Soldiers*, Calcutta, 1944.
- Gimlettee, G.H.D., *Nepal and the Nepalese*, London, 1928.
- Gruseppe, Father, "An Account of the Kingdom of Nepal", *Asiatic Researches*, Vol. 2, 1790 (Reprinted 1983).
- Gupta, H.R., "Sikh-Nepal Relations, 1839-40", *Proceedings of the Indian Historical Records Commission*, Vol. 30, Part-II (Hyderabad, 1954).
- Gupta, Anirudha, *Politics in Nepal*, New Delhi, 1964.

- Hagen, Toni, *Nepal, the Kingdom in the Himalayas*, Herne, 1961.
- Hall, D.G.E., *Henry Burney: A Political Biography*, Oxford, 1974.
- Hau, W.E., *A Treaties an International Law*, London, 1924.
- Hasrat, B.J., *History of Nepal: As Told by the Own and Contemporary Chronicles*, Punjab, 1970.
- Hooker, Sir Joseph Dalton, "On Notes of a Naturalist", *The Himalayan Journal*, 1891.
- Hunter, W.W., *Life of Brian Houghton Hodgson*, London, 1896.
- , *Imperial Gazetteer of India*, Vol. XIX, Oxford, 1908.
- Hussain, Asad, *British India's Relations with the Kingdom of Nepal*, London, 1970.
- Hussain, Imdad, *Problems of Defence North-East Frontier 1822-1866*, Gauhati University, 1975 (unpublished Ph.D. Thesis).
- Huttenback, R.A., "Gulab Singh and the creation of the Dogra State of Jammu and Kashmir and Ladhak", *Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 20, 1961.
- Imlah, A., *Lord Ellenborough*, London, 1939.
- Jain, M.S., *The Emergence of New Aristocracy in Nepal*, Agra, 1972.
- Karan, P.P. *Nepal, A Cultural and Physical Geography*, Lexington, 1960.
- Karan, P.P. and Jankins, W.M., *The Himalayan Kingdom: Bhutan, Sikkiam, and Nepal*, Lexington, 1963.
- Kaye, J.W. (ed.), *The Life and Correspondences of Charles Metcalf*, Vols. 2, London, 1858.
- , *Selections from the Papers of Lord Metcalf*, London, 1875.

- Krikpatrick, W., *An Account of the Kingdom of Nepal*, London, 1911.
- Lamb, Alistair, *Britain and Chinese Central Asia - the road to Lhasa*, London, 1960.
- Lamb, A., "Tibet in Anglo-Chinese Relations, 1767-1842", *The Journal of the royal Asiatic society of Great Britain and Ireland*, December 1957 and April 1958.
- Landon, P., *Nepal*, 2 Vols. London, 1928.
- Law, A., *India under Lord Ellenborough*, London, 1926.
- Low, D.A., *Lion Rampant, Essay in the Study of British Imperialism*.
- Lorraine, Peter, F., *The 1st king George's Own Gurkha Rifles: The Maulana Regiment, 1815-1921*, London, 1925.
- MacMunn, George, *The Martial Races of India*, London reprinted, New Delhi, 1972.
- Mason, K., "A Note on the Nepal Himalaya", *The Himalayan Journal*, 1934.
- Mitra, Rajendralal, *The Sanskrit Buddhist Literature of Nepal*.
- Mitra, K.P., "Anglo-Nepalese Treaty of Commerce, 1772", *Bengal Past and Present*, July-December 1941.
- Mojumdar, K., *Anglo-Nepalese Relations in the nineteenth Century*, Calcutta, 1973.
- , *Political Relations between Indian and Nepal, 1877-1923*, New Delhi, 1972.
- Morris, C.J., *The Gurkhas: A Handbook for the Indian Army*, Delhi, 1933.
- Northy, W.B., *the Land of the Gurkhas*, Cambridge, 1937.
- , and Morris, C.J., *the Gurkhas, their Manners, Customs and Country*, London, 1928.
- Morrison, J.L., *Lawrence of Lucknow*, London, 1934.

Munshi, D.N., *Foreign Policy of Nepal*, Delhi, 1973.

Narain, V.A., *Johnathan Duncan and Varanasi*, Calcutta, 1959.

Narayan, S., *India and Nepal*, Bombay, 1970.

Nepali, G.S., *The Newars*, Bombay, 1965.

Oldfield, H.A., *Sketches from Nepal*, 2 Vols., London, 1880 (reprint New Delhi, 1974).

O'Mally, *Bengal District Gazetteer-Champaran*, 1907.

Oppenheim, L., *International Law-A Treaties*, 1955.

Pannikar, K.M., *The Relations of the Indian States with the Government of India*, London, 1927.

———, *The Evolution of British Policy towards Indian States, 1774-1858*, Calcutta, 1929.

Pemble, John, *the Invasion of Nepal*, Oxford University Press, 1971.

Poynder, F.S., *the 9th Gurkha Rifles: 1817-1936*, London, 1937.

Philips. C.H., *the Correspondences of Lord William Bentinck.*, 2 Vols., Oxford University Press, 1977.

Rahul, Ram, *The Himalaya Borderland*, New Delhi, 1970.

———, *The Himalaya as a Frontier*, New Delhi, 1978.

Ramakant, *Indo-Nepalese Relations*, New Delhi, 1968.

———, *Nepal-China and India*, New Delhi, 1976.

Rana Padma Jung Samser, *Life of Jang Bahadur Rana of Nepal*, Allahabad, 1909 (Ed. A.C. Mukherjee).

Rawat, P.C., *Indo-Nepal-Economic Relations*, New Delhi, 1974.

Regmi, D.R., *Modern Nepal*, Calcutta, 1960.

———, *A Century of Autocracy in Nepal*, Kathmandu, 1958.


- , *Political and Economic History of Nepal*, Vols. 4, Calcutta, 1959.
- Regmi, M.C., *Land Tenure and Taxation in Nepal*, 4 Vols. Berkeley, 1968.
- , *A Study in Nepali Economic History*, New Delhi, 1971.
- Rose, Leo E., *Nepali: Strategy for Survival*, Berkeley, 1971.
- , and Scholz, J.T., *Nepal: Profile of Himalayan Kingdom*, New Delhi, 1980.
- Sanwal, B.D., *Nepal and the East India Company*, Bombay, 1965.
- Satish Kumar, *Rana Policy in Nepal: Its Origin and Growth*, New Delhi, 1967.
- Satish Kumar, "The Nepalese Monarchy from 1769 to 1951", *International Studies*.
- Sen, Jahar, *Indo-Nepal Trade in the Nineteenth Century*, Calcutta, 1977.
- Shakespeare, L.W., *History of the 2nd King Edward's Own Gurkha Rifles (Sirmoor Rifles)* 2 Vols. London, 1912.
- Shah, R., *Nepali Political: Retrospect and Prospect*, Delhi, 1975.
- , *An Introduction of Nepal*, Kathmandu, 1976.
- Spake, O.H.K., Learmouth, ATA and Farner, B.H., *India, Pakistan and Ceylon: The Regions Part IV*, New Delhi, 1967 (Reprint).
- Shrestha, B.P., *An Introduction to the Nepalese Economy*, Kathmandu, 1974.
- , *Kusum, Monarchy in Nepal: Tribhuvan Era*, Bombay, 1984.
- , M.K., *A Handbook of Public Administration in Nepal*, Kathmandu, 1975.

- Sinha, A.C., *Studies in the Himalayan Communities*, New Delhi, 1983.
- Sinha, S.N., "A Survey of Internal History of Nepal, 1767-1847", *Journal of Historical Research*, Bihar University, Vol. II, 1960.
- Stiller, Ludwig, F., *The Rise of the House of Gorkha*, Patna, 1973.
- , *The Silent Cry: The People of Nepal: 1816-1839*, Kathmandu, 1976.
- Temple, R., *Journals Kept in Hyderabad, Kashmir, Sikkim and Nepal*, 2 Vols, London, 1887 (reprint).
- Thompson, E., *Life of Lord Metcalf*, London, 1937.
- Thompson, E., *the Making of the Indian Princes*, Oxford, 1943.
- , and Garratt, G.T., *Rise and Fulvilment of British Rule in India*, London, 1935.
- Tucker, Francis, *Gorkha, the Story of the Gorkhas in Nepal*, London, 1957.
- Tyagi, Sushila, *Indo-Nepalese Relations, 1858-1914*, New Delhi, 1974.
- Vansittart, E., *Notes on Gurkhas*, Calcutta, 1890.
- , *Gurkhas, Handbook for the Indian Army*, Calcutta, 1915.
- Wheeler, J.T., *A Short History of Indian and the frontier States of Afghanistan, Nipal and Burma*, London, 1899.
- White, J.C., *Sikkim and Bhutan*, London 1909.
- Westlake, J., *International Law*, Cambridge, 1910.
- Wood, H.B., *Nepal Bibliography*, Oregon, 1959.
- Woodman, Dorothy, *The Making of Burma*, London, 1962.
- Woodyatt, N.G., *Regimental History of the 3rd Queen Alexandra's Own Gurkha Rifles*, London, 1923.

- Wright, D. (ed.), *History of Nepal*, Cambridge, 1877.
- Wanner, W.Lee, *The Native States of India*, London, 1910.
- Yapp, M.E., *Strategies of British India, Britain, Iran and Afghanistan, 1790-1850*, Oxford, 1980.
- Yule, H. and Burrell, A.C., *Hobson-Jobson*, London, 1969.
- B. NEPALI**
- Acharya, Baburam, *China ra Tibbat Sita Nepal ko Sambandh*, Kathmandu.
- Acarya, Baburam, "Bhim Sen Thapa ko Patan", *Pragati*, No. 10.
- , *Nepal ko Sangchipta Brittant*, Kathmandu, 2022 B.S.
- Bandari, D.R., *Nepal ko Aitihāsik Bivechanna*, Benaras, 1959.
- Dixit, Kama, (ed.), *Jung Bahadur ko Vilayat Yatra*, Kathmandu, 2014 B.S.
- Dwevedi, Bhagawan, *Nepal ko Naveen Itihas*, Birganj, 1955.
- Itihas Prakashan* 4 Vols. Kathmandu, 2011-12 B.S.
- Itihas Sansodhan*, Kathmandu, 2009 B.S.
- Gyawali, Surya, V., *Amar Singh Thapa*, Darjeeling, 1943.
- Nepali Chittaranjan, *General Bhim Sen Thapa ra Tatkalin Nepal*, Kathmandu 2013 B.S.
- , "Nepal Aur British Samrajya", *Sharda*, 21, 1 (1956).
- Pande, Totra Raj and Naya Raj Pant, *Nepal ko Sankshipta Itihas*, Benaras, 2004 B.S.
- Sharma, Balchandra, *Nepal ko Aitihāsik Ruprekha*, Benaras, 2008 B.S.
- Upadhyaya, A.P., *Nepal ko Itihas*, Benaras, 1979.
- , R., *Nepal Digdarshan*, Benaras, 1950.
- Varma, Jagan Mohan, *Rana Jung Bahadur*, Benaras, 1915.

Yogi, Narhari Nath, *Gorkhaliharuko Sainik Itihas*,
Kathmandu, 2011 B.S.

———, and Acharya Bauram, *Rastripita Sri Panch Bada
Maharaj Prithvinarayan Shahko Divyopadesha*,
Kathmandu, 2014 B.S.



Sketch Map of Tibet.



Dr. K.L. Pradhan (b. 1955) is serving currently as Reader, Department of History, Government Aizawl College, Aizawl. He graduated from Pachhunga Memorial Govt. College, Aizawl with Honours in History, in 1975. He passed his M.A. in 1979 securing 1st rank and a gold medal. As recipient of a UGC scholarship he joined the M.Phil. program and on completion in 1982, he continued for his Ph.D. which he obtained from NEHU, Shillong in 1987. Beginning his career as a lecturer in Govt. Zirtiri Women's College, Aizawl in 1984 he moved on to his present post in July, 2000.

Besides his normal duties, Dr. Pradhan takes active part in social services. He was the founder President of Mizoram Gorkha Youth Association (MGYA). He is also actively involved in Mizoram College Teacher's Association and was General Secretary for two terms (1987-1990). He is life member of North East India History Association (NEIHA), and member of Institute of Quarterly Historical Review, Calcutta as well as Mizo History Association, Aizawl, and is presently a member of the Academic Council, NEHU, Shillong.